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7 October 1983

NEAR EAST/SOUTH ASIA REPORT

No. 2834

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INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

IRAQ, EGYPT POSTPONE RAPPROCHEMEENT

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 24 Jul 83 p 3

[Article: "Whole Story of Egyptian-Iraqi Rapprochement: Why Discussion of Restoring Diplomatic Relations Has Been Posponed; Details of Results of Iraqi Foreign Minister's Visit to Cairo"]

[Text] Cairo, office of AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT--For 3 days, from 3 to 5 July, Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq 'Aziz held intensive talks with Egyptian President Husni Mubarak and senior officials in Cairo. This is considered the first visit by a senior Iraqi official to Cairo in about 8 years. This crowns the rapprochement which has come about between Egypt and Iraq during the past 2 years. The rapprochement has stirred conjecture about the approaching return of relations between Cairo and Baghdad. This visit has also raised the question of Egyptian-Arab relations again and the difficulties which have still prevented any other senior Arab official from visiting Cairo since the beginning of the Arab boycott of Egypt, since the visit of Moroccan Foreign Minister Muhammad Boucetta on 7 June 1982. The feeling prevailing now in Cairo is that Egypt's return to the Arab rank has often been delayed, in contrast to expectations immediately after Mubarak took over the presidency in Cairo. Therefore, the Iraqi foreign minister's visit to Cairo has raised questions about the future of Egyptian-Iraqi relations in particular, and Egyptian-Arab relations in general. This question calls for shedding light on the dimensions of the current rapprochement betewen Cairo and Baghdad.

How Did Rapprochement Come About?

It is well-known that Iraq was one of the first Arab states which broke off relations with Egypt immediately after al-Sadat's initiative in November 1977. Indeed, the leadership of the Iraqi Ba'th Party condemned this initiative immediately after it was announced and before al-Sadat arrived in occupied Jerusalem. They issued a statement on 16 November 1977 in which they described the visit as "a serious deviation about which we cannot keep silent."

Iraq participated in establishing the "Confrontation and Resistance Front" against Egypt, which held its first conference in Tripoli on 2 December 1977. However, it did not take long before Iraq withdrew

from the Front under the influence of traditional differences between Baghdad and Damascus. Iraq's withdrawal did not prevent it from continuing to boycott Egypt and condemning al-Sadat's subsequent steps. Camp David and the Egyptian-Israeli treaty moved the Iraqi government to call for a meeting of the council of the Arab League on the level of foreign ministers and ministers of economy. This was held in Baghdad on 27 March 1979, immediately after the signing of the treaty between Egypt and Israel.

This meeting produced resolutions for a complete Arab boycott of Egypt. Thus, the Iraqi position toward the Egyptian-Israeli peace was more intense than the positions of most of the Arab states. In spite of that, Iraq was one of the first Arab states which observers expected to restore relations with Egypt (in addition to Morocco and Jordan).

The special conditions which Iraq has faced because of the war with Iran have created a suitable opportunity for a gradual rapprochement with Egypt. Cairo's trend toward supporting Iraq has been clear since the beginning of this war, in spite of the public position of neutrality which Egypt has taken. It did not take long before Cairo objected to Iranian charges that it was giving military support to Iraq.

In the beginning Cairo tried to deny these accusations officially, as it did on 14 September 1980 when the Egyptian Ministry of Defense announced that "there is absolutely no truth to reports from Tehran that some Egyptian soldiers are fighting with Iraqi forces against Iran." In spite of that, it was well-known then that Cairo had sent quantities of arms and ammunition. After that, it was learned that there were Egyptian volunteers actually fighting with the Iraqi forces.

Rapid Development

Thus, the Iraqi-Iranian war was the direct factor behind the beginning of the Egyptian-Iraqi rapprochement. The special relationship which linked al-Sadat with the former Shah of Iran made him oppose the Khomeini regime. In the Gulf war, al-Sadat found an opportunity to bring down this regime, according to his announcement of 28 September 1980 when he said: "The Iraqi-Iranian war represents an opportunity to get rid of the Khomeyni regime. The possibility of a military coup in Iran is something to be mentioned after this war." At the same time, al-Sadat found in this war an opportunity to rebuild bridges with Iraq. On 1 October 1980 he announced: "Egypt is willing to help any Arab state in the Gulf whose sovereignty is threatened." He meant Iraq, of course, and it was actually confirmed when an Iraqi military delegation visited Cairo secretly in early March 1981 to reach agreement on purchasing some Soviet weapons no longer needed by Egypt. However, al-Sadat did not openly acknowledge that until the end of March, when he said: "Egypt has sold quantities of arms and ammunition to Iraq, in recognition of its position in the October War."

However, the Egyptian-Iraqi rapprochement remained limited until President Mubarak took over in fall 1982. Mubarak took a bigger step toward supporting Iraq when he announced before the Egyptian People's Assembly on 14 March 1982: "Our sympathies are with Iraq in the Gulf War, and we will not hesitate to do what we can."

This development in the Egyptian position was linked with the appearance of predictions about the restoration of Egyptian-Arab relations after the completion of the Israeli withdrawal from Sinai. It became clear that Iraq is one of the Arab states which supports restoring relations with Egypt as soon as possible.

Then former Iraqi Foreign Minister Saydun Hamadi announced on 11 May 1982: "The Arab nation does not want to continue excluding Egypt from the Arab ranks. When Iraqi President Saddam Husayn was asked about this several days later, he replied: "If President Mubarak takes one step toward restoring Arab relations with Egypt, then the Arab states must take two steps."

The following period saw high-level contacts between Cairo and Baghdad. Mubarak received the first message from Saddam Husayn on 4 July 1982 concerning the nonaligned summit, which was scheduled to be held in Baghdad before it was agreed to transfer it to New Delhi. Cairo wanted to coordinate with Baghdad on the eve of this summit conference. Mubarak then sent two delegates (Dr Butrus Ghali and Dr Asamah al-Baz) to Baghdad last February. The nonaligned summit in New Delhi on 7 March 1983 was the occasion of Mubarak's first meeting with Taha Ma'ruf, Iraqi vice-president and head of his country's delegation to the summit.

When Will Relations Be Restored?

This Egyptian-Iraqi rapprochement reached its peak with the arrival of Tariq 'Aziz, Iraqi foreign minister and deputy prime minister, to Cairo on the morning of 3 July 1983. President Mubarak received him immediately, announcing that talks would center on developing bipartite relations between the two countries. The senior Iraqi official held several sessions of talks with senior political and military officials in Cairo. That was accompanied by predictions about the approaching restoration of official relations between Egypt and Iraq.

Most Israeli newspapers expressed their apprehension about this development. Then the newspaper YEDI'OT AHARONOT, which is linked with Begin's government, published news of the visit over three columns on the front page under the headline: "Iraq Rebuilds Bridges of Complete Diplomatic Relations With Egypt." However, it soon became clear that the question of restoring diplomatic relations between Egypt and Iraq is still premature.

Nevertheless, it is certain that the visit resulted in bringing the points of view of Cairo and Baghdad closer together. Indeed, the two parties announced similar positions on several questions concerning the Middle East crisis and the Palestinian question. The Iraqi minister said: "We agree on many details concerning the dangers which threaten the Arab nations and the steps which the Arab leaders must take in the next stage."

Results of Visit

From the practical aspect, the visit produced agreement on a number of steps considered to be a turning point for relations between the two countries. The most important are:

Increasing working members of the offices in charge of Egyptian and Iraqi interests in Baghdad and Cairo.

Exchanging visits between ministers of the two states in the economic, agricultural and technical sectors.

Having the Iraqi Rafidayn Bank resume its activities in Cairo.

Encouraging the Joint Egyptian-Iraqi Committee for Economic and Technical Cooperation.

Strengthening cooperation between the Egyptian and Iraqi armed forces.

It is clear that these steps mean that Iraq is ending the boycott which it helped to impose on Egypt since the beginning of the Egyptian-Israeli peace. That means that the recent Egyptian-Iraqi meeting has led toward restoring natural relations between the two countries. These relations lack only the resumption of complete diplomatic representation.

However, it appears that this is still surrounded by difficulties attributable to the Arab situation in general. It is well-known that some Arab states still oppose restoring relations with Egypt, which prevents a unanimous Arab decision in this matter. Without this unanimity, it is difficult for states supporting the restoration of relations with Egypt to take the initiative in this field. Nevertheless, it is natural that the effects of the Egyptian-Israeli rapprochement should reflect on Egyptian-Arab relations. This is what Egyptian Foreign Minister Kamal Hasan 'Ali was saying when he stated: "There is no doubt that Tariq 'Aziz's visit, within the framework of continuous consultations, is a step toward relations with Iraq and a step forward for Arab relations with Egypt." The Iraqi minister also called for a new formula for Arab relations, since the traditional formula failed to meet the challenges before the Arab nation.

Thus, the question of restoring Egyptian-Arab relations remains subject to the general climate in the Arab world. It is certain that preserving Arab solidarity requires that this question does not become the focus of new disputes among Arab states. An Egyptian-Arab dialogue may be the beginning of a solution to this problem.

7587
CSO: 4404/536

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

FIRST STAGE OF ECONOMIC AGREEMENT IMPLEMENTED

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 182, 6-12 Aug 83 p 45

[Article: "Gulf Cooperation Council: Second Stage of the Agreement To Begin This Fall"]

[Text] The second stage in the implementation of the unified economic agreement of the GCC states will begin in September. A key feature of this stage is the standardization of customs fees. When this agreement established the infrastructures for unified economic integration leading to a Gulf common market, the future of Gulf cooperation came to depend in the long run on the success of the experience of applying the agreement. What has been accomplished in practical terms during the first stage of the agreement?

The most significant results achieved by the first stage of Gulf economic integration were as follows:

--The conversion of the Saudi Arabian Organization for Specifications and Standards into a Gulf organization concerned with establishing specifications and standards in the GCC states. Its specifications are compulsory in nature and thus ensure standardization of specifications for industrial production in the GCC states, on the one hand, and the homogeneity of products imported into these states, on the other.

--The elimination of customs fees on products produced within the member states.

--The institution of a transit system similar to the European T.I.R. system.

--The authorization of all members of the professions such as doctors, engineers, pharmacists, and technicians to pursue their professions in all GCC states on an equal footing with citizens of the host state.

--The authorization of citizens of the GCC states to practice certain economic activities on an equal footing with citizens of the host member state. These activities are as follows: industrial activity, agricultural activity, animal husbandry, fishing and contracting.

--The preparation of a model technology purchase contract as a standard for dealings with other states in the fields of petrochemicals, refineries, electric power plants and water purification stations.

--The preparation of studies for the construction of a rapid transit line connection the member states and extending from Kuwait to Muscat; study of the possibility of establishing a marine company for the ocean line connecting the chief cities and ports of the GCC states and the possibility of linking the GCC states with a railroad network.

--The formation of industrial coordination committees particularly for industries in which duplication could be a problem, such as the cement, iron and steel, aluminum and petrochemicals industries. In this connection, an agreement to freeze the issuance of new licences in the cement industry has been reached.

--The formulation of a unified veterinary agricultural quarantine plan.

--The formulation of a new schedule for airline flights of the three Gulf companies--namely, Saudi Airlines, Kuwait Airlines and Gulf Airlines--with the aim of increasing the number of flights among the capitals and major cities of the Gulf states and linking them throughout the day.

Completion of Projects

The implementation of the first stage of the unified economic agreement was accompanied by the establishment of a number of joint Gulf companies and projects, including the following:

--Arab Investment Company (al-Riyad).

--Arab General Investments Company (UAE).

--Gulf Insurance Federation Company (Bahrain).

--Arab Reinsurance Group (Bahrain)

--United Arab Shipping Company (Kuwait).

--International Gulf Bank (Bahrain).

--Scrap Aluminum Project (Bahrain).

This reflects the support of the Gulf investor for the course of economic integration. However, this support does not mean the complete absence of regional obstacles to integration. On the contrary, the main challenge facing the implementation of the second stage of the agreement could be the containment of the local interests of the member states which are still in opposition to the course of integration.

In view of the fact that the Gulf private sector is the sector most affected--and having the most affect--by the implementation of the agreement, this sector has expressed its fears on behalf of its local regional interests due to the economic laws and regulations that will be issued by the GCC states in the future. These fears led it to the point of demanding that it be given the

opportunity to "study the bills and economic legislation before they are issued, express opinions concerning them, and explore the problems and difficulties that could appear if they are put into effect."

The chambers of commerce of the GCC states believe that one of the means of encouraging the private sector to establish joint projects is to ensure that the economic benefits of these projects coincide with the development plans and that the projects preserve the principle of reducing differences in growth rates and development priorities among the member states and local development priorities within them. These chambers are afraid of the effects of the economic unification of the GCC states on equivalent and similar projects in the member states, which have multiplied in recent times due to the absence of development coordination.

Gradual Implementation

In light of these reservations, and in view of the probability of negative effects on the group of producers who have been put into unequal competitive positions by the economic conditions and investment laws in their countries, most of the chambers of the member states have expressed a preference for adopting the principle of gradual implementation of the elimination of customs barriers on goods that have mutual national origins among the member states during a specified time period. They recommend that during this period, the member states be permitted to protect products as their interests dictate and that a maximum level of protection be established with regard to the level of customs fees and the allowable time period for protection. During this period, the states can work toward the standardization of the laws and regulations pertaining to investment to prepare a suitable climate for equal competition among the units of production in the various member states.

In the agricultural field, the private sector in the GCC states are afraid of the effects of allowing a citizen of one of the GCC states to own agricultural land in any other member state--Saudi Arabia, for example--and conduct agricultural activities in it, taking advantage of all the types of support offered by this state. They are concerned that because of the differences in standards from one GCC state to another, the farmers might be attracted to the state that provides the most generous support.

On the threshold of implementation of the second phase of the economic agreement, the challenges that face the GCC appear to involve a race with time. The GCC is hopeful that it can find solutions to these challenges through two means. The first is the committee it formed at the minister-of-justice level and charged with exploring the matter of giving priority to the provisions of the unification agreement should it be in conflict with the local laws and regulations of the member states. The second means is the expanded meetings among representatives of the chambers of commerce and industry and officials of these sectors. Until the public and private sectors come together on common denominators in the process of implementing the second phase of the agreement, this phase will apparently be the main challenge in the course of economic integration of the GCC states.

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GULF STATES' PLANS TO COMBAT OIL SLICK

London AL-MAJALLAH in Arabic No 183, 13-19 Aug 83 pp 34, 38

[Article: "What Are the Gulf States' Plans to Combat the Increasing Danger of the Oil Slick"]

[Text] Despite the fact that the environmental protection experts in the Arab Gulf states, in their recent meeting in Bahrain, adopted the first joint regional plan to combat the oil slick, with everyone committed to begin implementation as soon as 'Id al-Fitr was over, days have passed and the plan still awaits the approval of the member states, even though their representatives adopted it. It is assumed that the Ministerial Council will meet to adopt it and to discuss the shares of the member states in its budget, which will approach \$10 million. Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and Bahrain have agreed to share in financing this plan.

The danger of the oil slick in Gulf waters is increasing day after day, since it is pouring out at a rate of not less than 4,000 barrels a day. It is expected that these amounts will multiply, following the collapse of the two platforms currently burning. The oil slick threatens the shores of the Arab Gulf and the desalinization facilities, electrical power plants, factories and ports on them, in addition to its affecting the fish and water life. Great numbers of these creatures have begun to show up dead along the coasts of the Gulf states, while some have banned fishing in regional waters for fear of poisoning. Unless we expedite taking practical steps to combat the spread of this oil slick, will this plan be implemented and its results proved beneficial, given the changes of the oil during the next few months, the changing climate of the Gulf and its sea breezes, which will naturally affect the direction of the slick? In response to these questions, Mr Khalid Fakhru, director of the Joint Operations Center of the Regional Environmental Protection Organization, said: "The basic problem that we are facing is a lack of precise information concerning the rates of flow and direction of the slick, because the fields and the biggest part of the escaping oil are in the area of military operations between Iraq and Iran, and naturally, they are areas that we cannot get near.

"Any job we do is an effort, in light of what we are allowed to do. Everyone knows that the basic solution to this problem involves capping the wells from which the oil is escaping. However, so far we have not

obtained approval from Iraq and Iran to do that and consequently, we can only operate outside the area of operations at the closest point to the damaged fields and combat the slick out at sea, in order to lessen the danger that great quantities of it will reach the shoreline. This is what the joint regional plan envisions, which was adopted recently by the technicians in Bahrain. Its point of departure is a comprehensive aerial and naval survey, to be undertaken by Saudi Arabia and Iran, in order to observe the large oil slicks in the southern area of the Noruz field. Samples would be taken and analyzed, and then these large slicks would be accumulated in an imaginary square delineated by the experts, with a length of 75 miles and a width of 70 miles, extending from the Iranian Marjan field to 15 miles south of the Arabian Peninsula. After that, the process of sucking up and cleaning the Gulf waters of the oil collected in this imaginary square would begin."

Khalid Fikhru said: "In the event this regional plan is carried out, it will be done as a small experimental plan on a limited scale, in order to learn the extent of the capability of the equipment and technical resources or the plans available to us the biggest of the oil slicks on the surface of the Gulf waters. It has been decided to continue the anti-oil slick operations out at sea, until we reach the conviction that it is impossible to continue implementation, either for economic or technical or other reasons." He added that in the event the organization did not receive the approval of the member states and, consequently, could not implement the plan, the organization's experts would meet again to consider other methods of combating the oil slick through concentrating on protecting the shores from pollution, instead of fighting it out at sea.

More Than an Oil Slick

On the other hand, some of the area states have confirmed that the oil coming up on their beaches was not Iranian oil, but rather, it was from the residue of the waste products discharged from some oil tankers and consequently, an increase in the rate of pollution in the area. 'Abd al-Latif al-Zaydan, the general coordinator for the Regional Maritime Environmental Protection Agency, said: "The agency has prepared an integrated project to build a center to receive ballast water in the area states, to deal with the problem of oil tankers dumping their ballast water into the Gulf. Currently, each state in the region is intensifying surveillance in their regional waters over oil tankers anchored there, to prevent them from dumping their wastes and ballast water into the Gulf. However, unfortunately, some of them wait until they are out on the open Gulf to get rid of their waste products."

'Abd al-Latif al-Zaydan confirmed the existence of some objections on the part of member states to the regional plan, which was supposed to have been approved within 3 weeks at most from the time it was adopted, but that has not happened, in order to ignore some detailed matters in the plan, including the time period decreed for the cleaning operations,

apart from their not providing equipment available in the area states for the plan, the cost of which was estimated at about \$10 million. Concerning the amount of oil that has so far escaped, he said that the minimum estimate was more than 1 million tons. The direction of the oil slick currently depends on the movement of winds and water currents, which have helped to delay the arrival of large quantities of oil to area beaches. He added that there are more than one slick, varying in size, and not just one large slick, because the well from which the oil is leaking is located out at sea at a depth of 30 feet under the surface of the Gulf. He said that the agency was currently considering a comprehensive study of the effects of oil pollution on sources of water, electricity and fish resources in the Gulf.

The Biggest Danger

Khalid Fakhru said: "The biggest danger that we fear is the collapse of the two platforms that are currently burning. It is possible that, with that, the daily rate of oil flowing out of the damaged Iranian fields will increase to 18,000 barrels a day. At that point, we would reach the stage of greatest danger. As for now, the rate of oil escaping fluctuates between 4 and 5,000 barrels a day, and the biggest part of this is in Iranian waters near the fields. We thank God that the heavy oil has not yet reached the western shores of the Gulf. Concerning the Gulf's geographic situation, as a semi-closed lake, our shores with their numerous facilities, our fish resources and maritime traffic in the Gulf will all be affected by the oil slick."

On the other hand, the efforts being made by the local environmental protection committees in the area states have not stopped. On the contrary, they are continuously working in an attempt to save our shores, within the limits of their capabilities. They are being aided in that by the fact that no large oil slicks are reaching the shores. However, in the face of the increasing danger, some of them have drawn up a plan of action to protect their territorial waters. Saudi Arabia was one of the first states of the area to devise its plan of action to combat the oil slick in its territorial waters. It submitted the plan to the recent meeting of experts in Bahrain, from which they extracted the main features of the joint regional plan. The Saudi plan estimated the amount of oil that has flowed from the Iranian Noruz field, since the latter part of last January until the first part of last May, at about 60,000 cubic meters of oil (300,000 barrels). The flow is still continuing at a rate of 600 cubic meters (3,000 barrels) a day, at a minimum estimate. The probable quantities of oil located in Saudi territorial waters by the first part of last May were estimated at about 15,000 cubic meters, with the expectation that larger quantities would arrive from the northern areas, due to the water currents stemming from the winds.

Saudi Arabia revealed its plan of action, when it began aerial and naval surveys and observations of the slick's movements within the Saudi part of the Arab Gulf waters, and across the Kuwaiti and Bahraini borders after

gaining the approval of their authorities. This was in addition to the continuation of land surveys on the part of the University of Petroleum and Mining in Dhahran and the Royal Board in al-Jubayl. Moreover, it was decided to issue a daily bulletin containing all the specialized information concerning the oil slick, and it is being sent by telex to all the authorities concerned in the area. The bulletin reports the movements of the slick, in order to protect the environment from it, and conducts studies to evaluate its effects and seek ways to eliminate it, and to restore the maritime and fish life to their original state.

Save the Shores and Islands

The Saudi plan, through the use of equipment (floating barriers, fixed scraping network, etc.) called for providing protection for desalination stations, electrical generators, and so forth, along with shifting the barriers in accordance with the changes in the weather in shore areas with environmental sensitivity. The total length of these shores is estimated at about 170 kms. The Saudi plan to combat the oil slick depends on mechanical oil accumulation processes in areas both far from and near to the coastline, and dispersing the oil accumulated near important areas, along with cleaning the beaches and outlying islands, in order to save the turtles and birds. The accumulated oil would be shipped to storage places or special cisterns in order to get rid of it. The purpose of that is to reduce the quantities of oil located with the waters of the economic area and Saudi territorial waters, and to lessen its effects on the beaches and shore facilities, while reaching an acceptable balance with respect to the levels of oil pollution.

In the accumulation operation, the most modern equipment would be used, capable of collecting large quantities of heavy oil, containing and concentrating the agglomerations of sediment globules before collecting them. Tests are also currently underway to determine the efficiency of different types of materials to disperse the oil, so that the best of them can be chosen for use in specified areas, which will not affect the maritime environment. The Saudi plan called for operations to clean the shores of the effects of pollution when the wells of the Noruz fields are capped, in order to reduce the continuous damage which could be done to the shoreline environment, as a result of continually removing surface layers that are mixed with oily materials. In addition, some beaches could be excluded from use and recreation. The plan of priorities for coastal use will depend on the extent and nature of the oil pollution and the conditions of the beaches.

The plan to gather up the oil, which does not conflict with the principles of environmental protection, depends on storage of the oil over the long term, or temporary storage with elimination later by burning or by spreading it over the ground and burying it in waste burial pits in al-Jubayl. There is also treatment and reclamation, i.e., refining or

biological treatment. Then it can be used in fertilizing agricultural soil and shipped directly to places of final disposal before being stored. Questions still remain: Will the oil slick give the area nations time to consult on how to implement the plan? Or will member states begin unilaterally to prepare their local plans to combat the oil slick each on his own? These questions require clear answers from officials, especially after everyone was assured that the oil slick is not imaginary, but rather, is an increasing danger day after day.

7005
CSO: 4404/571

INTERNATIONAL AFFAIRS

OBJECTIVES, ORGANIZATION OF SECOND AFRICAN YOUTH FESTIVAL NOTED

Tripoli AL-TALIB in Arabic 31 Jul 83 pp 8-11

[Article by Mas'ud al-'Allaqi: "Second African Youth Festival; Jamahiriyyah Constantly Seeks To Unite Africans and To Fuse Them in Melting Pot of Single Action and Natural Alliance Against Forces of Evil and Oppression; Jamahiriyyah Embraces Biggest African Youth Demonstration; African Youth Festival With Slogan of Independence, Unity and Anti-Imperialist Solidarity; Our Efforts Include Working To Bolster African Unity and To Settle Internal African Problems in Accordance With Spirit of Charter and Laws of OAU; Designated Chairman of Preparatory Committee: Jamahiriyyah Will Be Podium of African Youth Struggle Against Imperialism, Zionism, Racism, Colonialism, Reaction and Apartheid"]

[Text]

Foreword

The Jamahiriyyah will continue to be, as it has always been, a stronghold for honorable free men in all parts of the world and will continue to be the platform [al-mathabah] for all forces opposed to colonialism, imperialism, Zionism and reaction, flying the banner of the popular revolution and performing the civilizing message, which has emanated from the Jamahiriyyah and spread in all parts of the world, for the final victory of the persecuted on this earth.

The holding of the second African youth festival in Tripoli on the soil of the Jamahiriyyah is nothing but a reaffirmation of the Jamahiriyyah's eagerness to unite the Africans and to fuse them in the melting pot of a single action and a natural alliance against all the forces of evil and oppression. This is why we say that the organization of African festivals at the continental level will continue to be a noble task for which the youth have devoted themselves as an expression of their awareness of the decisive battle being waged by the African peoples for rehabilitation and for the appreciation and enhancement of the main African cultural resources that need their true identity, taking into consideration the socioeconomic transformations of African youth, who represent our peoples' future, who must achieve the best results at all levels, be they physical, moral or intellectual, and who must contribute actively and effectively to the tasks of building a united, strong and prosperous Africa.

This is why our report in this edition is concerned with the progress of the activities of the preparatory committee of the second African youth festival and with fully introducing this festival and its program. We have interviewed a number of members of the preparatory committee of the second African youth festival, namely:

1. ('Ali Kura) from Senegal, a representative of Senegalese Socialist Youth and chairman-designate of the preparatory committee.
2. (Naso Dasi Bond), representative of Benin youth and member of the preparatory committee.
3. (Stephen Perep Joseph), representative of SWAPO youth and preparatory committee member.
4. (Al-Hasan Dukuri), representative of Mali youth and preparatory committee member.
5. (Mohamed Ould Boubah), representative of Mauritanian youth and preparatory committee member.
6. ('Abdallah Benz Benjami), representative of Madagascar youth and preparatory committee member.
7. (Jad Tighulazar), representative of Burundi youth and preparatory committee member.

('Ali kura), chairman-designate of the preparatory committee, was the first to speak: We Africans consider ourselves as being in our second country to perform this collective duty, which gives all the African youth the opportunity to express their views. The Jamahiriya under these circumstances will be a podium for African youth's struggle against imperialism, Zionism, racism, colonialism, reaction and apartheid.

Throughout our presence in Tripoli since last February we have been working for the success of this festival. Invitations have been issued to all of the world's youth to attend this major African festival. We hope to have more than 40 African countries participate in this major festival. We also hope that certain youth organizations, such as the Soviet Youth Organization, the French Socialist Youth and other world youth organizations, will participate.

The interview was then continued with the other participating members and it can be summed up as follows:

Festival's Objectives and Complete Program

1. Objectives of Second Festival

The African festival seeks fundamentally to:

1. Exert efforts to achieve African independence, unity and solidarity against imperialism, colonialism, Zionism, racism, apartheid and reaction and efforts for political, economic, social and cultural progress so that Africa may become truly African.
2. Exert efforts to mobilize African youth to achieve unity of action for the political, economic, social and cultural independence of the African continent.
3. Advance tangible and sincere support to the legitimate liberation movements and to the peoples struggling against colonialism, Zionism and apartheid and for the liberation of Africa.
4. Strengthen and develop bonds of fraternity and solidarity among the African youth.
5. Introduce and highlight the great cultural resources of Africa so as to enhance their liberation and safeguard their integrity with the aim of positively enriching world culture.
6. Exert efforts to bolster African unity and to settle Africa's internal problems in accordance with the spirit of the charter and laws of the OAU and without any foreign intervention so that Africa may be for the Africans.
7. Exert efforts to enlighten African youth on the struggle for the establishment of a new, fair and balanced international economic system and on the struggle for Africa's national independence, for regaining its natural resources and for its social progress.
8. Inject new dynamism into the African youth movement so as to bolster its historical vanguard role in the African revolution.
9. Express the solidarity of African youth with the youth and peoples struggling in their countries against socioeconomic and cultural systems opposed to progress and against reaction.
10. Bolster the solidarity that is opposed to imperialism, Zionism and apartheid and is for independence, peace and friendship with all the world's democratic youth and for fair and productive cooperation.

The second African youth festival will be a real occasion for all African youth to express truly their support and assistance:

11. For the legitimate national liberation movements struggling for national independence, especially the peoples and youth of South Africa, Namibia, the Western Sahara and the frontline countries.
 12. For the Arab youth and people in Lebanon, especially for the Palestinian people in their struggle against imperialism, Zionism and reaction and for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East.
 13. For the youth and people of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah in their struggle against the provocative actions of the U.S. imperialism and against the Zionist and reactionary schemes seeking to strike the great 1 September revolution which is working for the people's happiness.
- II. Political Program of Official Days**
1. A day of solidarity with African Youth and with the national liberation movements, especially with the youth and peoples of South Africa, the Western Sahara and the frontline countries [buldan khatt al-muwajahah].
Working against the endeavors of neocolonialism, imperialism, Zionism and apartheid.
 2. Days for human rights and childhood and for solidarity with the Arab peoples, especially with the Lebanese and Palestinian peoples.
 3. Days for solidarity with the peoples struggling for liberation and independence, for the establishment of a new international economic system, for democratic international relations and for African cooperation.
 4. A day for African unity and for friendship, fraternity, peace and solidarity among the African peoples.
 5. A day of African youth solidarity with the democratic and progressive forces for freedom and peace in the world.
 6. A day of solidarity with the Asian and Latin American peoples victimized by the barbaric imperialist aggressions and threatened with annihilation.
 7. A day of action for world peace and international security and cooperation, for putting an end to the arms race and for disarmament and a day of struggle to eliminate all foreign military bases in Africa and to oppose all attempts to establish new bases.
 8. A day of solidarity with the people and youth of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah.

III. Symposium on African Policy

Main topics: United action by African youth in the struggle against imperialism, Zionism, racism, apartheid and reaction and for an Africa for the Africans.

Discussion Topics

- 1. The solidarity and action of African youth in the struggle against colonialism, racism, apartheid, Zionism and neocolonialism.**
- 2. African youth's contribution to the struggle to eliminate the last strongholds of colonialism in Africa.**
- 3. African youth's struggle for full observance o. the peoples' right to self-determination.**
- 4. African youth's role in the struggle for the democratization of national organizations in Africa.**
- 5. African youth's solidarity with world youth and peoples struggling against colonialism, neocolonialism, imperialism, fascism, Zionism, racism, apartheid and man's exploitation by man.**
- 6. The struggle to eliminate all foreign military bases in Africa and the struggle against all attempts to establish new such bases.**
- 7. The development of cultural and athletic exchanges so as to strengthen friendship and relations of fruitful cooperation between African youth and world youth.**

IV. Symposium on African Economic Problems

It is the duty of African youth to make clear the diversity of the forms of intervention applied to the course of Africa's economic and social development.

Discussion Topics

- 1. African youth's contribution to regaining national resources in the interest of the peoples alone and for building an independent national economy.**
- 2. The youth's efforts for regional [jihawi] cooperation and cooperation among the various areas to achieve a merger of the African economies.**
- 3. African youth's role in the establishment of a new fair and balanced international economic system.**
- 4. The unification of African youth's efforts with the efforts of world youth and peoples struggling against imperialism, monopolies and man's exploitation of man.**

5. African youth's participation in implementing the Lagos action plan.
6. African youth's efforts in drafting and implementing the national agricultural policies in the interest of the toiling masses so that land may revert to those who serve it.
7. African youth's support and assistance for the African nations victimized by natural catastrophes, such as backwardness [al-ta'akhkhur], drought, starvation, malnutrition, epidemics and other dangerous diseases.
8. The inclusion of women in socioeconomic development.
9. The youth's participation in the struggle against backwardness in Africa through the mastering of science and technology.

V. Symposium on Basic Problems of African Culture

This issue involves a search for the means to implement an African youth policy in the struggle to liquidate colonialism, to rehabilitate [i'adat al-i'tibar], enhance and safeguard African culture.

In this regard, the following main and subsidiary topics can be discussed:

1. Culture and society:

The African cultural identity.

Cultural policy and action.

Culture and development.

2. Particular and general characteristics of African cultural values:

Cultural traditions.

Genuine historical heritage.

Moral and spiritual values.

Relationship between cultures.

Safeguarding and appreciating the national cultural heritage.

3. Culture and education:

Resources and guarantees.

Main tasks of education.

Right of education for all.

4. Culture of sciences and technology:

 - Artistic and intellectual creativity.
 - Mechanisms of preservation and distribution.
 - Pros and cons.
5. Culture and language:

 - Elements of communication.
 - Social impact and diversity.
 - Phenomenon of (plundering).
 - Horizons.
6. Culture and information media:

 - Work and dissemination of technology.
 - Democracy of media.
7. Culture, recreation and revitalization:

 - Creative jobs.
 - Revitalization and popular education.
 - Organizations and councils.
8. Culture--Literature and art:

 - An analysis of these points should make it possible to draw up an action program that includes tangible tasks whose implementation requires full participation by the youth.

The organization of meetings between the areas is likely to fill the gap between festivals, to encourage the exchange of experiences among the areas' youth and to lead to the implementation of the tasks posed in the action program.

VI. Meetings

1. Meetings among teachers, educators and youth (activists):

 - School and environment.
 - Reforming education to make it compatible with African truths.

Eradicating job illiteracy and stressing national language.

Rehabilitating and enhancing national languages.

Juvenile delinquency.

New school and new man.

2. Student meetings:

Role of African university in development.

Democracy of education.

3. Meetings of writers, journalists and producers:

Role of writer in African society.

Role of media in Africa: Cinema in Africa, facts and message.

4. Meetings among artists:

Craftsmen from hand to machine.

Directing popular and modern art in Africa.

Problems of African artists.

Impact of craftsmen on African society.

5. Meetings between youths and the union [sic]:

Problems of working women.

6. Meetings among women:

Liberation of African women.

Methods of recruiting women for youth organizations.

7. Meetings between youths and farmers:

Forms of land utilization and role of youth in (enriching) countryside.

Eliminating distinction between city and rural areas as a means of stopping rural emigration.

8. Meetings among young athletes:

Sports as a means of education and an element bringing peoples closer.

Popular sports.

VII. Cultural Activities

All cultural activities must observe the second African youth festival's slogan, to which other issues may be added: Peace, friendship, democracy and progress.

The languages used are the languages of the African youth movement: French, English, Arabic, Portuguese and all the other African languages.

It has been decided to approve the following art and cultural activities generally:

A. Poetry, essays, stories and plays.

The best art works: Paintings, sculptures, (inspirational work, puppets).

B. Music: The best compositions, modern and traditional bands, revolutionary songs.

C. Ballet, folk dancing.

D. Cinema festival.

2 [as published]. International Club of Young Artists.

All these various activities will take place, in addition to various other performances, expressed specifically in:

1. A sedate musical show intended to enable individual musicians and bands to play their pieces.

2. The folk music and dance meet, designed to let individual musicians and musical bands perform their folkloric shows.

3. Popular music shows designed to let individual musicians and popular troupes perform shows and play the best international musical compositions.

4. A political songs contest.

This meeting will bring together the continent's most creative musicians. It will also reflect youth's preoccupation with social problems, with the struggle against imperialism, with solidarity, friendship and peace and with appreciation for national traditions and respect for man's dignity.

5. Shows by delegations: This activity has been scheduled to enable countries that have the capability to present major shows to do so. Each country will present its show at one of the theaters or public stages in the evenings.

6. Delegations' cultural programs: This activity has been scheduled to enable the countries that do not have the capability to present a more intricate show to offer cultural programs compatible with their special capabilities, be they artistic, human or material.

7. Modern and traditional ballet.

These activities have been scheduled to enable the countries with modern or traditional ballet troupes to offer their own shows.

8. Folk dances: This show has been included primarily for folklore dance groups and teams since the countries do not have to establish the programs, but rather other real folklore groups can do it.

9. Cinema festival: This activity has been programmed to provide the opportunity for showing and analyzing films produced by the participating countries pertaining to childhood and youth problems and reflecting the principles of independence, unity, anti-imperialist solidarity, peace, friendship and social progress.

As for the internal regulations of the second African youth festival, we can say that all the preparations have been made according to the following:

Name: Second African Youth Festival.

Slogan: Independence, unity and anti-imperialist solidarity.

Flag, symbol and anthem of second festival:

A. The flag is the flag of the African youth movement--a white flag with a symbol of green Africa and a red torch.

B. Symbol: A circle with an African symbol--Africa and the torch.

C. Anthem of festival: It is likely that the anthem of the first African youth festival will be maintained and that a contest will be held for a final anthem. The general secretary of the African Youth Movement has been assigned to study and approve a final anthem for the second festival.

Site: Tripoli, Libya.

Duration: 5 days.

African Preparatory Committee:

A. Composition:

1. Algeria.
2. Angola.

3. Benin.
4. Burundi.
5. Guinea-Conakry.
6. The Congo.
7. Libya.
8. Madagascar.
9. Mauritania.
10. [missing].
11. Mozambique.
12. Senegal.
13. Sierra Leone.
14. Somalia.
15. SWAPO.
16. Tanzania.
17. Togo.
18. Tunisia.
19. Zaire.
20. Zambia.
21. Zimbabwe.

The African Preparatory Committee chairman, who is the assistant secretary general of the African Youth Movement, is assigned to head the Cultural Affairs and Festivals Committee of the African Youth Movement. The Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriyyah shall undertake the tasks of the general secretariat of the African Preparatory Committee.

The African Preparatory Committee's headquarters for a period of 6 months prior to and 1 month after the festival shall be in the host country.

Tasks of the African Preparatory Committee: The African Preparatory Committee proposed by the Cultural Committee and approved by the African Youth Movement's Executive Committee shall be entrusted with the task of projecting

and following up on the preparatory activities for the second African youth festival. It shall do so in full coordination with the national preparatory committees and the national preparatory committees of the member organizations in accordance with the specific instructions issued by the Executive Committee. The preparatory committee's duty's are to:

1. Draw up the general program and the internal regulations governing the festival's various activities.
2. Make sure that regional and national preparatory committees are formed and that contact and coordination is established between the various preparatory committees.
3. Mobilize the information and propaganda media necessary to insure the success of all planned activities listed in the festival's official program.
4. Enlighten all member organizations concerning their effective participation.
5. Participate in the various efforts and contacts that have to be made with international and national organizations and with various countries with the aim of securing political, moral and material support for the festival.
6. Coordinate with the host country's national preparatory committee to (secure appropriations for the second African youth festival).

Subcommittees of the African Preparatory Committee:

A. Program and internal regulations subcommittee:

Tasks:

Draw up a general program for the festival activities.

Draw up the daily programs and various activities and plan the rational use of the halls and spaces placed at the disposal fo the festival.

Regional preparatory committees:

A. Composition:

Group A: Mauritania, Morocco, Algeria, Libya and Tunisia.

Group B: Egypt, Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia and Djibouti.

Group C: Madagascar, Seychelles, Mauritius and Comoro Islands.

Group D: Mozambique, Malawi, Tanzania, Uganda and Kenya.

Group E: Zambia, Zimbabwe, Botswana, Lesotho and Swaziland.

Group F: Chad, Central Africa, Zaire, Rwanda, Burundi, Angola, Congo, Cameroon, Gabon, Equatorial Guinea and Sao Tome and Principe.

Group G: Mali, Guinea-Conakry, Senegal, Togo, Benin, Nigeria, Ivory Coast, Sierra Leone, Liberia and Cape Verde.

2. Liaison and coordination committee:

Shall be entrusted with following up on and coordinating the activities of the regional and national preparatory committees. On the other hand, it shall watch and observe the progress made in preparations for the festival.

3. Information and propaganda committee:

Shall be entrusted with securing the information and propaganda means necessary to disseminate and spread the activities carried out by the regional and national preparatory committees, as well as the successes scored in the official festival program.

4. Material, equipment and transportation committee:

This committee shall be entrusted with the material preparations for the festival, with building the various structures and reception facilities needed for the good progress of the festival. It shall also secure transportation for members of the African Preparatory Committee and for festival participants.

5. Finance committee:

Tasks: Formulate the festival's financial policy; manage the festival budget in cooperation with the host country.

Tasks of the host country's national preparatory committee:

The host country's national preparatory committee shall make the material arrangements for the second African youth festival and shall manage the festival's finances in coordination with the African Preparatory Committee.

Participation:

A. Every member organization or country may participate in the conference with 50-100 delegates.

B. The organizing of a contest in any activity requires by necessity the participation of at least four countries in the competition.

C. Distribution of commemorative medals to all participants in a contest. The insignia of the African Youth Movement shall also be distributed to all those who come to the festival.

D. Judges shall be appointed by the African Preparatory Committee on the recommendation of the regional preparatory committees. The judges will be responsible for evaluating the art contests that will be crowned with the awarding of bonuses [sic].

E. Setting up a friendship pavilion for the festival using revenues from contributions and from art and craft shows of the participating organizations and countries. Revenues from sales will be deposited in the festival's fund.

The second African youth festival shall be held under the patronage of the Socialist People's Libyan Arab Jamahiriya and under the chairmanship of its leader, or any other African head of state or of the top official of a national liberation movement (whose patronage the African Preparatory Committee accepts).

As for the role of the African Preparatory Committee, it is embodied in the following:

Prepare the general program and the internal regulations governing the festival's various activities, insure formation of the regional and national preparatory committees and insure coordination of the various activities of these preparatory structures of the second festival.

Mobilize the information media and propaganda means to insure the success of all the planned and recorded activities of the program of the African Youth Movement and of the second African youth festival.

Enlighten and assist the member organizations of the African Youth Movement through their actual participation.

Participate in the various efforts and contacts made with the international and national organizations and with the various countries with the aim of getting their political, moral, material and financial support for the second African youth festival.

Establish firm coordination with the host country's national preparatory committee in managing the appropriations for the second African youth festival.

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CSO: 4504/534

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

EVREN QUOTES ATATURK IN RESPONSE TO ARMENIAN DEMANDS

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 26 Aug 83 p 1

[Article: "In His Speech at Van, Evren Also Responded to Armenian Demands: The President Answered to Those Demands by Quoting a Statement by Ataturk"]

[Text] President Evren and his associates returned to Ankara yesterday from Van, completing their tour of the eastern vilayets.

In Van President Evren made a speech directed to the people, the details of which we were unable to give in yesterday's issue, because the entire text of the speech had not yet been released. In his Van speech the president reflected on some edifying points: he based his progressive suggestions on a religious foundation, finding that husbands are specifically responsible for their wives' status of oppression, and recommended that an end be put to the tradition of women dressing entirely in black.

The president also addressed the demands of the Armenians.

"Lately we have been faced by Armenian demands," the President stated. "As you know, our representatives are being martyred by fanatic Armenian militants. But they also voice a demand. They demand land from us. For example, they point to these lands of yours, Van, as Armenia and demand these lands. At this point I put a question to you: what will you do if they come here? Will you give them these lands?"

The president then added that the best response to the Armenian demands is to quote a statement by Ataturk made in the 1930's. Ataturk stated most aptly and appropriately that the Turkish people will not give a single inch of soil to anybody, that these lands have been Turkish throughout history and shall continue to be.

8817
CSO: 4605/127

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

ASALA ACCUSED OF 'DAMAGING ARMENIAN CAUSE'

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 25 Aug 83 p 1

[Article: "Discord in ASALA"]

[Text] It is reported that following the most recent incident at Paris Orly Airport organized by the ASALA, dissension has developed among the organizers, and the Armenian terrorists have split into two separate factions. The ASALA- Revolutionary Movement has made public a statement, accusing the organization of targeting innocent people and claiming that the acts it carries out greatly harm the Armenian Cause. The ASALA leaders are condemned as fascists and bandits.

The small ASALA splinter group declares in its statement that the attack at Orly Airport and the killing of innocent Turks and persons of other nationalities were purposeless, an act carried out through the instrumentality of young Armenian militarists. The statement went on to claim that those who have split from ASALA are in the majority but who have received blame for those events which have taken place in Europe and elsewhere in the world and which have resulted in the deaths of innocent persons.

The statement claimed that those who perpetrated the disaster at Orly represent a fascist movement. The statement contained the following interesting comment: "The truth is that there exists in the ASALA organization, the members of which are self-proclaimed revolutionaries, such corrupt, terroristic pressure and a poisonous atmosphere that the external terrorism directed outward by the organization is nothing compared to the internal troubles and terrorism."

Former ASALA leaders Hakop Hakopian, Mihran Mihranian, and Vahram Vahramian, and the newly organized Armenian terrorist organization designated the ASALA Revolutionary Movement, denounced the ASALA for becoming a fascist organization of murderers.

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CSO: 4605/128

ARMENIAN AFFAIRS

TWO ARMENIAN 'TRAITORS' REPORTEDLY ASSASSINATED BY ASALA

Istanbul MARMARA in Armenian 30 Aug 83 p 1

[Article: "ASALA Executes Two Armenians"]

[Text] It is reported from Athens that the Central Committee of a clandestine Armenian organization by the name of ASALA has provided information about two Armenians who were executed by that organization as traitors. The names of the two Armenians are Aram Vartanian and Karlen Anayan. They are members of a criminal gang which, collaborating with a number of foreign powers, was responsible for the death of two ASALA members, Viken Ayvazian and Khachig Havarian. As we reported yesterday, these latter were killed on 15 and 16 July.

The ASALA statement concerning this, written in English and dated 16 August, was sent yesterday to the Athens bureau of Agence France-Presse.

The entire incident is still rather mysterious, for it is not known where or how Viken Ayvazian and Khachig Havarian, who has also been referred to as Epu Mahmut, were killed. They were the victims of actions by an organization which has enjoyed the protection of international powers. A criminal gang is responsible for this action, a gang which includes Armenian members. These Armenians seem to be working in collaboration with U.S. and Turkish intelligence organizations. These organizations helped two Armenians from this same group, Davit Davtian, and Monte Melkonian, escape from the clutches of ASALA to safety in Lebanon's Bekaa Valley.

It was also reported yesterday in a BBC broadcast that U.S. and Turkish security organizations helped the two Armenians escape from the clutches of ASALA.

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CSO: 4605/131

UPCOMING AGRICULTURAL NATIONAL FAIR REVIEWED

Algiers EL MOUDJAHID in French 28 Aug 83 p 3

[Article: "From 12 to 20 October in Algiers. First National Agricultural Fair."]

[Text] Algiers--The first national agricultural fair will take place in Algiers at the Palace of Exhibits from 12 to 20 October 1983, under the sponsorship of the Ministry of Agriculture and the Agrarian Revolution.

This agricultural exhibit, the biggest to be organized by Algeria since gaining independence, will be preceded by six regional exhibits of the same type at Constantine from 20 to 23 September 1983; Sidi Bel Abbes from 20 to 23 September 1983; Guelma from 27 to 30 September 1983; Chlef from 21 to 23 September 1983; Djelfa from 4 to 7 October 1983; and Tizi-Ouzou from 4 to 7 October 1983.

The organization of the national agricultural fair and the six regional exhibits preceding it prompted a working meeting Saturday morning at the Maritime Pines Palace of Exhibits, uniting all the heads from the wilayas hosting the regional fairs and from the farm bureaus and institutes for development. The meeting, moreover, brought together representatives from the Ministry of Heavy and Light Industries; the Ministry of Commerce; and the Secretariat of State for Forestry and Land Utilization.

That meeting was designed to work out in detail preparations for setting up pavilions and booths for the different exhibits, as well as material, organizational and financial issues, which were widely discussed at the meeting. Those taking part noted in fact certain deficiencies with respect to the importance and scope of those exhibits. In addition, the meeting featured discussions of programs of cultural and artistic activity to be set up at the fairs.

A Better Knowledge of the Agricultural Sector

In light of the accounts given at the meeting, it was found that the organization of the regional fairs was the object of particular interest and attention on the part of the local authorities who perceived the interest and

scope of the exhibits at a time when the political leadership is making unusual efforts to give back to the agricultural sector its rightful place in the national economy.

The considerations leading to the organization of those agricultural fairs answered a concern for informing the Algerian people about a sector which, despite all the measures taken on its behalf, remains misunderstood regarding its problems, transformations and basic realities.

For several years, the agricultural sector has experienced significant structural transformations (restructuring of farm operations, businesses and offices; reworking of the functions of production units and environmental structures; in-depth examination of the physical, economic and financial situation of the agrarian sector of the revolution; re-evaluation of the development program; extension of state aid, especially to the private sector; revamping of administrative intervention by MARA [Ministry of Agriculture and Agrarian Reform] in production, etc.)

On the other hand, investments and production plans are further helping to overcome the problems whose effects were felt during the recent agricultural campaigns. Worthwhile efforts have elsewhere been made to train technicians and engineers and to mechanize agriculture. All those factors have militated in favor of organizing an exhibit specifically reserved for the agricultural sector.

Topics In Keeping With Reality

Among the topics to be taken up during those exhibits are large-scale farming; truck farming fruit growing; agrarian education and training; restructuring of the self-managing sector and the agrarian revolution; poultry farming; beekeeping; sheep, cattle and horse raising; agricultural mechanization and raw materials; rural craftsmen; etc.

The second phase of those exhibits will be devoted to organizing competitions in which all the production units of the self-managing and private sectors for vegetable and animal production will take part. The units ranking at the regional level will be represented at the national agricultural fair and will participate in the finalist competition.

All sectors under the Ministry of Commerce which are directly linked with rural society and the agricultural sector in general (OFLA [Fruit and Vegetable Office]) are connected with the agricultural fairs.

The immediate environment of the agricultural sector will be under the Secretariat of State for Forestry and Land Utilization, which will report on the role of the forest, reforestation and wood processing.

The idea of organizing the regional fairs responded to the desire to disseminate information about agriculture throughout the local structures. It was likewise concerned with getting all the agricultural structures of one section to participate, and with studying the effect of local development in

conformance with the principle of decentralization. In that spirit, the minister of the interior encouraged all local heads at every level to give all their attention and aid to organizing that exhibit.

Since the national and regional fairs also were claiming to be forums for cultural exchange, it was decided with the Ministries of Information and Culture to set up an artistic and cultural enrichment program bringing together local folkloric groups, artisans, painters, etc.

To foster a better knowledge of the country's different animal products and aid their development and promotion, the agricultural fair also intends to reserve an important place for displaying sheep, cattle and horse breeds. Thus, the Djelfa regional fair will resemble a large sheep fair during which the best herds and breeders will be chosen and ranked.

At Caroubier, as the national agricultural fair gets underway, participants in that exhibit, with the active participation of Harras El Djoumhouin, the National Federation of Equestrian Sports, and the Algiers Racing Society, plan to set up a competition for horses. A horse show of the different clubs and a race with prizes will both be organized.

The Ministry of Teaching and Scientific Research, with INA [National Agronomic Institute]; the National Veterinary School; SNED [expansion unknown] which will undertake the sale of books on agricultural subject; and the Algerian Rural Development Bank will also take part in the fair. As for the organization of the Algiers fair, many national companies have insisted on lending their assistance to organizing this exhibit, making their pavilions in the Palace of Exhibits available to the organizers.

9475
CSO: 4519/317

CAIRO RESUMES TRADE RELATIONS WITH SOVIET UNION

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 11 Aug 83 p 3

[Text] With the ratification of the new commercial treaty between Egypt and the Soviet Union, which will go into effect next year, once more commercial relations between the two countries resume their growth and prosperity after nearly 8 years of being suspended and of a steady reduction in the volume of trade exchanges between them which did not cease until 1982.

This treaty which was signed in Moscow by the representative of the Egyptian ministry of economics and foreign trade, is considered as one of the biggest mutual trade treaties between Egypt and the Soviet Union to be ratified since 1985. It comprises a large increase in the volume of Soviet-Egyptian trade amounting to nearly 115 million pounds, a 40 percent increase in volume between the two countries over the past year.

As a result of this agreement the total trade between both countries in the coming year will amount to 415 million pounds, to date the highest trade volume figures ever reached between the two countries, surpassing the previous highest figures for trade between them which was 328 million pounds set in 1975.

Since 1975--because of the rupture and breakdown in diplomatic and political relations between Egypt and the Soviet Union--the volume of trade exchanged between them had declined by large increments until it reached its lowest level in 1980, which was 134 million pounds, or 41 percent of the 1975 level of trade between both countries.

Because of this drastic decline in the volume of trade Egypt transferred its primary imports source and its primary trading partner for fully 10 years from the Soviet Union to its arch-rival the United States.

At the moment when the imports from the Soviet Union intended for Egypt began to shrink year after year, American imports began to increase greatly until they reached in 1980 nearly 1.2 billion pounds, equivalent to almost 23 times the volume of Soviet imports that year, since those imports did not exceed 53 million pounds.

In spite of the decline and renewed rise of the curve of trade between Egypt and the Soviet Union since 1981, and in spite of the large rate of increase projected by the trade treaty signed between the two countries last year (a rate of increase of 20 percent), the volume of trade between them has been shown to be less than the amount reached in 1975, which was the highest trade figures ever attained between the two.

The volume of mutual Egyptian-Soviet trade exchanges following the 1982 treaty came to almost 300 million pounds whereas in 1975 it amounted to 328 million pounds.

By ratification of the new treaty between Egypt and the Soviet Union the volume of trade between them surpassed the highest levels attained in 8 years by nearly 100 million pounds.

The matter does not stop there. It includes a large increase in Egyptian exports to the USSR equivalent to six times the volume of the increase in Egyptian imports from the Soviet Union.

This treaty makes arrangements for repayment of Egyptian debts owed to the Soviet Union, since Egypt stopped payment of these debts in 1980 according to the decree of the former president, Anwar al-Sadat.

The new debt payments will be the result of the increase of Egyptian exports to the Soviet Union over imports, by the differential between 220 million pounds, the value of Egyptian exports and the 189 million pounds worth of imports, or a difference of 35 million pounds which is equivalent to discharging the balance of the debts. Egypt was able during its negotiations with Moscow to reduce the Russian demand for the yearly repayment of the debt balance from 70 million to 35 million pounds as it is now stipulated in the treaty.

Moscow had estimated according to Gritsch, the representative of the Russian foreign trade ministry, that Egyptian debts between 1955 until now amounted to nearly 3.84 billion rubles (the dollar equal 4 rubles). Included in this were military debts which amounted to 2.13 billion rubles, the interests payments after Egypt had stopped payment came to 321 million rubles of which the debt balances come to a total amount of 320 million rubles.

Egyptian sources said that there was a dispute over these figures with the Soviet Union especially with the estimates of military debts. Sources in Cairo added that Egypt paid 1.4 billion rubles of that debt.

In addition an agreement was completed to start a new round of negotiations between the two countries this coming October to reach agreement on drafting Egypt's debt repayment schedule to the Soviet Union as a result of a request from Cairo which Moscow in past years has refused to respond to. It is now ready to study the idea because of a thaw in the frozen diplomatic and political relations between the two capitals.

The list of goods to be traded between Egypt and the Soviet Union comprises first the proportion of Egypt's imports from the Soviet Union, which is estimated to be 190 million pounds, comprising 45 million pounds of the spare parts needed for Egyptian factories, especially the iron and steel factory. Some of the imports are: wood and newsprint, tools and equipment, cement, glass, frozen fish, trucks and tractors.

The list of Egypt's exports to the USSR which were determined by the treaty include: leather products, aromatic scents and oils, Khan al-Khalili products, carpets, flowers, and some agricultural products such as citrus fruits, rice, garlic, and onions. Following the terms of the treaty these shall be paid and accounted in pounds so as to help lighten the Egyptian balance of payments deficit.

9587
CSO: 4504/567

EGYPT

LABOR PARTY OFFICIAL DISCUSSES MINISTERIAL JOBS, RESPONSIBILITIES

London AL-SHARQ AL-AWSAT in Arabic 17 Aug 83 p 7

[Article by Dr Muhammad Hilmi Murad: "Nature of Ministerial Positions and Qualities of Those Who Occupy Them"]

[Text] What has drawn my attention in President Husni Mubarak's address to the youth of the National Party, which the president heads, is, among other things, what he said about ministerial positions and the difficulty of finding people to fill them in the course of his remarks on the criticism directed at the ministers and the lack of a word of encouragement given to them. The president said:

"Make the minister who has rendered his country a service feel that he is appreciated, because if he finds persistent criticism, he will opt to leave his position, telling himself that he can earn 20 times his ministerial salary if he leaves the cabinet."

President Mubarak added that a recently graduated youth working in the private sector earns three or four times as much as the minister and that any minister can serve in the cabinet for 6 months and leave, agree secretly with a company and work for this company upon leaving the cabinet if we continue to change cabinets.

The president also said that it is difficult to find a "good" minister and that if he runs out of "good" ministers he will be forced to lower the standard of ministers and, consequently, the standard of services.

He also said that he asked a certain individual to serve as minister and that this man's son begged him to relieve him because a minister's salary is small and the minister is subjected to criticism, questioning and notification requests, which affect his nerves and his children's nerves.

These statements raised in my mind numerous interpretations and ideas about the nature of ministerial positions, which differ from other types of work carried out by people who are not ministers, i.e., who are not rulers who run state affairs to achieve present and future public interests.

These statements also prompted me to think of the qualities that should be possessed by those who hold ministerial positions, of how they should be

selected, of the type of work they perform, of the watch and criticism to which they are subjected as a result of this work, of how ministers should accept in advance these hardships in return for assuming leadership, of the reasons why qualified people have shunned ministerial positions and of the difficulty in choosing those to occupy these positions.

Ministerial Positions Are Positions of Political Leadership

Let us begin by describing the ministerial positions. We say they are more of a political nature than of a technical, technocratic nature. Therefore, an individual who is highly specialized in a certain technical field may lack the comprehensive view that a minister needs when formulating a public policy or a future plan for his ministry. But a minister cannot dispense with specialized technicians who offer their opinion and advice in their field of specialization. This is perhaps the reason for the failure of some university professors who are highly qualified in their field of specialization when they are asked to be cabinet members without having had experience in political affairs and without having mingled with the masses and experienced their true needs.

Ministerial positions are also characterized by a spirit of leadership, which makes their holders individuals with a message who are supposed to believe in this message and to sacrifice for its achievement. They must possess the qualities of leaders capable of gathering workers around them and injecting their workers with the spirit of enthusiasm for work, capable of selecting the right persons for the various work positions and capable of being a sublime example for their subordinates; otherwise, they lack the most important factor for success as ministers leading the executive action in their ministries.

Based on the view that ministerial positions are political and leadership positions, they should not be perceived as the top step in job promotion within each ministry--a promotion to which all of the top officials of a ministry aspire by virtue of capability and seniority. The position of undersecretary should be the top step in the ladder of each ministry's technical positions, otherwise the ministerial positions will turn into technical executive jobs and not political leadership jobs and ministers will become government employees and not political leaders.

As an offshoot of the above, ministerial positions are by their nature temporary positions because they are linked to the political conditions prevailing in the country according to the system of government and the constitution in force. Whatever these conditions, ministerial positions, unlike technical or administrative positions, do not have the quality of permanence and are not governed by the same rules insofar as the conditions of appointment, rights, duties, retirement age or pension are concerned.

Consequently, any individual agreeing to hold a ministerial position must know in advance that he is proceeding to undertake the burdens of a position that is temporary by nature and in which he will not stay long and that

eagerness to stay in the position for the longest period possible should not be his overriding concern, or he will lose his prestige and fail to meet his responsibilities, thus turning into an employee clinging to job security for the longest time possible because the job is his source of livelihood.

Ministerial Position Is Public Service, Not Source of Livelihood

When the ministerial position loses its value as a public service whose holder sacrifices his time and effort for the good of his country and to solve the public's problems and puts his ability and his expertise at the disposal of the nation so as to enhance it, without consideration for any material reward other than a return that enables him to lead an ordinary life, thus providing a good example for others--when the ministerial position loses this value, it becomes a repugnant and revolting job for both those who hold it and those who view it from outside.

Those who hold the position see it as no more than a source of constant exhaustion and of demands for further efforts for enhancement and improvement. They also view it as a position whose salary is not commensurate with the effort expended. No matter how hard the state tries to raise the ministers' salaries, it cannot pay them their due and bring their income up to that of owners of investment projects, directors of major firms or directors of international organizations who collect high salaries, in addition to numerous in-kind benefits, without shouldering the heavy hardships and responsibilities falling on ministers, especially in Third World countries seeking to develop economically and socially at two rates of speed: One to make up for lost time and one to keep pace with what is happening.

Moreover, people's view of ministers will not change if we measure their work by the yardstick of the civil servant's efforts. In the people's view, the ministers will not be those few faithful patriots who have devoted their life to serving their country and its citizens in return for a little money that is not enough to enable them to enjoy the pleasures of life and its luxuries. Rather, the people will see the ministers as a group of top-ranking employees who carry out the orders of their superiors and who work to please the groups with the louder voice so that they can retain their positions, trying to exploit their positions, even if by seeking to secure jobs with generous salaries that make up for their ministerial salary when they leave the cabinet, as President Mubarak has said regarding what is rumored about some of the ministers.

These rumors, some of which have surfaced regarding ministers leaving the cabinet, are what harms those who replace the outgoing ministers. Legal rules must be established to prevent the occurrence of anything that might harm the ministers' reputation. For example, a provision should be introduced prohibiting ministers from working for a certain period of time, no less than 5 years after, leaving the cabinet, for any firm or establishment that has a working relationship with the ministries. This was stipulated by some Egyptian laws before the 23 July revolution in order to safeguard the integrity of the government.

However, the issue is not one of legal provisions but primarily one of traditions, principles and values that must be instilled in the heart and in which society must have conviction. This is the duty of the press, of the writers and of the men of opinion, the role of the parties and the politicians and the message of clergymen and educators.

Dealing With Life's Contradictions and Society's Circumstances

As for what President Mubarak has said about recently graduated young men who earn salaries exceeding those of the ministers when they work for the private investment sector, this is one of the many contradictions that have developed in Egyptian society, a contradiction similar to the presence of a population explosion at a time when Egypt is suffering from a manpower shortage and the high incomes of unqualified craftsmen compared with the incomes of university graduates who have spent years upon years in studying and preparing.

These anomalies are a result of the economic, social and political transformations that have developed in Egypt without the presence of the courage and the ability to confront and tackle their ramifications and consequences in an attempt to deal with these ramifications and eliminate their harmful consequences. This can only happen via the path of true democracy that brings in a government that represents the people and that has the courage to tackle the situation with the facts and with the necessary means for a cure, even if they are bitter-tasting means for a time.

Egypt Is Well and Abounds With Capabilities and Skills in Every Field

As for the apprehension that some ministers may leave and that replacements of equal qualification may not be found, it is an apprehension expressed to President Mubarak by those who defend the ministers that should leave. It is an apprehension that has no basis in fact.

I once heard the same words from President Jamal 'Abd al-Nasir in 1968 when one of the ministers demanded that the electoral districts be closed to cabinet ministers who run for the People's Assembly on the grounds that it is unacceptable that any of 'Abd al-Nasir's ministers fail in the elections. At the time, I objected to the statement and said that the political leadership should act in a sound democratic manner, that the minister who agrees to run for election does so at his own risk and that if he fails he should be dismissed [from the cabinet]. I also said that there are tens, even hundreds, who can replace such a minister. 'Abd-al-Nasir then asked: Where are they? I said: The country is well and there are many with abilities in the various fields. If you ask me to prepare for you lists of the names of the persons qualified to occupy each of the ministries, I will do so without any trouble.

This shows (the intentions) of the circles concerned with making the nominations for such positions in the absence of the normal conditions for political action--conditions that give prominence to the proper elements that become obvious to the eyes, thus eliminating the need to search for

the individuals to occupy these positions, a search that leads to selecting the wrong personalities as a result of resorting to unsound means of nomination. The examples in this regard are numerous and this is not the place to cite them, even without mentioning the names of those concerned.

Ministers Cannot Be Above Accountability

In any case, and even acknowledging the difficulty of selecting the right ministers in the Third World countries and acknowledging the exhausting burden imposed on those who hold ministerial positions in these countries, this does not mean that they should be immune to criticism or that their policies and decisions should not be brought to account before the people's representatives. This is the fate of those who undertake leadership. They have always to be prepared to defend their actions and conduct and to accept every criticism directed at them tolerantly. This is the task of leadership, which is counter-balanced by the feeling of satisfaction and happiness with the achievement of a public accomplishment or the performance of a public service that remains throughout the ages a subject of remembrance and appreciation for whoever has achieved it.

8494
CSO: 4504/583

EGYPT

MINISTER OF INTERIOR HIT FOR ILLEGAL POLICY ON PARTY MEETINGS

Cairo AL-AHALI in Arabic 24 Aug 83 p 5

[Article by Salah 'Isa: "Democracy of Closed Chambers"]

[Text] The Ministry of Interior deserves congratulations because it has triumphed over al-Wafd Party and forced it to transfer its celebrations of the anniversary of Sa'd and al-Nahhas from a public square, 'Abidin Square, to a closed site, the athletics field of al-Sa'idiyah secondary school.

Thus, the Ministry of Interior has completed its victories against all the opposition factions and has implemented a tradition it has established--a tradition dictating that the parties hold their public meetings and popular conferences in closed sites. Since the beginning of the year, the ministry has besieged the Socialist Labor Party and forced it to hold all its popular meetings' and conferences in closed halls. As for the Grouping Party--a party against which the ministry has scored the largest number of victories--it has been forced since 1978 not to leave its offices or to emerge into the street.

Persuasion by Coercion

The Ministry of Interior has thus achieved through coercion, which sometimes takes the form of persuasion, what it failed to achieve by law. The ministry, as well as all existing Egyptian parties, knows that the constitution is clear about existing Egyptian parties, knows that the constitution is clear about granting the right of public and private meetings and of processions and gatherings to all Egyptians. This is what the administrative law courts embraced and what the Ministry of Interior rejected under the administration of its ill-reputed minister, al-Nabawi Isma'il. The ministry fought this right so fiercely that a number of high-ranking security officials were sentenced to prison terms for refusing to implement court orders permitting Dr 'Abd-al-Muhsin Hummudah to hold public celebrations at a public square, al-Tahrir Square.

Because the Ministry of Interior has replaced the law and the constitution with its own tradition, the interpretation offered by the present minister of interior, Hasan Abu Basha, in his latest interview with the sisterly

AL-MUSAWAR on this unconstitutional tradition is a security and political interpretation based on no article in the constitution or the law. The gist of this interpretation from the security viewpoint is that the opposition speakers at such meetings and conferences deal with issues strongly and in an aggressive manner that is likely to provoke the other parties, thus making the holding of such meetings in the street an opportunity for clashes that might occur and open the door to police intervention. On the political side of the interpretation, the minister said: These meetings concern only the members of the party that calls them and there is no justification for citizens who are not members of the party to attend.

Had the minister been fair, he would have explained the ministry's coercion of the political parties to hold their public meetings in closed places on constitutional and legal bases and he would have answered AL-MUSAWAR's question concerning this strange tradition with provisions of the constitution, the law and of judicial rulings permitting him to act as he acts. This is how a minister should act and speak as long as he is a member of a cabinet that is supposed to be accountable to the law and to the people for what it does.

But as the minister preferred not to speak of the law or of the constitution, this means that he acknowledges that what he is doing is illegal and unconstitutional. This is a pitfall that we hoped Hasan Abu Basha's intelligence--and even Abu Basha's opponents are unanimous in calling him one of the most intelligent ministers of interior known to Egypt--would not overlook.

Other Benefits

Regardless of the soundness of the security and political reasons cited by the minister to justify this undemocratic tradition that he wants to replace the law, forcing the opposition parties to practice a democracy of closed chambers has benefits that the minister cannot deny, even though he can disavow the responsibility for such benefits. This democratic heresy [bid]ah has enabled the National Party to completely control the conferences of the opposition parties. The National Party controls the capacity of the sites designated for the opposition so that only a minimum number of citizens is able to attend these meetings. The National Party also prohibits its opponents from using loudspeakers to convey what they say beyond those narrow confines. The harrassment to which the opposition is exposed reaches the point where "childish acts" are perpetrated, such as locking toilets and cutting off electricity. Moreover, the opposition parties' right to erect signs, to distribute invitations or to announce publicly the site and date of a meeting is denied in pursuance of the logic that what is declared at such meetings concerns only the members of the party that calls the meeting and that, therefore, this party may not invite the general public. Every attempt such a party makes to transform the democracy of closed sites to an open-air democracy must be turned aside.

The interpretation cited by the minister to justify his acts vis-a-vis a deep-rooted right guaranteed to Egyptians by all of the constitutions,

namely, the right of public meetings, is no different from the interpretation offered by numerous and successive heads of the political security agencies regarding another right guaranteed to Egyptians by all of the Egyptian constitutions, namely, "freedom of belief." Those chiefs commonly said for many years that it is the right of every Egyptian citizen to embrace any ideas or creeds he wishes. This is his constitutional right. But if he tries to disseminate his convictions by discussing them with others, then this is a crime that the political security agencies do not permit even if the law and the constitution do.

Abu Basha's Law

The simple and direct meaning of this ingenious understanding of the constitution and of the law is that we Egyptians are free to hold any public meetings but that other Egyptians are not free to attend them and that our freedom of belief is confined to talking to ourselves in front of the mirror about our beliefs. Should we get tired of this, then we have the walls, the birds and the cats to talk to as we wish, otherwise we fall under the jurisdiction of Abu Basha's law, which follows neither the penal code nor the provisions of the constitution.

Considering that the minister has avoided citing the constitution and the law in his interpretation of the democracy of closed chambers, then we are not required to cite them in answering him. But we owe it to him to say that the stability that he seeks and that we seek and the security for which he is eager and for which the opposition parties are eager cannot be achieved by flouting the law and the constitution but rather by following them and by persistent efforts to amend in the constitution and the law whatever provisions are in conflict with the guaranteed rights of all men since they have known modern constitutions, not by establishing traditions that mock every right of citizenship.

If the minister wants stability, then he will find it in a strong public opinion that knows what it wants, that is familiar with all the opinions, that hears all the ideas, that compares all programs and that selects its representatives without material or moral coercion and without custodianship from anybody, not even from the minister of interior.

Citizens, Not Subjects

If the minister wants stability, then let him punish his advisers who have convinced him that what the political parties deal with concerns only party members, keeping in mind that the political parties offer programs, solutions and opinions that concern the interest of every citizen, that it is the right of all Egyptians to hear what these parties say, to discuss with the parties what they say and to turn away from these parties out of their free will if they don't like what the parties say. It is the right, and duty, of the members of every existing political party to listen to what those in the other parties that disagree with them have to say because they may change their partisan positions and may even change their party's views on certain issues. In this way, the country benefits and its stability is reasserted. The opposite is not true.

If the minister wants to guarantee security, discipline and order, then such a guarantee does not come by concocting a tradition unrelated to the law but by compelling everyone to abide by the law. Security has been lost in some conferences held by the Labor Party under the canopy of the democracy of closed places, not because of the inflammatory nature of what the party leaders said but because the National Party preferred to debate with bricks, stones, pipes, Shakshuk, Samahah and other professional and amateur bullies of the [National] party.

Will the minister confront those who debate with bricks and stones among his party members? Will he implement the law and the constitution and give the opposition parties freedom to hold their conferences and distribute their publications everywhere before the opposition takes him to court on the charge of violating the law and the constitution and of following the practice established by his predecessor, al-Nabawi Isma'il, . restricting meetings to closed places?

Will the minister take a step to reassure us that the era of al-Nabawi Isma'il, with his detention camps, his torture and his circumvention of the law, has ended? Will the minister save his reputation, which is dear to his supporters and his opponents, from what afflicted his predecessor's reputation?

Will he implement the law and the constitution so that we Egyptians may feel that we are citizens in a state not subjects in a fief.

8494
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NEW ENVIRONMENTAL CENTER WILL MONITOR POLLUTION

Cairo AL-'UMMAL in Arabic 15 Aug 83 p 5

[Article by Muhammad Husayn: "Three Million Pounds will be Spent to Build the First Center in the Middle East to Protect the Environment from Pollution"]

[Text] To monitor pollution and restrict it in the industrial zones to protect workers from its dangers.

To restrict the locations suitable for industrial plants and new projects. The problem of environmental pollution originating from toxic gas and fumes emitted in the air from automobile exhaust and factory smokestacks is one of the most important problems confronting environmental scientists in Egypt.

In scientific cooperation with the electronics department in the College of Engineering at 'Ayn Shams University and the environmental studies center in Michigan, the first engineering center in the Middle East to use laser beams (infrared light) to limit the variety and amount of gases and toxic fumes entering the environment in general will be built. It will be specifically concerned with industrial districts and protecting workers from the dangers of these emissions that are a result of production. This center will be set up at the College of Engineering.

Aims of the Center

Dr Muhammad Mahmud al-Sharbini, who is supervising the center's establishment and is a teacher in the electronics and computer engineering department in the College of Engineering at 'Ayn Shams University said about the nature of the new center and its activities that it was natural that there would be a certain average rate of pollution, but that when that rate increased it could lead to catastrophes, especially for the workers since they are the ones who are most exposed to the pollution because of the nature of their work in the factories and their exposure to toxic gases. Because of that some thought was given to utilizing advanced scientific technology to monitor the polluters and to restrict them to industrial zones and to give advice and guidance to plants and companies about the best means to decrease the amount of pollution, to keep a normal rate, and to use safety measures to protect workers from harm.

Choice of New Industrial Zones

Dr al-Sharbini added that the center will draw up maps of Egypt to demonstrate clearly the distribution of pollution rates. This will permit it to present scientific guidance to workers, manufacturing, and civil planners organizations to assist them in choosing the most appropriate districts for building new factories and companies far from the polluted areas so as to protect their workers.

How Do We Restrict the Pollution Rate?

Dr al-Sharbini said that pollution rates would be controlled by use of mobile measuring equipment that is comprised of two parts. One is a laser ray apparatus that projects rays into the sky that are returned by a reflective surface, which is the second part. By analysing the path of the laser beams reflected back on the first apparatus it is possible to know the amount and types of toxic gases in the air.

How do We Protect the Workers?

He added that rising fumes and gases can be present in certain acceptable levels. The center's concern will be to keep these levels stable by presenting continuous data to the factories and firms so they can use industrial safety measures in case of an increase in levels and in addition work on a way to decrease this rate once its causes are known.

Advanced Technical Operations

Dr Muhammad Marzuq Ibrahim, chief of the electronics and computer engineering department at 'Ayn Shams University and one of the supervisors of the center said that the pressing need for establishing it began during the session of the scientific conference held in Cairo last January, organized by the Academy for Scientific Research and Technology to investigate the potential uses of laser beams in different applications.

He added that as a result of that an agreement was concluded between 'Ayn Shams University and the Environmental studies center in Michigan to establish this center in Egypt. It will cost \$2.775 million and the Americans will give \$1.3 million to assist Egypt. It will begin operation in a year and a half.

Dr Marzuq said that a number of Egyptian technicians will be sent to the U.S. for training in the use of the most modern advanced scientific equipment using infrared rays so the center can have a maintenance shop run on a profitable basis. Likewise they will help set up comparable centers in the Arab world and Africa.

He added that Egyptian scientists will begin at the same time to set up a complete laboratory including all the engineering equipment to be used in the center.

The college is establishing an advanced scientific office with all the data and modern resources and especially data for the center's studies.

Finally Dr Marzuq said that the center represents a large scientific addition to the roles in science that Egyptian universities must undertake to apply to Egyptian society, especially for the workers who share in supporting the nation's production.

9587

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LEADER OF NEW POLITICAL PARTY DEFINES GOALS

Casablanca MAROC SOIR in French 2 Aug 83 pp 1-2

[Interview with Maati Bouabid, prime minister and president of the Constitutional Union, published in a special issue, devoted to Morocco, of the magazine FRANCE-PAYS ARABES; date and place not specified]

[Text] FPA: Does political life in Morocco with respect to the role of parties seem to you to be what it should, seeing as how you felt the need to create a new group--and why?

MB: The decision to create a new political movement is in no way based on a negative evaluation of the role of the existing parties in Morocco but, on the contrary, is aimed at consolidating the multi-party system required by our constitution and desired by most of our citizens. In fact, it is a question of forming a group that is open to the different kinetic forces, ready to contribute to the political, economic, and social development of the country in a spirit of tolerance and of responsible dialogue--a group that the political programs, styles, or speeches of the existing parties disappoint or marginalize. This means that the popular base, as well as the elite, of the Constitutional Union will not be "gleaned" from the existing parties but will come mainly from those vast segments of our society that remain in a state of availability, especially the young people that I call the "post-independence generation," that is to say, those born in 1956 or after, or those who were, at that time, in the prime of their youth and have not since then participated in the battle for independence.

FPA: Isn't the multiplicity of political parties liable to complicate political life in Morocco?

MB: The multiplicity you mention enriches political life and does not complicate it. What might complicate it is, rather, the fact that the parties speak a language that corresponds neither to every-day reality nor to the potential of the country, which they do in the hope of recruiting a clientele that is disappointed by such-and-such a party or that is located elsewhere. If everyone would adopt a clear line of conduct and respect the rules of the democratic game, politics would be simple for the electorate, for the elected, and for the party in power. And as long as the parties agree on the

basic principle (constitutional monarchy, pluralist democracy), political activity is free within the framework of the law.

FPA: What, in your opinion, are the priorities that a political party should bring to the fore--economic, social...?

MB: A political party must bring to the fore not only the economic and social priorities but also everything that can contribute to harmonious social development. A party that wants to assure itself of a certain permanence and an active participation in the life of the nation must have a global vision of the problems to be solved and must prepare adequate solutions--for the short, medium, and long terms--that take into account various objective limits and are removed from demagogies and miracle cures that exist only in the minds of those who make one-upmanship a working method and a profession of faith.

FPA: Should foreign policy be important for a political party? How would you define it for Morocco in your party?

MB: Any political party that wants to have a national vocation and dimension must have a program that covers both the internal policy and the external relations of the country. Indeed, in today's world, no country is marginal to the international community. Foreign policy is, in fact, only an indicator of national policy in that it reflects the aspirations of a nation which cherishes its sovereignty and which, in return, must respect that of others, notably that of its partners, its neighbors, and its friends. As far as our party's foreign policy is concerned, it should be noted that it was defined during the constitutive congress held last 9 and 10 April. However, I would like to emphasize one aspect that won the unanimity of the nation. I mean defending and perfecting the territorial integrity of the kingdom within its real borders. In this connection, recovery of the Saharan provinces, of the cities of Sebta and Mellilia, and of the presidios still under Spanish rule is not only a legitimate and irreversible aspiration but also a gauge of the good feeling that should govern the relations which are and must remain those of two states which history, culture, immediate neighbors, and common interests indissolubly unite. The choices that Morocco has made, under the enlightened direction of our sovereign, with regard to foreign policy have an important place in our program, for the fact that we belong to the Moslem world, to the Arab nation, and to the African continent--our geographic position--obliges us to have a positive non-alignment, an active solidarity with our Palestinian, Arab, and African brothers, as well as with every people that loves justice and peace and that aspires to a better future, far from the tumults over ideology and hegemony that shake the planet.

FPA: What part do women play in political life in Morocco? Do you want to give them more importance and, if so, how?

MB: Our constitution firmly guarantees the equality of men and women with respect to civic and political rights. This is not only a principle but

also a rule of public order. Our party, for its part, wants to comply with it. It is, moreover, significant--and reassuring--to note that many women and girls immediately joined the ranks of the Constitutional Union. Furthermore, our party gives women special attention in that they play an important role in safeguarding the values of the Moroccan family, in the edification of a well-balanced society, and in the economic and social life of the country. This role will become increasingly meaningful as the percentage of women in the work force grows and as the psychological barriers that prevent them from playing an active role in politics disappear by virtue of the culture, the professional and technical training, and the financial independence that every day are more and more within their reach.

FPA: Is the protection of liberties an indispensable element to be brought to the fore and how?

MB: To our mind, liberties are not elements to be brought to the fore; they are something achieved that must be preserved and defended. The constitution of our country, its laws, and its regulations guarantee individuals and groups extremely wide liberties, which are a credit to a developing country, to a third-world country, and which lift it to the level of the most advanced democratic countries. These liberties--of opinion, expression, association, assembly, movement--are, as I have said, a precious asset which we must vigilantly preserve and safeguard. They are a shield against partisan tyranny and intellectual terrorism; they are the national road to the blossoming of the personality of the individual and of the group within society; they are the catalyst of a lucid and realistic patriotism; they are the bread of future generations. This is why the Constitutional Union is determined to make their defense one of its priorities.

FPA: How do you plan to arouse the "spectators"--those who generally don't get involved in politics?

MB: It is said that, in politics, not taking a position is itself a choice. This is true to the extent that abstention is deliberate, is conscious. Unfortunately, in most cases, abstention is a consequence of marginalization, of disinformation, of nonchalance. This is the source of the famous "silent majority" or those whom you call the "spectators," who are, in the end, the objective allies of the forces of inertia and of the conservative and reactionary groups, since they encourage the opposition to progress, the status quo, by their passivity. We know that the existence, the maintenance, and the development of such political strata in our country are justified for more than one reason: certain groups have caused so much disillusion and bitterness that many Moroccans have become indifferent. It is this tendency that we must fight, and such a fight can only be won by arms of frankness, realism, and exemplarity. These are the arms that the Constitutional Union has chosen.

12368
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BAHRAIN

NEW OFFSHORE BANKING FACILITIES FACING TIGHTER CONTROLS

Kuwait AL-QABAS in Arabic 7 Aug 83 p 14

[Interview with Assistant Director of the Bahrain Monetary Organization Shaykh Ibrahim al-Khalifah by 'Abd-al-Muttalib al-Sayrafi: "Tighter Controls on the Opening of Any New Offshore Banks"; al-Manamah, date not specified]

[Text] Shaykh Ibrahim al-Khalifah, assistant director of the Bahrain Monetary Organization, expressed optimism concerning the future of the market for offshore foreign banking facilities operating in Bahrain. This was in spite of a drop in assets since the beginning of the year estimated to be 10 percent. He informed AL-QABAS "that the combined budget for the offshore banks had realized a 10 percent increase in the month of June after a continuous decline in the previous 5 months."

This decline was attributable to the recession in the world economy, the drop in oil price early this year, and the crisis in the unofficial securities market in Kuwait.

Shaykh Ibrahim unveiled a committee formed at the last meeting of central bank directors of the Gulf Cooperation Council states to evaluate the role of the offshore banking facilities operating in Bahrain. He indicated that the organization began taking steps to bring tighter scrutiny of any new applications to establish offshore banking facilities in Bahrain.

World Recession

[Question] The organization announced the decrease in assets of the offshore banking facilities during the first half of this year. What is your explanation of this decline?

[Answer] In fact, by the end of 1982, the total assets of the foreign banking facilities stood at \$59 billion and had actually reached \$62 billion in August of that year. However, there has been a decrease in these assets since the beginning of this year down to \$55 billion by midyear. This represents a decline of some 10 percent of the assets of the foreign banks from the level at the end of 1982. We believe that the recession in the world economy and the confusion that has developed in the loan market in Latin America are two of the main factors behind the decline in the assets of the offshore banking facilities in Bahrain.

These factors brought about a sudden contraction in the volume of exchange among the banks. And since any world banking center depends primarily on the recirculation of funds from center to center--or more accurately, from financing areas to investment areas--the result of this situation will naturally affect the volume of exchange.

Another factor that has affected the Gulf area to a considerable degree is the reduction in oil prices and the consequent decline in the oil revenues of the Gulf states. This means that the surpluses of these states will be affected on account of this decline in oil prices. These surpluses are currently invested as deposits in the foreign banks.

Other factors include what has occurred in the unofficial securities market in Kuwait--the al-Manakh crisis--and the continuation of the Iraqi-Iranian war, which represents a myriad of dangers to the Gulf area. We can see this effect in the move among some banks toward limiting their level of operations in the area. However, we are confident that this situation--the decline in the assets of the offshore banks--will not continue for long. The evidence for this is the fact that the combined balance sheet of the offshore banks showed an increase for the first time in June, rising approximately 1 percent or \$500 million.

Many Applications

[Question] In light of this, have some of the offshore banks begun to pull out of the Bahrain market?

[Answer] On the contrary, there is a large number of applications on which the organization has not yet made a decision. I would like to point out that the organization has begun to take steps toward strictness and deliberateness before issuing any new licenses because we believe that current circumstances in world financial markets are not favorable to the issuing of new licenses, despite the attractiveness of the Bahrain market to a large number of world financial organizations and investors in the region.

Several Standards

[Question] What standards do you apply before issuing any licenses to open new offshore banking facilities in Bahrain?

[Answer] Actually, there are several standards governing the license for any organization. These standards start with the capital of the company or bank. For example, any banking institution that intends to work in Bahrain must be either a branch of one of the internationally recognized banks or a company organized in Bahrain with sufficient capital. In other words, this license must be consistent with the demands of the marketplace.

The second standard is that the bank or institution that intends to operate in the Bahrain market must possess a management with a high level of competence. We in the Monetary Organization require that the application be accompanied by the qualifications of the management, including applications from the directors and assistants.

The third standard is that there be a projected balance sheet of the organization and a cost-benefit study projecting the expected volume of operations of the bank or institution in the Bahrain marketplace. More important than this is consideration of the possibility that this organization or bank may open up a new field of operations comparable to the Bahrain market. If not, it is beneficial if the institution at least represents a market not currently represented in the Bahrain market--in other words, if this bank comes from a country in which there is no banking representation from the Gulf area. If we can obtain all this information in full, the application will be considered seriously and positively.

Elements of a Financial Center

[Question] But there were official estimates last year indicating that the Bahrain financial market had reached a saturation point. Is this thinking still current?

[Answer] You know, of course, that there are 72 offshore banking organizations in Bahrain and a number of representative offices that do not conduct banking operations. Without entering into a discussion of whether or not we have reached saturation point, it can be noted that up until the end of last year, there was considerable growth in the combined balance sheet of the offshore banks and commercial banks. As I said, the priority in the consideration of any new applications will take into consideration the standards I indicated a short while ago. We believe the most important of these standards is geographical representation. This means that if a bank submits to us an application to obtain a license, the question will be whether the state to which this bank belongs is represented sufficiently in Bahrain in proportion to the size of its commercial interests in the Gulf area. It can be said in general that the principle we adhere to in these cases is to endeavor to give Bahrain all the elements that make up a world financial center.

Stock in Foreign Banks

[Question] The Saudi monetary authorities have taken several measures to "Saudize" the sector of the foreign banks operating there while the UAE has begun to move in that direction. Do you have any intention to "Bahrainize" the commercial foreign banks in Bahrain?

[Answer] As you know, there are 19 commercial banks in Bahrain. Three of these are national banks and the remainder are branches of foreign banks. Questions of this sort are being heard continuously. Does the organization intend to permit citizens to own a portion of the stock of the commercial banks operating in Bahrain as has been done in Saudi Arabia in the past? And what does the UAE intend to do? Our answer to this has two parts. First, the Bahrain market has developed a distinctive character based on freedom of entry into the market. Consequently, any move to force the foreign commercial banks operating in Bahrain to sell a percentage of their shares to the citizens will not be interpreted correctly in financial circles. It could have an impact on the reputation that Bahrain has gained as a world financial center. However, this does not mean that the organization opposes the investment of local capital in the foreign commercial banks working in Bahrain. In fact, we encourage and strongly support such initiatives.

The second part of the answer is that if we look at the total assets of the commercial banks, we will find that the three national banks have approximately 70 percent of the total operations of the commercial market with the remaining 30 percent divided among the foreign banks. Two foreign banks that have been in the market for a long time predominate among the foreign banks. In short, the gains that could be realized from requiring the foreign commercial banks to sell part of their stock to the citizens appear to be insignificant.

[Question] You spoke of the organization's encouragement of private sector initiatives in this direction. Have any such initiatives actually been made?

We Encourage Initiatives

[Answer] A number of local investors have submitted requests to us to participate in the capital of an Arab commercial bank. However, the negotiations with the management of the bank have not been completed yet. As I said, we encourage initiatives such as this--after studying them, of course.

Coordination Among the GCC States

[Question] This means that the disparities will continue to exist in the monetary policies of the GCC states. In your opinion, what are the appropriate means to coordinate the monetary policies of the six states?

[Answer] Any monetary policy is based on two main elements. The first is an interest rate policy and the second is an exchange rate policy. In addition, there is a third element that is organically linked, namely, the coordination of credit policies. The recent meeting of the central bank directors of the GCC states formed a committee of experts to study the possibility of coordinating or standardizing the exchange rate of the currencies of the GCC states. This naturally demands consideration of interest rates because it is impossible to standardize exchange rates without regulating interest rates on Gulf currencies. The committee of experts will prepare a report to be submitted to the next meeting of the committee of Central bank directors of the GCC states. If the report is approved, it will be put in the appropriate practical forms to achieve coordination or standardization of the monetary policies of the GCC states.

Standardized Currency

[Question] What about standardized Gulf currency?

[Answer] Without a doubt, the establishment of a common Gulf currency is a goal of everyone. However, as I said a short while ago, there are essential prerequisites that must be met first, including the standardization of exchange rates of the currencies of the GCC states. This is a policy that will take some time, as you well know.

[Question] What was the view of the central bank directors of the GCC states with regard to the offshore banking facilities in Bahrain?

[Answer] The meeting charged the committee of experts with preparing an integrated study of the role of the foreign banking organizations in Bahrain and their effect on the banking industry, the commercial markets, and development in general in the states of the area. The goal of the study is to attempt to arrive at a joint assessment of the role played by the foreign banking facilities' market in Bahrain.

8591

CSO: 4404/560

AGRICULTURAL BANK DIRECTOR DISCUSSES PLANS FOR RURAL SECTOR

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 21 Jul 83 p 8

[Interview with Bahnam 'Aziz Bani, general manager of Agricultural Bank, by Muhi-al-Din Jasim: "Role of Agricultural Bank in Achieving Food Security: Complete Plan to Support Agricultural Activities;" date and place not specified]

[Text] The credit plan of the Agricultural Cooperative Bank, which was determined by the annual agricultural conferences, complies with the requirements of agricultural action and supports farmers' needs with the finances necessary to carry out their agricultural projects. It implements the main goals set by the leadership of the party and the revolution to achieve complete agricultural development in the country and proceeds from the guidelines included in the agricultural sector working paper for 1981-1982, which is considered the handbook for action and the general framework for the financial operations which the bank embarked upon during 1981.

Achieving Food Security

In AL-THAWRAH's interview with Bahnam 'Aziz Bank, general manager of the Agricultural Cooperative Bank, he shed light on the bank's loan policy. He said: "Throughout the years of the revolution, and especially since 1980, the agricultural loan policy has occupied first place in the progress of the agricultural sector. Its dimensions and trends have been clear, with an increase in the effectiveness of financing in light of the party and revolution's reliance on development plans and programs aimed at exerting the utmost efforts to achieve food security, within the framework of the Arab agricultural integration plan."

He added: "In the forefront of these policies are increasing the bank's capital to 300 million dinars to enable it to expand its financial base to include the fields of crop and livestock production and offer banking facilities with conditions to encourage producers. This reflects in general on the size of investments in this sector in comparison to the averages which prevailed before 1980. During the years 1980-1982, they rose to 383 million dinars, distributed among 66,642 credit applicants."

Harmony of Distribution of Loans With Importance of Agricultural Projects

Explaining the bank's policy of distributing loans, he added:

During the past 3 years, loans were distributed according to the relative importance of those projects with regard to filling the people's needs for food, such as farm equipment and machinery seeds and fertilizer. The bank advanced loans of 144,265,093 dinars to 28,568 applicants for farm machinery and equipment. These included 115,364,543 dinars to purchase 25,579 tractors and 15,322,694 dinars to purchase 1,602 reapers. Loans for livestock totaled 141,837,489 dinars to 17,068 applicants, including 102,117,482 dinars for building poultry facilities; 24,380,821 dinars for operating them; and the remainder, 15,339,186 dinars, as a noninterest-bearing loan for other animal resource projects, such as calves, sheep, building lakes for fish, and beehives.

"There were 36,104,936 dinars in gardening loans to 15,121 applicants, including 22,292,887 dinars to establish new gardens and 13,812,049 dinars to develop and restore existing ones."

As for loans for equipment and agricultural marketing, the general manager says that 34,769,012 dinars in loans were recorded to 4,071 applicants, and 15,630,467 dinars to 458 applicants. Loans for machine services (cultivating, irrigating, reaping) totaled 4,985,481 dinars in 989 transactions. Total loans for other agricultural projects, which include land reclamation, construction of buildings and agricultural facilities for the peasant cooperative societies, and redemption of pledges, amounted to 5,237,614 dinars in 367 transactions.

Record Levels in Investing Bank's Finances

The general manager discussed the Agricultural Bank's investments during the war period, saying: "In fact, previous indicators show clearly that investment in agricultural loans in the crop and livestock fields during the period of the war has reached record levels, since the bank recorded the highest figure during the past 3 years. In 1981, credit totaled 186 million dinars in 30,461 transactions. It should be noted that the bank constantly asks for advice from the leadership of the party and the revolution, headed by the hero of national liberation Saddam Husayn, through the annual agricultural conferences. These come according to the development conditions through which the country is passing, provided that the programs and guidance remain the distinguishing characteristics of the fiscal path. Loans for agriculture mechanization reached record levels during the past 3 years, when their percentage of the total credit reached 38 percent. Loans for construction and operation of poultry facilities accounted for 37 percent, while loans for marketing and equipment totaled 13 percent, gardening 9 percent, and other agricultural purposes, 3 percent. The bank expects to change the aforementioned percentages for the end of this year and next year so that they

will go along with the desired categories and fields for credit according to the needs and requirements of the agricultural sector. The methods of the program must be effective in distributing loans according to the importance of the sectors and the needs of the agricultural stage of our country."

High Efficiency in Financing Agricultural Projects

The general manager went on to say that in spite of 3 years of aggressive war imposed by the regime of deceit and trickery in Iran, the bank has continued to be highly effective in financing agricultural projects with the guidance of the leadership. Figures indicate that total financing during the past 4 months of this year reached 8 million dinars distributed among 1,533 applicants, allocated according to the importance of the purposes and sectors identified by the eleventh agricultural conference.

Private sector loans totaled 5,730,607 dinars distributed among 1,371 transactions; cooperative sector loans totaled 2,254,062 dinars, in 159 transactions; and socialist sector loans amounted to 60,000 dinars, in three transactions.

Records in Financing

In closing, he said: "With regard to other agricultural purposes and other sectors, they also have been given high indicators. Loans for livestock amounted to 3,431,116 dinars in 500 transactions; for gardens, 1,696,142 dinars, in 501 transactions; loans for farm machinery, 72,487 dinars, 41 transactions; and 156,868 dinars for other purposes."

He added: "The bank expects its rate of agricultural financing to rise to record levels, surpassing those set over the past 3 years, when the law concerning leasing from the state by companies and individuals goes into effect. We hope that the bank's loans invested in specific agricultural fields will be positive factors during the coming years and will help to increase productivity in crops and livestock, subsequently benefiting all citizens, playing a part in strengthening and supporting the national economy, and taking an important step on the road to the desired food security."

7587

CSO: 4404/536

INTELLIGENCE CHIEF DONATES 18 MILLION DINARS TO WAR EFFORT

Baghdad AL-THAWRAH in Arabic 22 Jul 83 p 1

[Text] Barzan Ibrahim al-Takriti, chief of intelligence, came to the Republican Palace yesterday and presented a check for 14.3 million dinars as a contribution from the members of the intelligence leadership, in addition to the sum of 3.7 million dinars which was sent by the intelligence chiefs to the committee collecting contributions.

That brings the total contribution to 18 million dinars to strengthen the spirit of victory and participate in supporting our just battle against the malevolent Iranian forces.

Thus, the generous Iraqi gift is significant. The members of the intelligence staff have given a great deal to this nation. Since the outbreak of the revolution, they have dedicated themselves with vigilance to protecting its course, offering liberal sacrifices in confronting the enemies of the revolution from the malevolent agent forces. They have constituted a brave, persistent fighting group, and with this generous financial contribution they strengthen the will to fight against the Iranian aggression until final victory is won, pursuing the splendid constructive path under the leadership of the nation's hero and hope, President Saddam Husayn, until the historic revival of our Arab nation is achieved.

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CSO: 4404/536

SOUTH LEBANON WILL CONTINUE TO RESIST ISRAELI OCCUPATION

Doha AL-'AHD in Arabic 2 Aug 83 pp 18-19

/Interview with Mustafa Sa'd, secretary general of the popular Nasirite organization in Sidon: "Partial Withdrawal Will Ultimately Lead to Partition"; date not given/

/Text/ Southern Lebanon is passing through a very delicate and sensitive period, especially after the Israeli-Lebanese agreement was signed and when the idea of a partial withdrawal was raised, by which time the occupation forces had effectively hastened to create a new reality in this Arab territory by transforming it into another West Bank by the acts of war, oppression, forced expulsion, murder, and assassination that they performed.

AL-'AHD met in Sidon, the capital of the south, with Eng Mustafa Sa'd, secretary general of the popular Nasirite organization, and held a lengthy conversation with him about the efforts of the south and the developments he expects. The interview turned also to a number of other issues that exist beyond the Lebanese arena. Following is the text of the interview:

/Question/ How do you view the partial withdrawal and to what extent has that reflected on the general situation in Lebanon, and in the south in particular?

/Answer/ In the first place we call for an unconditional Israeli withdrawal from Lebanese territories calling on the Security Council resolutions 508 and 509. Such a withdrawal embodies the desires of the overwhelming majority of the Lebanese people who are passionately looking forward to the day when they will no longer see a single Israeli or foreign soldier contaminating the soil of our homeland.

The new American-Israeli scenario about partial withdrawals from Lebanon is nothing but an attempt to partition a large chunk of our homeland and place us under Israeli control on a permanent basis. Thus they accomplish both the American goal, which aims at breaking the impasse that has currently set into the Lebanese situation on the one hand and likewise the Israeli goal which aims at ridding itself of the principle of a total withdrawal from Lebanese territories, thereby achieving a historic Israeli ambition to have permanent control over the south of Lebanon.

I feel that Lebanon is the biggest loser, in spite of all the treacherous American pledges with which America has promised to work for the evacuation of foreign forces from Lebanon and to work on establishing the legitimate government over all Lebanese territories. Their actual implementation has been completely the contrary. Lebanon's interest is the last thing American policy is working for.

I look at the situation in Lebanon now and after the passage of a full year since the Israeli annihilation of Lebanon and the sinking of the Lebanese state to being entirely a pawn to American policy, becoming a land even more fragmented, even more projects to break it up and divide it more effectively and finally, yet we still feel the grave threat more than at any time in the past history of our land of being a united entity. This step of partial withdrawal is nothing but confirmation of the fears of our country's fate and its continued existence as an independent united entity. Opposition to the dangers of the Israeli-American policy with regard to Lebanon requires the Lebanese Government to adopt a different policy course which must regard the defective elements currently existing. They are:

First, the Lebanese Government's acting totally as a pawn of American policy to save Lebanon.

Second: Ignoring the historic Zionist ambitions for Lebanon. These ambitions began to clearly appear by the time of the final partition of the south.

Third: Choking off the expressions of opposition and resistance to the Israeli occupation.

The dangers that threaten the country in general take on an acute and direct form in south Lebanon which is oppressing by its presence every citizen of the south. Attempts to attach the south to Israel began to become clear from the first day of the Israeli attack on both the economic and political planes, not just the military plane.

Practices of Israeli Repression

Israeli acts to degrade the people of the south have taken different forms, ranging from flattery to arrests to total warfare of some villages of the south. The questions are to what extent could Israel suppress this voice?

What I will say is not any revelation but it is a truth which is becoming well-known far and wide. Israeli forces practice some of the extreme means of terrorism oppression and degradation against the southerners between the ages of 12 and 75. The occupation forces do not distinguish between children and elders, not even women. The efforts of citizens of the south have not been limited by these practices, although we are unable sometimes to even find the word to express this. In addition to the destruction which the Israeli invasion left behind, the effects of which are still visible, and which ruined industrial, educational, residential, and agricultural establishments alike, we cannot forget the memory of the hundreds of murdered, wounded, disfigured, and of those who are buried by the hundreds in the very middle of Sidon. There were ongoing arrest campaigns this summer imposed on the sons of the south who live under this burden and anxiety.

There is the Ansar detention camp where thousands of Lebanese and Palestinian detainees are kept. This detention camp is like the Nazi concentration camps and the detainees exist in it in manner incompatible with the barest minimum of humane standards. The dozens whom the Israeli forces have released have been afflicted with diseases as a result of their improper treatment; prisoners have lost their limbs as a result of torture.

Before and after the invasion there was the daily encirclement of the resisting villages of the south. Village followed village in capitulation and humiliation. Israeli forces executed night raids and daily arrests concentrated on Sidon and the south. They arrested young people and led them off to Israeli centers and subjected them to various kinds of psychological and physical coercion tactics until the municipal palace in Sidon which is the "Israeli military governor's headquarters," was transformed into a torture and terror gallery. And in addition there were persistent attempts to transfer the south to the Israeli market by tying it economically and comprehensively to Israeli by flooding southern markets with Israeli goods of all types, while at the same time hindering Lebanese goods from arriving from Beirut and other regions of Lebanon. Likewise the continual campaigns of cutting down citrus and other fruit trees under the guise of security concerns.

All of these attempts aim at subjecting the south to their attachment to Israel. But we here from the resisting lands of south Lebanon assert out loud that the people of the south are unswerving in their nationalism, and in spite of all the terrorism, oppression, degradation, and coercion that we have borne, our position is clear and our opposition to the occupation will continually escalate and the voice of the south will remain one and united in rejecting the occupation, and refusing to cooperate with it. We will call for their evacuation from our land and for the return of the legitimate authority to spread its rule over all the lands of Lebanon and the south. These humiliating practices will not augment anything except our insistence for our position. The southerner will not increase anything except his tenacity for his land and a more intense opposition. There was a comprehensive response on the day of national mourning on the first anniversary of the Israeli invasion of Lebanon throughout all of the south, which remembered the peoples of Dayr Qanun al-Nahr, 'Arab Salim, and Kafr Sayr who held out against the Israeli siege but failed. No terrorist means nor enticement means have succeeded nor will any method succeed in the future to change the south into an Israeli protectorate. The south will always be an ignited land, a land of perpetual turmoil. Let that be known.

Situation in Beirut and the Mountains

Question/ The legitimacy of the Lebanese Government in all its organs is under attack in Beirut. In light of that how do you view the security situation here?

Answer/ The security situation in Beirut is unstable. There are many explosions aimed against this or that. I won't enter into details, except to say that the government did not touch East Beirut where there remains an armed force other than the legitimate Lebanese army.

Question/ And the situation in the mountains?

Answer/ The unsettled situation in the mountains does not accommodate the risks under the slogan of salvation which has been raised by the Lebanese Government. All these matters call for the state, being the most concerned party, to make an effective gesture on the internal Lebanese situation in order to assure the bases of national reconciliation which will fit what is said to the actual situation because Lebanese unity is the first and last guaranty. Any treatment based on the principle of the dominant and the dominated, or any course that relies on sectarian hegemony instead of the resources of the country, or any role which focuses on obtaining strength through support of (whatever) outsiders, will not be in Lebanon's interest either as an entity or homeland.

Trips by American Envoys

Question/ In light of that how do you view the course of the Israeli-Lebanese agreement in regards to the stepped up trips of American envoys to the region?

Answer/ That agreement obligated Lebanon without having Lebanon's interests in mind. In brief this agreement responded to American and Israeli needs without any benefit falling to Lebanon. Because its existence on the one hand must give legitimacy to the situation that now exists, and yet on the other hand it is powerless to change that situation, this stalemated agreement is the legal basis that compels the Lebanese Government to act as a pawn for American policy. The most succinct commentary was offered by one of the prominent Lebanese politicians who said: "This agreement makes us closer to Israel than to the Arabs and puts us in the heart of the Middle East crisis after every attempt had been made to separate the Lebanese crisis from the Middle East crisis." Likewise after Lebanon had always tried to be neutral in the international struggle, she is now today in the thick of that struggle. Even more she is on the side of one of the two parties (the United States). Can this weak, exhausted divided country support such a commitment? I can imagine Lebanon getting out of this impasse by the Lebanese Government's retreat from this treaty which is not in Lebanon's economic, political, or security interests, and by working to implement the Security Council resolutions 508 and 509 concerned with the unconditional evacuation of Israeli forces from Lebanon. It should likewise work for the expulsion of all foreign forces from Lebanon which would then enable the Lebanese Government to extend its authority over all Lebanese territories.

It is in the interest of the Lebanese Government to bear in mind a well-established fact, and this is what we shall tell the new tour of American envoys in the region, and likewise to all countries that revolve around the American sphere, namely: "That there can be no true peace or security in Lebanon or in the region unless the Soviet Union participates and that being a hostage to the U.S. role alone is not in Lebanon's interest nor the interests of its independence, leadership, nor survival as a united entity."

I consider that the basic force which the Lebanese Government can rely on is the unity of the Lebanese, which comprises the most powerful element of all the circumstances because without a true Lebanese national reconciliation the Lebanese situation will remain the weakest element in the equation.

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS COMPLETED WITH CUBAN ASSISTANCE

Aden 14 UKTUBAR AL-USBU'I in Arabic 15 Jul 83 p 2

[Article: "The Construction Capacity of the Local Building Organization in the Governorate of Aden has Grown"]

[Text] The construction capacity of the local construction organization in the governorate of Aden has increased in the last 2 years. During 1982 1.4 million dinars worth of work was completed. By the end of this year the amount is expected to reach 1.92 million dinars. In 1980 and 1981 520,000 dinars worth of work was completed. In a conversation with the Aden News Agency 2 days ago Comrade Ahmad 'Abd-al-Wasi', the director general of the organization, explained that this is due to several factors, among them the following: the growth of the labor force; the availability of useful tools and equipment; the relationship which links the organization with the building organization in socialist Cuba, which has improved the skills and capabilities of Yemeni workers, and has provided expertise and skills. He mentioned that the organization is currently implementing several projects. Among these are 400 homes in al-Mamdarah; the headquarters for the State Meat Company; maintenance of the historic Aden lighthouse; the production base; public warehouses in al-Mansurah; and experimental apartments. Several projects are scheduled for implementation in the future, such as the headquarters of the land transport [organization] and three polytechnic units. During the last 2 years the organization completed a project to erect a memorial to the unknown soldier. It has implemented other projects on time. He indicated that there is now a movement to establish a joint Yemeni-Cuban construction organization to begin activities early in 1984. It should be noted that the local construction organization in the governorate of Aden was established in February 1980 pursuant to cabinet resolution number 20 of 1980. It enjoys financial and administrative independence and is under the supervision of the head of the executive office in the governorate. It is a subsidiary of the Ministry of Installations and it implements housing and service projects in the governorate of Aden.

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CSO: 4404/545

PEOPLE'S DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF YEMEN

AGRICULTURE, FISHERIES EXPORT PRODUCTION REVIEWED

Aden 14 UKTUBAR in Arabic 6 Jul 83 p 3

[Article by Najat 'Ali Yahya: "Fish Exports Are Suffering From a Shortage of Storage Space; High Levels of Production Are Harming Productivity"]

[Text] Exports play an important part in raising the level of our national economy. In order to find out about the quantity and volume of exports and the reasons behind their lower levels, and to find out about the problems that stand in the way of increasing them, we met with Ahmad Salih, the deputy director general of the foreign trade company.

An Article About the Export Bureau in the National Foreign Trade Company

Until the nationalization proclamation in 1969 the export bureau's activities were limited to exporting and reexporting leather which came from Somalia and North Yemen, as well as locally produced leather, Somali incense, and Yemeni coffee beans. Many local goods are no longer exported, such as dragon's blood, henna, aloe and mother of pearl. All of these are products of the island of Socotra. The company was compelled to suspend trade in them because their supply was irregular and because of the difficulty of sea and postal communications, making contact with its branches in Socotra difficult. Furthermore, there are no permanent markets, and the cost of these items rose. Therefore, the export agency now concentrates on the following goods:

Cotton: The company has assumed responsibility for marketing by opening it up to annual international competitive bidding through its membership in the Cotton Marketing Board.

Various varieties of tobacco: The company offers it to foreign markets through competitive bidding or direct selling to importers. It also fills the demand of the local market by supplying merchants and distributors with these products.

Dried lime: It is sold to the foreign markets in the same way as tobacco, except that is not sold locally because there is no local market for it.

Henna: It is sold in the same way as tobacco both locally and for export.

It should be noted that there are other local products which are the republic exports through other agencies, such as the Ministry of Fish Resources, the Ministry of Industry and the State Salt Company. This means that the company's export bureau is not the local agent responsible for all exports throughout the republic.

The Volume and Value of Exports

When I inquired about the volume and value of exports for 1980, 1981 and 1982, and about the increase in the balance of exports during those years, the director provided me with the following table:

<u>Value in U.S. Dollars</u>	<u>Quantity</u>	<u>Details</u>
<u>1980</u>		
9,005,675	2,898 bales	cotton
56,175	25 tons	dried lime
173,798	3,400 (farasilah)	henna
1,111,979	6,000 (farasilah)	Ghayli tobacco
<u>1981</u>		
1,217,698	2,931 bales	cotton
101,915	40 tons	dried lime
240,544	4,500 (farasilah)	henna
1,667,149	7,545 (farasilah)	Ghayli tobacco
<u>1982</u>		
6,168,470	21,523 bales	cotton
128,000	80 tons	dried lime
The entire crop was consumed by the local market.	8,000 (farasilah)	henna
748,661	3,050 (farasilah)	Ghayli tobacco

The Most Important Export Markets

Cotton is sold to Great Britain, Switzerland, France, Bulgaria and West Germany. Tobacco is sold to the Gulf states, North Yemen and Saudi Arabia. Dried lime is sold to the Gulf states. Henna is sold to North Yemen, Djibouti and some Arab countries.

The Reasons for the Decreasing Volume of Exports

The reduction of exports is due chiefly to natural factors such as floods, plant epidemics and drought. Certain production factors are usually a cause of reduced production and as a result they are a cause of reduced quantities exported. This does not help in formulating an export plan. But the company is basically relying on the production plan of the cooperatives, the state farms and the development organizations in Abyan and Tibn. The company is strenuously attempting to develop and expand production through trade shows held by the chamber of commerce and industry in many foreign countries, such as the Soviet Union, democratic Germany and Bulgaria. We asked about the volume of exports by the cigarette and match factory during the years 1980, 1981 and 1982. The cigarette factory's director general for financial and administrative affairs answered us, "We are unable to report the volume and value of exports for 1980, 1981 and 1982 because we only began to export cigarettes in early 1982 through an agreement with our agents in North Yemen, Saudi Arabia and the Gulf. An estimated 3,396 cartons of cigarettes with a total value of \$339,600 were exported. An estimated 10,000 cartons of matches valued at \$25,000 were also exported. We can't make any comparisons because we only began to export in 1982. Furthermore, cigarettes are a product that is subject to whims of taste, and ours do not have the same reputation as the widely advertised and distributed brands."

Plans for 1983

What about your plan for 1983?

We do not have an export plan, but if we should have a surplus, and the demand exists, we can export. Our brands are Perim and Radfan. We are currently prepared to export Radfan should there be a surplus.

Another factor preventing us from formulating an export plan is the instability of the markets.

We were all set to export to the Saudi market. But as a result of a decision by the concerned agencies there limiting the percentage of nicotine and tar in cigarettes--a percentage that is considered lower in our cigarettes--we were forced to postpone exporting until we purchase the laboratory equipment to help us make the appropriate measurements.

The only obstacle to regular sales and exports to Djibouti is [poor] communications--that is, transport--which is essential for regular sales and consumption.

We currently have a protocol with Ethiopia and arrangements for exporting there are expected to be completed by the end of this year.

It is clear that exports and export growth have been irregular. What, in your opinion, are the solutions?

The answer given by the deputy director general of the foreign trade company contained points of support and encouragement from organizations involved in exporting, such as those involved in trade, finance, and currency supervision. [He promised] to expedite the issuance of export permits.

[He promised] more advertising.

[He promised] that people's tastes would be studied. This will require time.

The Most Important Thing is Study

The director told us that cigarette exports have been significantly lower. This calls for a study to determine the reasons behind the reduced quantities in these exports. [We should also consider] the solutions mentioned to us by the director. The important thing is how will we make it as realistic as possible? and who, I wonder, will be responsible for its implementation?

Fish Exports Are Not Stable

On the subject of fish exports 'Abd-al-Rahman 'Abd-al-Rabb, deputy director general for marketing affairs, told us the following: "The party and the state have shown themselves to be particularly concerned with the development of this sector through investments in development plans. This has been accomplished by developing the national fleet and by improving the construction of economic and fishing installations through the introduction of modern technology in this area."

He continued, "It has not been possible to maintain the peak levels of our exports of various marine products. Rather, there has been fluctuation from one year to the next during the last 3 years."

What about the fluctuations?

The deputy director said, "The reason for the fluctuation is the quantity of the various fish that have been caught. Every product has a specific value. Thus, the larger the catch, the greater the value, and the more the high-priced item is caught. The most important of these exports are squid, rock (sharukh) [kingfish?], deep-sea (sharukh), (rish), and lukhm. One of our most pressing problems is obtaining adequate storage for these products so that we can sell them at the appropriate time according to the demands of the market. This has an effect on prices because the better we are able to store our products and sell them at the appropriate time, the higher the prices we can realize.

"Japan is the market for squid. Squid is sold through public bidding. It is stored on the boats in the water. This makes it necessary for us to sell the product for the highest price bid, despite the fact that we know that this price is not suitable. We are faced with a situation

in which we either accept the price or we stop fishing operations. We have two choices: either sell or stop fishing, because of the inadequate storage capacity on the boats."

What has the ministry done about this?

The ministry has taken the following steps:

Reduce the fishing boats for the Japanese boats.

Provide guidance for commercial fishing operations, with instructions on preserving products that have been stored and that have actually begun to be affected. This was a major reason for the fluctuations in export levels.

Conduct a marketing policy for our exports to export them to the consumer countries.

Diversify exports, and study the markets.

The following table shows clearly the fluctuations in the volume and value of exports in 1980, 1981 and 1982. It shows clearly a decrease in quantities caught and marketed abroad. It is quite obvious that this has resulted in a reduced value of exports.

<u>Value in dollars</u>	<u>Quantity in tons</u>	<u>Year</u>
18,072,180	6,792	1980
6,083,861	2,677	1981
8,167,386	3,981	1982

Types of fish exported:

1. (banjiz) squid
2. rock (sharukh)
3. deep-sea (sharukh)
4. white (zanjah)
5. (rish lakhm)
6. fish meal

What are the chief factors behind the lower prices and the reduced volume of exports?

The following are the principal causative factors in the reduction of prices and the reduced volume and value of our exports:

1. The size of the catch
2. The law of supply and demand
3. Our failure to sell the product to the principal market

4. Our failure to prepare our products in conformity with the specifications of the primary market for these items.

The Plan for 1983 and Increased Exports

The program which we have devised provides for increasing the

The program which we have devised provides for increasing the volume of exports, diversifying the products that are exported, diversifying the markets, improving the way the goods are prepared, seeking solutions to transport problems, actively promoting our exports, training the employees of the foreign sales division, and preparing a monthly bulletin about foreign marketing.

From what the organization's deputy director general for marketing affairs says we can conclude that there has been a drop in the volume and quantity of goods that are being marketed.

What steps, then, must the ministry and the organization take to increase exports?

The deputy said, "I believe the following steps must be taken:

"1. We must study the economic feasibility of having our boats fish for squid and rock (sharukh) in light of actual practice. Not so that we can find out the usefulness of the activity [sic].

"2. We must reexamine the fishing grounds law to provide penalties for those who violate fishing grounds which are closed during the breeding season. We must establish rigorous penalties because such an offense is a transgression against national economy.

"3. We must establish rigorous surveillance of our territorial waters to defend them against any unknown fishing boats. Security surveillance plays a major role in this area."

9123
CSO: 4404/545

IRAN

MOSCOW BLASTED FOR ATTITUDE TOWARDS IRAN-IRAQ WAR, TUDEH PARTY

Tehran JOMHURI-YE ESLAMI in Persian 17 Aug 83 p 3

[Text] In its Tuesday night Persian-language news broadcast at 2030 hours, RADIO MOSCOW broke its long silence on the imposed war and the victories of Islam's soldiers in the victorious Val-Fajr II and III operations. Its commentary explained the Kremlin's position on the issue of the imposed war.

The repetition of the Kremlin's previous positions examined in this commentary is noteworthy since the uniformity of the policies of the United States and the West with those of the Soviet Union at the present juncture of Islam's history-making war against blasphemy has become completely obvious. Their news media even use similar expressions in their statements and commentaries.

The beginning of RADIO MOSCOW's broadcast, which quoted the political weekly NEW AGE, briefly examined the results of the Val-Fajr II and III operations, and quoting what the radio termed foreign observers, claimed that with a probability bordering on certainty Iran's operations will not affect the overall status of the front.

Following this introduction attempting to belittle the victories of Islam's combatants, the radio claimed that it has become totally clear after 3 years of war that the war is coming to a dead-end.

Parenthetically, the noteworthy point here is that simultaneously with the Kremlin's claim, U.S. and Western imperialism continue spreading the rumor of the war reaching a dead end, using the international media on a wide scale.

As an example, almost simultaneously with RADIO MOSCOW's broadcast, the BBC broadcasted at 2200 hours a Persian-language report-like commentary quoting NEWSWEEK on the imposed war, claiming that the war has reached a deadlock from the military standpoint. Furthermore VOA made mention of this topic during news about the imposed war the night before last.

As RADIO MOSCOW continued its speechifying, it described the imposed war as a factor leading to the strengthening of the imperialist and Zionist ties in the Persian Gulf, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean, without even mentioning the factors of the Iraqi regime's aggression and daily-increasing dependency

on the United States and the West. It continued by declaring the Islamic and ideologically pure goals of Islam's soldiers to be vengeful, racist tendencies. The radio similarly considers the policy of the Islamic republic towards the imposed war a factor in the suppression of so-called patriotic domestic forces. In RADIO MOSCOW's opinion, the traitorous, affiliated and dissolved Tudeh Party is one of the friends of these forces.

It seems as if this radio in its continuing support for the dissolved Tudeh Party's treacheries ignores the undeniable facts relating to the exposure of Tudeh Party agents' espionage within some ranks of the military. In this dimension of its treachery the party was blatantly supporting the regime ruling Baghdad, but the radio fancies it was only putting its hand forward so as not to fall.

This radio interprets the demagogic motions of Bahi J's regime aimed at forcing an imposed peace on the Islamic Republic of Iran as signs indicating the Baghdad regime's good will and desire for peace. After mentioning these efforts of political propaganda, it implied that the uncompromising position of the government and nation of Muslim Iran towards the plot of imposed peace and demagoguery is Iranian 'expansionism' and 'bellicosity'.

In order to prove its claims, which were quoted from Iraq, the radio was here compelled to lie about the reality of the Ba'thist aggressors' occupation of a portion of the Islamic homeland's soil.

This statement was made while the major goal of the Val-Fajr III operation was to drive the aggressor out of another part of the Islamic homeland's soil. Furthermore, other areas, including Naft-e Shahr, are still occupied by Saddam's mercenary army. It would be better if those preparing RADIO MOSCOW's commentary would do some research themselves rather than relying on Baghdad's claims, which are usually retracted within a few days or replaced by some other grand claim.

At the end of this commentary, which turned the whole reality of the imposed war upside down by making baseless claims, RADIO MOSCOW stressed the necessity of finding political, compromising solutions to end the war.

9597
CSO: 4640/337

INDIAN MINISTER'S USSR TALKS CITED: POLITICAL UNCERTAINTY VIEWED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 10 Sep 83 pp 1, 8

[Article by Bhabani Sen Gupta]

[Text] NEW DELHI, Sept. 9: Within 100 days of inauguration of South Asian regional cooperation, a series of events have once again exposed the native cleavages in the region thereby underlining the inbuilt difficulties in bringing the regional nations closer together. Closely following on the heels of the anti-Tamil carnage in Sri Lanka, broke out the political unrest in Sind and elsewhere in Pakistan. Simultaneously, India's relations with Bangladesh were strained by New Delhi's unilateral decision to build a barbed wire fencing across India's border with Bangladesh. As if all these were not enough, deportation of a batch of Nepali job-seekers by India because they had entered this country in the Siliguri area which is heavily militarised has sparked a dispute between India and Nepal which has the dangerous potential of exploding into an ethno-national crisis between the two neighbours.

None of the four issues has remained, nor it seems they can be kept, strictly bilateral problems. The plight of the Tamils in Sri Lanka and the anti-regime demonstrators in Pakistan have already drawn extensive international attention. The Lankan President Junius Jayewardene tried even early August to internationalise the Sinhala-Tamil conflict when he sounded four governments for possible military or other assistance and later sent his Foreign Minister to several capitals. Now, the leader of the Tamil United Liberation Front, Amirthalingham, has gone to London, reportedly with the approval of the Indian government, to acquaint the British authorities with those aspects of the ethnic-national cleavage in Sri Lanka which are of vital interest to the Tamil minority.

The Pakistani politicians who have taken refuge in London have been sparing no effort to internationalise the political conflict between MRD and the military regime. The Indian Foreign Minister Narasimha Rao in a surprise visit to Moscow last week discussed developments in Pakistan and Sri Lanka with the Soviet Foreign Minister Andre Gromyko. The military ruler of Bangladesh, who faces an imminent movement by the opposition parties including the Awami League for elections earlier than March 1985, is reported to have

decided to bring the Indian decision to barbwire the border first to the notice of the regional countries and later of the international community. Reports from Kathmandu suggest that at least one Nepali organisation which is spearheading a still anti-Indian movement in the Kingdom has sought the help of China.

The silver lining in this otherwise ominous regional cloudscape is that none of the South Asian countries has taken any step to smother the sibling of regional cooperation. The regional governments have obviously learnt from the behaviour of other conflicted nations. The KAL plane crisis has generated a lot of cold war heat, but has not stalled the moderate momentum in U.S.-Soviet dialogue: It did not prevent a meeting in Madrid between Gromyko and Shultz, nor in Geneva between two powers' representatives to arms limitation talks. Across the globe, in China the KAL plane crisis did not halt the process of Sino-Soviet negotiations for normalisation of relations. The Chinese have quite cordially received Mikhail Kapitsa, a Deputy Foreign Minister for the USSR and one of the foremost Soviet experts on China, who is said to be close to Andropov's thinking on how to resolve the last knots of the 20-year-old Sino-Soviet impasse. If the major nations of the world can live with conflicts and cleavages and still soldier for cooperation and normalisation of relations, it would be unfortunate if countries in South Asia cannot do the same.

The fact that President Ziaul Haq reacted with restraint to the Indian government's expression of sympathy and support to the Pakistanis who have been agitating for early return of democracy has made a good impression on Indian public opinion. Prime Minister Indira Gandhi in her personal communication to Gen. Zia has assured him that her government has no intention to interfere in Pakistan's internal problems. She has, however, pleaded earnestly for release of Abdul Gaffar Khan. Whether or not Mrs. Gandhi's letter makes up for her own and her government's statements of August which drew forth a protest from Islamabad, the point to be noted is that political elites in neither country has any longer a monolithic image of the other. The Indian expression of support to the NRD followers in Pakistan divided the Indian political elites.

Political and diplomatic circles in New Delhi have now lowered their sight of the NRD movement launched on Aug. 14. It is generally conceded that the agitation has not gathered enough momentum and that the abstaining of Punjab from the agitation has been a tremendous victory for the military regime especially of President Zia himself.

Nevertheless, the feeling in Western as well as Asian diplomatic circles in New Delhi is that the agitation has not been a failure. Several Americans who recently came to Delhi from Pakistan told this correspondent that they expected the movement to simmer for a long time and that they would not be surprised if it spread to Punjab.

The broad assessment of the overall Pakistani political situation in political and diplomatic circles here is that President Zia will probably have to initiate a process of consultations with political leaders in the near future,

and that result of these consultations would probably be the advancing of election by several months, restoration of more of the 1973 Constitution that was allowed in the President's Aug. 12 announcement, and participation of the political parties in the political and electoral process.

If this means a period of political uncertainty in Pakistan, will the negotiations between Islamabad and New Delhi for a treaty relationship be halted or will they proceed regardless of who rules in either country? Also, what would happen to the other negotiation between Pakistan, Afghanistan and the USSR under U.N. auspices for a comprehensive political settlement of the Afghan problem? My own inquiries lead me to believe that the Indian government is ready to participate in the next round of talks as and when the government of Pakistan would signal its readiness. Since the next round is to take place in Islamabad, the initiative for it must come from the Pakistani Foreign Office.

Gen. Zia is not among the 30 Heads of State listed in the Indian Foreign Office as sure participants in the 'world summit' at U.N. headquarters later this month called by the seventh Non-Aligned Summit Conference in New Delhi last March. If Gen. Zia goes to New York a meeting between him and Mrs. Gandhi could give a push to the India-Pakistan negotiations.

Rao, who discussed regional and global issues with Gromyko in Moscow was reportedly told by the Soviet Foreign Minister that the Afghan negotiations would be resumed at the U.N. later this month. Pakistani political developments are being as closely monitored by the Soviets as by the Americans. Radio Moscow, however, has been far more restrained than the Voice of America and BBC in reporting the MRD movement. According to sources close to the Indian Foreign Office, Moscow, has no intention to burn its boats with Gen. Zia and is willing to engage in serious negotiations for a political settlement in Afghanistan. The question is whether the political incidents in Pakistan have not changed American perspectives of the longevity of military rule in the country. If observations made by several American dignitaries who came recently to Delhi from Islamabad reflected the American mind, it is definitely lacerated with doubts about the future of U.S.-Pakistani relations.

CSO: 4600/02

PRO-INDIA STATEMENTS OF EXILED PAKISTANI LEADERS CRITICIZED

Karachi JANG in Urdu 2 Sep 83 p 3

/Editorial: "Statements of Leaders Living in London" /

[Text] Mr Gulam Mustafa Khar, a leader of the defunct People's Party PPP, said in London that Prime Minister Indira Gandhi's statement has a great influence on Pakistanis. Supporting Mrs Gandhi's statement, he said that other neighboring democratic countries should also support the establishment of a democracy in Pakistan. According to ALL-INDIA RADIO, Mr Khar said that Mrs Gandhi does not mean to interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs. According to Mr Khar, India is the greatest democracy in the world. He added that Mrs Gandhi supports efforts to achieve a democratic government in any country, especially those who are India's neighbors. Jam Sadiq Ali, another leader of the defunct PPP, has declared that people in Pakistan in general and those in Sind in particular are thankful to Mrs Gandhi for her statement.

According to a spokesman representing the Indian Government, the media did not reflect the true position of the Indian Government. The Indian Government even insisted that ALL-INDIA RADIO did not broadcast the statement properly. But these statements were made only after learning of the nationwide opposition to the statement. Later, a government spokesman in New Delhi said that the statement was made at a party meeting, the purpose of which was to defend India from incidents in Pakistan. The Indian spokesman added that "we support the establishment of any kind of government without interfering in their internal affairs." Referring to the statement of the Indian foreign minister, the Indian spokesman said: "This statement was given in support of Abdul Ghaffar Khan, who is the only living supporter of our movement for freedom and the companion of Mahatama Gandhi, Pandit Nehru and our prime minister. Also, he is respected by our people."

It is obvious from the statement by India's prime minister, India's explanation of it and the support given it by PPP leaders stationed in other countries that the Indian prime minister made this statement just to stir trouble in Pakistan. When Pakistani and world media reacted differently to it, however, the Indian Government backed down. One reason for this change in attitude is that Indira Gandhi, regardless of her championing of democratic principles, cannot cross the diplomatic barriers and interfere in Pakistan's internal affairs. It is a sad state of affairs that leaders who consider Indira a champion of democracy

forget that when the Parliament of Kuwait expressed concern at the massacre of thousands of Muslims in India, India expressed anger at this interference in its internal affairs. Leaders who consider India a model of democracy are blind to the continuous denial of rights to Muslims there and the refusal to grant Sikhs their democratic rights. But whenever Indian leaders issue statements in support of any movement in Pakistan, these leaders /living in London/ prostrate themselves and begin to sing songs in praise of Indian adherence to democratic principles.

Even though we do not believe that incidents in Sind are directed by a foreign power, we are forced to think that Indira is playing the same game with the help of her Russian sponsors that she played 12 years ago in East Pakistan. This is evident from Indira's statement, which was condemned by the opposition parties and supported by the pro-Russian Communist Party of India. Also, the pro-Indian statements of Pakistani leaders living in London sound like replicas of the statements made by leaders of the defunct Awami League in Calcutta. As for an early election, the establishment of democratic rule in Pakistan and the involvement of people in government, we have always supported in these columns the demands of the people. We have also written that the government should discriminate between political workers and subversive groups. Lieutenant General Abbasi, governor of Sind, has declared that the government is not treating political workers and subversive groups similarly. Nevertheless, we have told the opposition to distinguish between the government and the country. Governments come and go; countries stay. Opposing a government is known as politics and this kind of politics is practiced in every country. It is not a crime. Pakistanis have the full right to start a movement in their country and they are the ones to decide the kind of government they want. We cannot give this right to Indira Gandhi or the pro-Russian Communist Party. They cannot mold Pakistanis as they wish and pave the way to bring leaders with vested interests back to power. Mr Mustafa Khar and Jam-e Sadiq Ali have served no purpose of the PPP by expressing their gratitude to Mrs Gandhi for her statement. Instead, they have forewarned the millions of patriots here who are wondering if the history of Jaffar and Sadiq is being repeated once again.

7997
CSO: 4656/253

BHUTTO WOMEN'S PLIGHT DISCUSSED, COURAGE LAUDED

Calcutta SUNDAY in English 11-17 Sep 83 pp 22-24

[Article by Tariq Ali: "The Bhutto Women"]

[Text]

When historians pronounce their final judgments on the murkiest period in Pakistan's history (the phase of Zia's military dictatorship), they will be compelled to make some references to the courage and determination of two women: Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto, the widow and the daughter of Pakistan's only elected Prime Minister, who was judicially assassinated by the army. Pakistan was never a country where life was easy for women but every preceding decade appears now as a golden age. Under the present regime, life is a veritable hell for women. Islam is utilised as a cloak to stifle all politics, but the throttling of women's rights is the most blatant expression of barbarism. Women are second-class citizens, denied equality before the law and subjected to numerous indignities. In such conditions, the odyssey of Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto has truly been remarkable.

Nusrat Bhutto is an Iranian. She was always concerned with the social welfare of her gender, but was only peripherally interested in politics. As the wife of a cabinet minister during the late Fifties and Sixties (when Bhutto was a rising star in Ayub Khan's government), she performed her role to perfection, though there is little doubt that she found the social conventions stifling and claustrophobic. Life with Bhutto could not have been easy. His profligacy and philanderings were the source of never-ending gossip in Karachi and later Rawalpindi. During the Bhutto years, she never sought to interfere in politics, discouraged sycophancy and confined her efforts to improving the status of women, both within the Peoples Party and in society as a whole. I remember being shaken on a visit to Pakistan in 1976: the number of women employed in government offices amounted to a mini-revolution. It was obviously not simply a result of Nusrat Bhutto's influence, but she played a major part in the process. Not for nothing did the Jamaat-e-Islami ideologues denounce her at great length. The fact that she was an Iranian, did not cover her head, wore western clothes, etc., was denounced as a corrupting influence on Pakistani women. It was, of course, the exact opposite: an attempt to institutionalise for women a dignity and self-respect that was constantly denied to them in the name of religion.

When the army launched its *coup d'état* in July 1977 and soon after when it imprisoned Bhutto, then Nusrat came into her own. The 21 months of her husband's trial,

appeal and execution were sheer agony. No one would have held it against her if she had retired from the scene and started embroidering shawls as the fictional Rani Harappa in Salman Rushdie's *Shame*. Not for her the seclusion of Larkana or a privatised social existence at Clifton in Karachi. From the very beginning she threw herself into an incredible struggle to save her husband's life.

Once a Prime Minister's wife, she was now prepared to confront the authorities at every level. In December 1977, she went to attend a cricket Test match at the stadium in Lahore. The spectators were first thunderstruck and then pro-Bhutto chants were heard from the cheapest enclosures. The police waded in with their *lathis*. Begum Bhutto was struck several times on the head and had to be taken to hospital for immediate surgery. Here was a classic demonstration that the repressive arm of the state was ready to strike down anyone who resisted its decrees. The very same policemen were probably assigned to line the streets when the Bhuttos visited Lahore several months previous to this incident.

If the army had thought that a display of physical force would frighten Nusrat Bhutto, they were soon to be proved wrong. She was soon confronting the regime again. In desperation, the army placed her under house arrest, restricting her to one visit outside a week to see her incarcerated husband in Kot Lakhpat Jai's few miles outside Lahore. She challenged the army in the courts, but to no avail. When Bhutto was moved to the death-cell in Rawalpindi, she asked that she be transferred to that city as well. Her low blood pressure made a weekly flight from Lahore to Islamabad a painful affair and she often fainted on the journey. With the world's press following Bhutto's trial, the army agreed. Occasionally Nusrat Bhutto defied her jailers and spoke to the foreign press, refusing to conceal her disdain and contempt for the dictator. After every such interview she was subjected to further restrictions on her movements. In order to humiliate her, the army insisted that she would have to submit herself to a body search every time she went to see her condemned husband. Nusrat Bhutto was livid. She refused pointblank. If they persisted with their obscenities, she warned, then she would refuse to visit the prison and accuse them of denying the prisoner his rights. The army retreated and the visits continued.

Through this ordeal Nusrat was enormously strengthened by the presence of her daughter, Benazir, who had returned to Pakistan from Oxford and found herself arriving on the eve of the coup. Benazir was at that stage not seriously interested in politics. On the last occasion on which I had met her (during a debate at the Oxford Union, when she was president and I one of the guests), we had discussed Pakistan since I had just returned. It was January 1977. Benazir had said that her interests lay in becoming a diplomat, but her father was insisting that she enter politics. I urged her to resist, explaining that politics was not hereditary and she should do what she wanted. She knew that, but felt it was difficult to resist her father's overpowering will. She asked what I thought would happen in Pakistan. I replied, "Either Zab (Zulfikar Ali Bhutto) will be assassinated or there will be a coup." She agreed that assassination posed a problem, but refused to concede a possibility of a coup. "Zia is in our pocket," was her reply. I recall insisting that no general in Pakistan was in any civilian politician's pocket, but she was not convinced.

Then history intervened, unfortunately, in my favour, but also to settle Benazir's future. With her father in prison, confronting a death sentence, she joined her mother on the barricades (speaking figuratively). What she lacked in experience, she made up for in terms of

sheer audacity. She drew large crowds and so she, like her mother, became "a law and order problem." Her treatment was the same. Insulted and vilified by officialdom, physically punished by ignorant policemen, she was also confined to her home by special decree. The army feared these women, more than any politician of the Pakistan Peoples Party. They became a symbol to the populace. Their homes became prisons in the literal sense of the word, complete with a warden.

Benazir's friends at Oxford had, in the main, been upper-class twits, luminaries of OUCA (Oxford University Conservative Association), chinless wonders and the like. There is always a certain glamour attached to the daughter of a Prime Minister: hangers-on and toadies are never in short supply. Not all her friends were of this type. Some were sincere and loyal. One of them, Victoria Schofield, went out to Pakistan to help and is still totally immersed in a campaign to free Benazir. Benazir's OUCA links, no doubt, prompted the then leader of the opposition, a Mrs Thatcher, to invite her to tea at the House of Commons. Thatcher, let us recall, was the first Western leader to visit Zia after the execution of Bhutto! Another of her friends is now a senior leader-writer on the *Daily Telegraph*. This high Tory rag has yet to write an editorial on the lack of democratic rights in Pakistan, leave alone the plight of Benazir.

Benazir Bhutto has moved on since those times. Like her mother she has been through terrible traumas. She allowed herself one plea to Bhutto's jailers on her last visit to see him. She begged that she be allowed to embrace and kiss her father, given that this was the last time she would see him. The warders refused. Bhutto's death seems to have given his daughter a steel-like resolve. She refused to compromise. Her last public appearance was typical: she agreed to appear at the trial of Jam Saqi, an imprisoned Sindhi communist, and give evidence on his behalf. On that occasion she justified revolution against oppression and dictatorship. Her Clifton home in Karachi has been designated a sub-jail and she is confined there without any contact with the outside world. Despite these attempts to silence her and reduce her influence, she remains a potent symbol. She is the prisoner of a dictatorship, member of a sex that the generals want to keep suppressed and a Sindhi to boot. Democracy, gender, subjugated nationality; she is emblematic of three parallel struggles in one.

Nusrat Bhutto had become seriously ill. Treatment was only available in Europe. The regime delayed a long time before letting her out. Mrs Gandhi's intervention was decisive in this regard. It is a sign of the times that the Indian Prime Minister is extremely popular in Zia's Pakistan. If there were a poll, Indira Gandhi would easily outpace the Saudi royals, Qadhafi or anyone else. Her most recent statement against the killings in Sind has only enhanced this popularity. Nusrat Bhutto is presently in France, receiving an intensive radiation treatment that is debilitating in itself. She sees very few people and has so far not permitted any TV interview, though during the recent upheavals in Sind, she was under unremitting pressure from the BBC. One reason is, of course, that she is not well. But there is another and more important reality for her. She is a mother. Her daughter is still a prisoner of the Pakistan army. Given what they did to Qulfiqar Ali Bhutto, how can she have any illusions about their capacity to kill her daughter. So she remains silent. Her sons, Murtaza and Shahnawaz, were kicked out of Kabul

over a year ago. The Russians were negotiating a deal on Afghanistan with Zia at the time and the presence of the Bhutto boys was an obvious embarrassment. They packed their bags and went off to Damascus, with their Afghan brides and children. It would be most unnatural if they had not by now embraced their mother and wept together. This would be the first time that they would have seen her since the death of their father. I assume this meeting; I have no information. There are some questions which are not asked. Yet one hopes that they have met.

It is not necessary to agree with mother and daughter in every respect before expressing one's admiration. In Pakistan itself, many have remarked that if the male chieftains of the PPP had demonstrated the same unrelenting and single-minded pursuit of justice, our history might have taken a different course. Let's leave that aside for the moment and let's simply hope that deliverance is not far off. The Sindhi people have risen. What few have noted is that this is not just a manifestation in favour of democracy, but also the expression of a nationalist anger. Ask Zia how many Sindhi officers and soldiers there are in the so-called Sind regiment? How many police officers? If the reply is truthful then you will see why even the interior of Sind is up in arms. Gone is the old docility, the blind obedience to Pirs and in its place is a rising anger. It might be temporarily contained, but it will rise again. The two folk-heroines who will be most celebrated when the dictatorship falls will be Nusrat and Benazir Bhutto.

CSO: 4600/11

MINISTER TALKS ABOUT SPECIAL PLAN TO HELP SMALL FARMERS

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Sep 83 p 8

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Sept. 10: The supply of liberal credits, interest-free loans, extension of rural services, special programmes and the enhanced agricultural inputs including farm machinery is being assured for the small farmers during the Sixth Five Year Plan in order to manage and develop the agricultural sector on scientific and progressive lines. This was stated by Dr. Mahboobul Haq, the Deputy Chairman of the Planning Commission here today.

Talking to newsmen here Dr. Haq admitted that without a major breakthrough in this field the social objectives of the 6th Plan would never be achieved. He said according to the 1980 agricultural census there are three million small farms in the country which cover a total areas of 16 million acres, 33 per cent of the total cultivable land. Seventy five per cent of these farms, he said, were of twelve and half acres while the average size of these farms was not more than five acres.

The 6th Plan, he added, lays much emphasis on the development of these small farms and a special 5-point strategy has been evolved to offer special incentives to the small farmers. He said the government has already decided to give agricultural loans up to Rs. 20000.00 on personal surety while the production loans up to Rs. 6000.00 are being given as interest free loans. The Finance Minister he added, had already announced that from now onward the commercial banks in the country would accept the agriculture land a mortgage for advancing loans to the farmers. The limit of these loans, he said, would be constantly under revision and continued to be increased. He said so far the agricultural credits have continued to be increased. He said so far the agricultural credits have increased from Rs. 102 crore in 1979-80 to Rs. 230 crore in 1982-83 which is 37 per cent of the total agricultural loans amounting to Rs. 630 crore in 1982-83, compared to Rs. 290 crore in the year 1979-80. He said by the end of the Sixth Five Year Plan the amount of agricultural loans would be raised to Rs. 180 crores in 1987-88 from the current level of Rs. 630 crores. Half of the amount Rs. 900 crore, he said, would be allocated to the small farms.

The planning chief said during the current financial year, 5000 to 6000 small tractors will be imported under 25 million dollars Japanese loan. He said five tractor manufacturing plants have been directed to produce 20 to 30 horse

power tractors as demand for these is increasing tremendously. Agricultural Development Bank of Pakistan which secured 100 million dollars as credit from external sources, he said, had been asked to sanction loans to small farmers for the purchase of tractors.

Dr. Haq said the expanded rural services will be extended to small farmers, farm to market roads will be constructed and village electrification, carried on.

A special programme will be launched for the development of barani areas which constitutes the small farmers. He said a research and development project for the area, costing Rs 18 crore has been negotiated by the Pakistan Agricultural Research Council with the Canadian International Development Agency (CIDA).

The main element of the strategy Dr Haq said, was the establishment of agro-based industries particularly in the rural areas. He said the government would give incentives for the establishment of agro-based industries in the rural areas. This will help overcome the unemployment situation which constitutes 15 to 20 per cent in rural areas, he added.

CSO: 4600/02

CONDITIONS IN KARACHI SLUMS DESCRIBED

Karachi DAWN in English 9 Sep 83 Magazine p I

[Article by Habib Shahab]

[Text]

In appalling contrast to the affluence and extravagance of a few, nearly two million people live close to bare subsistence level in sub-human conditions in 362 Katchi Abadis (unauthorised settlements) in and around Karachi in small murky houses along narrow lanes filled with filth.

While the civic agencies call these unauthorised colonies "cancer spots", Mr Akhtar Hameed Khan, a well-known social worker, says they should be more appropriately called "volcanoes".

The biggest of these 362 "volcanoes" is Orangi, which has a population of 800,000. It has the good luck of Mr Akhtar Hameed Khan's attention since April 1980. The multi-disciplinary pilot project headed by him promotes a programme of low-cost lane sanitation, water-drilling, home schools with girl teachers, first aid centres, etc.

The average income of 80 per cent of households of six to seven persons in these settlements is Rs 500 in sharp contrast to the much-vaunted statistics of Pakistan's average household income of Rs 2,332. This income of Rs 500 for a household is too far below the poverty line. (In the United States, the income below poverty line for a household of four is 3,700 dollars.)

Sixteen per cent of these two million slum-dwellers are unemployed, 25% are self-employed, 27% are unskilled labourers, 12% are clerks and the remaining 20% are skilled workers.

The tragic irony of this metropolis, 22nd largest city in the world running 47% of the country's industries and holding 50% of the bank deposits, is that it has nearly as many huts and sub-standard houses as the well-build ones. Thirty-seven hospitals in urban Karachi provide only 6,500 hospital beds, one bed for nearly one thousand of population.

Private clinics, which serve the rich, have a roaring business. Many investors are turning to this field. A five hundred room doctors' plaza or a 500-bed private hospital is a highly profitable business proposition. After a slump in real estate and flat-houses, the builders have begun to pay attention to ailing profitable humanity!

Faces radiate anger

The existence of these slums assorts ill with the high sounding cliches one hears every day about our egalitarian objectives. Increasing disenchantment is lending a dangerous dimension to life in a city where problems of water, power, transport and medical aid are getting ever more acute. Life for the slum-dwellers is hard and brutish. One can often see distress and anger writ large on their faces.

The slums can erupt and prove right Mr Akhtar Hameed Khan's description of them as volcanoes. One is tempted here to refer a lecture he recently delivered at the Peshawar University. He recalled how during his 21 years stay in East Pakistan "he sadly and helplessly watched three strange phenomena — the incomprehension of the rulers, the corruption and breakdown of the political and administrative system, and the growing alienation of the Bengalis. It was like watching the inexorable and dreadful progress of cancer."

The economic uplift and social development of people living in poverty and squalor should be of fundamental and direct concern to society and the state. The persistence of these conditions can seriously disturb the stability and equanimity of society. Besides, their vast unutilised energies lying dormant should be harnessed in the service of the nation before they get addicted to indolence and fatalism. If this happens they will then rather languish in poverty than prosper in activity.

Social development is not only economic change but transformation of the human being, motivating and mobilising him for constructive thought and action.

Social justice

Social justice is central to Islam's concept of a welfare state.

It envisages a reasonable level of income for every one, specially the unemployed, the old and the sick, through state action and voluntary effort. The Holy Quran's emphasis on voluntary contributions for the uplift of the needy is reflected in verse 177, Surah 11: " .but righteous is he who believeth in Al-lah and the Last Day and the Angels and the scriptures and the Prophets; and giveth his wealth, for love of Him, to kinsfolk and to orphans and the needy and the wayfarer and to those who ask."

The Sind Government's Five Year plan envisions a strategy for carrying out improvements in Katchi Abadis by providing services such as water-supply, sewerage, building streets and circular roads, granting ownership rights to residents of houses, leasing out plots and making available soft loans to residents through the House Building Finance Corporation and banks for the building of houses. Under a Martial Law Regulation for development and improvement of Katchi Abadis, 238 settlements have already been surveyed and programmes adopted for their improvement.

The progress of these programmes should be carefully monitored and the residents of the shanty towns closely associated with their implementation. It is also desirable that the Orangi Pilot Project is adopted as a model in those settlements where people are willing to work towards community development on a self-help basis.

REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT BODY PLANNED

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Sep 83 p 1

[Article by Ashraf Hashmi]

[Text] ISLAMABAD, Sept. 10: The federal government is understood to have decided to set up a Regional Development Finance Corporation (RDFC) exclusively responsible for the industrialisation and investment in the less developed regions of the country which include NWFP Baluchistan, Northern Areas and Azad Kashmir.

The main function of the proposed corporation would be to extend financial assistance, support and facilities to the local entrepreneurs for encouraging them to set up industries in these regions.

The corporation to be established as a subsidiary of the National Development Finance Corporation (NDFC), though in the beginning will function only in NWFP, Baluchistan, Azad Kashmir and Northern Areas yet depending on its capability its operations may be extended to less developed areas of Punjab and Sind like Dera Ghazi Khan, Muzaffargarh, Mainwali, Tharparkar, Dadu and Tando.

Its capital, according to the concerned quarters, will be subscribed by the NDFC or raised with suitable participation by the Pakistan Banking Council. Assuming the authorised capital to be Rs. 100 million the NDFC may [words indistinct] per cent leaving the balance for the Banking Council or the commercial banks.

The new organisation, these quarters said, will also receive lines of credits in rupees as well as foreign exchange, negotiated on its behalf by NDFC or directly by itself. In addition, it will also utilise surplus funds raised through mobilising deposits.

The RDFC, it is further learnt, will be encouraged to break new grounds in investment. Thus the areas that are not strictly industrial such as hydel generation, plantation style agricultural activities (such as vegetable farming, fruit orchards, dairy farms etc) may get help from it to operate on commercial lines. A part from providing rupee capital the corporation will also provide foreign exchange as well as working capital and long-term financial assistance wherever required.

It will also be giving special attention to the development of minerals, and a separate mineral wing will be established in the corporation to deal exclusively with the financing of projects in mineral sector to meet its credit demands.

There will be no lending limit on the new organisation whose functions are proposed to be as follows:

[Passage indistinct] including acceptance of deposits special promotional efforts in the less developed areas identification of projects and parties for promotion of investment establishment of effective coordination with provincial governments to assistance to programmes for developing technical skills in less developed areas provision of financial assistance in the form of long term loans, working capital bridge financing and other short terms loans, taking special measures to develop and implement schemes for the disbursement of supervised credits in industry, minerals, transport and other such sectors. Financing of transport, specially in areas where industrial investment has been non-existent, e.g. Baluchistan; financing projects with the cooperation of Baluchistan Development Authority. Sarhad Development Authority, AKMIDC and other similar organisation that operate in the less-developed areas, acting as consortium leaders for financing projects in less developed areas; providing underwriting facilities assistance for mineral development in the form of loans which can be small as well as large; financing the construction of internal roads in mineral bearing areas which are normally left to the mine owners, financing the establishment of machinery pool for mine owners, to be set up independently or in association with banks and [line indistinct].

CSO: 4600/02

FORMER MINISTER SPEAKS OUT AGAINST REGIME

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 83 pp 1, 7

[Text]

LAHORE, Sept 14: Lt-Gen (retd) Fazl Ali Chishti, former chief of the Election Cell and a former Federal Minister, has said there is no administration in the country, and people want a change.

Speaking at the Lahore Press Club's programme 'Tajzia' today, he said that it was the duty of the chief executive of the country to attend to the needs of all federating units, and to ensure the exercise of basic civil and fundamental rights by people.

Gen Chishti said that with his professional background as director of research and development in the Pakistan army, chief of the Elections Cell, a corps commander and as a Federal Minister he was for the restoration of basic civil and fundamental rights of people and for the revival of democratic process in the country. "Where

there is a will, there is a way," Gen Chishti maintained.

Answering a question, he emphatically stated that the 1973 Constitution should be restored in its full and original spirit with Article Six.

He refuted an allegation that he was in "a pre-settled fight" (Noora Kushti) with the Government, and said that unfortunately this country had been a victim of "loyal leutnants", besides being a victim of "intellectual dishonesty" on the part of politicians.

Gen Chishti expressed his total disagreement with the August 12 formula and said Elections were nothing but transfer of power and as such (being a true Muslim and having faith in God) there should be no hesitation in announcing the date for them — to be held within the next three or four months.

"For God's sake walk out with grace and dignity...as a nation we are facing a crisis, we are in deep trouble, we should understand each other and we must compromise and revert to democratic process", said Gen Chisti when he was asked to comment on the present situation in Sind and elsewhere in the country.

He warned that Pakistan was an ideological State and the Hindus wanted to eliminate it, and if they felt that the custodians of its geographical boundaries had become weak, the country would be overrun by them.

The Muslims in India were now looking towards their brethren in Pakistan, and to restore the confidence of the Muslims in India it has high time to start and accomplish the process of accountability — "till today there is no accountability"— Gen Chisti added.

As an institution the Army

should be preserved, he said and disclosed that he had opposed the Army action in the former East Pakistan because to him — as director of research and development — military action was and is a wrong thing, and the only role of the armed forces was to defend the geographical frontiers of the country.

In his opinion, the former Head of the State, Gen Yahya, should have been hanged, as far as responsibilities of a military commander was concerned.

He disclosed a number of things and clarified others regarding July 5, 1977, takeover, Mr Bhutto's hanging, etc.

COMMENTARY PROBES MRD MOVEMENT, SIND SITUATION

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 83 p 9

[Article by Ghazi Salahuddin from the "Karachi Diary" Column: "Movement and Inertia"]

[Text]

WHY do people resort to violence? At what point do they realise, even if mistakenly, that all other means of resolving social conflicts are blocked? Is political violence inevitable in disequilibrated system protected largely through the threat or use of force? When do the oppressed, sleepy sections of population — the peasants and the rural women, for instance — become the ferment of history?

It is no use, it seems, taking these and similar questions to theoreticians who had considered themselves responsible for creating a revolutionary ideology. Simple facts that reflect the movement of life rather than the inertia of things have overtaken the idle talk of the ideologues. Winds of change have disturbed the dust of centuries enveloping the plains of Sind.

No, I am not attempting an explanation of the fateful confrontation that has developed in the small towns of Sind. That, as I said last week, is not possible without being specific. All that one can do is to shuttle the official handouts one more time.

It is like playing with a pack of cards in which the heart is not red and you cannot call a spade a spade. A number of people dying in a clash with the "law-enforcing

agencies" in the country can be accommodated in a single column. But people only hurt in a demonstration in a foreign land are found deserving of a banner headline.

Yet there is little doubt about what attracts our serious attention. The MRD movement has completed one month and entered another. More people who remain nameless and faceless have marched into the valley of death. More people have gone into prisons. More judgments have been pronounced in the Summary Military Courts. More headlines have assured us that there is really no political unrest in the country — or in Sind.

This was the week that the President "helicopter" to some towns in Sind, including Dadu and Badin. He found that except for a few pockets here and there, "the situation is quite satisfactory and pretty well under control". This he said in a news conference on Saturday in Hyderabad immediately after his visit to Dadu. The next day, he was in Badin.

On Monday, as the official handout said, five persons died when "law enforcing agencies" opened fire upon agitators in "self-defence" in Khairpur Nathan Shah, a town about twenty-five miles from Dadu. A goods train was fired at near Nawabshah and the engine driver was seriously hurt.

Last week, the Moro incident had prompted mystification. Eight policemen had died in that encounter. This week, Khairpur Nathan Shah demands understanding. What really did happen? What

are the ta... Why has the interior of Sind become so distant for Karachi which, come of think of it, is a integral part of the province?

I know many Karachites who feel genuinely concerned about the relative passivity of their city. Karachi, you know, had always considered itself the arbiter of Pakistan's political destiny. This is where the action has been. Remember the spring of 1977 and the winter of 1968-69?

Now, of course, as the Americans would say, it is a new ball game. There are reasons why Karachi faces the loss of its leadership role. The present struggle is not part of an attempt by the elite to restore equilibrium in a disturbed society. Along with the elite, Karachi must recognise its incompetence in dealing with the situation — unless the need to make nonviolent change possible is fully recognised.

Karachi is also being neutralised because the industrial labour in Pakistan is almost irrelevant in terms of movements for radical change. The organised industrial workers are small in number and as divided as the idle theoreticians. They are, in any case, prisoners of fringe benefits. They love to be bribed with concessions.

This does not mean that Karachi has lost its conscience. Its progressive intelligentsia is greatly disturbed and realises the danger that the Federation is confronted with. There was the statement by some former judges and a number of leading intellectuals to stress that to suppress the "just politico-economic and social rights of the people of Sind" was tantamount to endangering the very unity and solidarity of Pakistan.

The Karachi Branch of the Pakistan Medical Association also expressed serious concern over the sentence of flogging and underlined its physical and psychological consequences. I am aware of a statement being signed by doctors

which, besides objecting to flogging on sound medical grounds, expresses commitment to democracy.

But I do not know what to suggest to a friend who teaches history in a college and is eager to do something tangible to save his country from threats that he perceives as real. He was greatly agitated when I met him on Tuesday. He said he had not slept well for almost a week. Not being a man of action, he felt totally demobilised. One cannot hold meetings or write a pamphlet or even issue a statement without inviting trouble.

Take the case of three Lahore journalists who, as it was reported yesterday, were sacked from a National Press Trust newspaper for signing a statement which appealed to the people to play their historical role in the struggle for the restoration of democracy.

This sense of helplessness among the urban intelligentsia may be contrasted with the dramatic involvement of women in the small towns of Sind. Women have taken out processions in many places and in Hyderabad, they have been courted arrests. I was thinking of doing a separate column on the feminist ferment, which has been a major social development in Pakistan in the past two or three years. Rural women have provided a new dimension to this surge which symbolise the clash between the obscurantist and the progressive forces. But there is so much else that diverts my attention.

For the moment, we have to contend with problem of maintaining the integration of our country. The system is beyond doubt under great stress and not recognise this would be a folly. Let us play cricket by all means, if the weather in Bangalore allows it. But some crucial issues have to be faced and tackled in the countryside of Sind without being distracted by the Bangalore or any subsequent cricket matches.

REPORT PRESENTED TO ZIA REFUTES CLAIMS OF NORMALCY IN SIND

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 83 p 12

[Text]

Prof. Asadullah Bhutto presented a 38-page report to President Zia-ul-Haq on the current situation in Sind during the latter's visit to Sukkur last week.

According to Prof. Asadullah, he told the President that nothing would be far from the truth than to claim that "everything is in order or under control" in the province.

There has been uneasiness for a long time for a host of factors, including sense of deprivation, lack of representation in services, land management, he said and suggested that a high-level commission be set up to inquire into the injustices done to the people of Sind from time to time, to recommend and remedial measures together with future guarantees.

He thanked Sind Governor, Lt Gen S.M. Abbasi for stating on the floor of the Sind Provincial Council that there is an acute feeling of sense of deprivation among the

people of Sind.

He strongly advocated the policy of "forgiveness and large-heartedness" to tackle the present situation and said that repression, jail terms or flogging would make solution even more difficult.

Prof Asadullah said eyes of the world were on Pakistan, and the enemies of the country would not miss the slightest opportunity to cash in on internal weaknesses and chaos.

He said that to achieve the objective of national cohesion and unity it was necessary to find a solution, on the basis of justice and equity, through negotiations.

He called for immediate announcement of the general election schedule as a first step to create the desired conditions for a negotiated settlement.

The 38-page report which Prof. Asadullah presented to the President is entitled "Analysis of the Sind Situation and its Solutions".

CSO: 4600/03

NOORANI URGES POLITICAL SOLUTION OF CRISIS

Karachi DAWN in English 14 Sep 83 pp 1, 3

[Text]

Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani, President of the defunct Jamiat Ulema-i-Pakistan (JUP), yesterday urged the Government to seek a political solution to the political tangle.

On its part the JUP was willing, to sort out with the Government the modalities of peaceful transfer of power to the elected representatives of people, he said but insisted that the JUP-Government dialogue could take place only on the basis of a "mutually agreed" agenda, and that the ultimate outcome would rest on the "collective wisdom" of all the recognised political parties.

Maulana Noorani was talking informally to some newsmen at a luncheon meeting at his Saddar residence. Others present were Pir Syed Barakat Ahmad Shah, Maulana Abdus Sattar Khan Niazi and Prof. Shah Paridul Haq, Senior Vice-President, Secretary-General and Deputy Secretary-General respectively of the defunct JUP, and Soofi Ayaz Mohammad Khan, President, Sind JUP.

The JUP chief reaffirmed his party's support to the MRD movement, saying that restoration of democracy had also been the party's main plank.

Secretary-General Maulana Niazi intervened to add that since the JUP was equally committed to the enforcement of Nizam-i-Mustafa (Shariat-i-Mohammadi) a basic point non-existent in the MRD's founding declaration — the question of the JUP joining the

MRD did not arise.

Maulana Noorani rebutted allegations about the "Sindhu Desh" or any other separatist movement going on in Sind, but said the administration's "inept and provocative handling" of the situation had given an impetus to the parochial and ethnic trends.

He paid warm tributes to the sagacity and far-sightedness of Pir of Hala, Makhdoom Mohammad Zaman Talibul Maula, and Pir Pagaro in maintaining fraternal unity and brotherhood between the old and new Sindhis.

The Maulana referred to his latest meeting with Makhdoom Talibul Maula at Hala at the latter's invitation and said that discussions he and his party colleagues had with him were "frank and instructive." Persons like him stood in an enviable position to "sewage the "wounds" of the people, and Makhdoom services should, according to him, be secured, Maulana Noorani pointed out.

Maulana Niazi said the JUP Policy Committee had considered the programme of "direct action" in case the party's deadline of Sept. 30 expired without any response coming from the Government side. Starting from Oct. 1 next, the "direct action" may take the form of a "civil disobedience movement," or a call for "no taxation without representation," "resign from the Government services" or "suspend business, and court arrest."

He said contact was being

maintained with other defunct parties like Jamaat-i-Islami, Jamiat Ulema-i-Islam (Darkhawasti group), Ahle Hadith and the Khaksars. And whosoever desired to "go along with us will be welcome," he added.

However, Maulana Noorani corrected the impression by saying that it was they (above-mentioned parties) which had initiated a dialogue with the defunct JUP. Both he and Maulana Niazi said they did not believe in the Left and Right permutation, and their party was ready to cooperate with any of the parties which wanted the martial law to end, and believed in a democratic set-up and the enforcement of Nizam-i-Mustafa.

Maulana Noorani made it clear that his party's decision to hold talks with the Government aimed at "saving the country from the Government-people confrontation and bringing it back to the constitutional path." The Government should realise the gravity of the situation and act wisely in the supreme interest of national unity, security and solidarity," he emphasised.

Maulana Noorani made an impassioned plea for a change in the Government's "intolerant and repressive attitude", saying that the carding off of New Jatoi, excesses on political detenus and similar other harsh measures should be shunned to calm down the highly surcharged atmosphere.

FEDERAL COUNCIL COMMITTEE URGES EARLY ELECTIONS DIALOGUE WITH POLITICIANS

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 83 p 7

[Text]

LAHORE, Sept 14: The Coordination Committee of the Federal Council set up at Islamabad during the last session of the Council, at a meeting here called upon all patriotic political elements in the country to have a dialogue with the Government to evolve an agreed formula for the holding of elections in the light of the Aug. 12 announcement of President Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq.

The Coordination Committee comprising Federal Council members, Syed Moeenuddin, Convener, Mr Hamza (Punjab), Mr Ghulam Qadir Masori Bugti (Baluchistan), Prof. Mohammad Shafi (Sind) and Maulana Qazi Abdul Latif (NWFP), passed a resolution regretting the negative reaction to the President's announcement by some elements.

The resolution said the country could not afford postponement of elections any more and the politi-

cians realising their national obligations should have meaningful dialogue with the Government to arrive at a decision which made it possible to pave the way for holding of elections and peaceful transfer of power. The politicians should realise that election was not the only question at present to be solved, rather the more important issue because the nation wants peaceful transfer of power. That was possible only if all those who strongly believed in national solidarity sat together to achieve the objective of putting the country on road to constitutional path.

The Coordination Committee urged the Government to implement the programme for holding the general election after the local bodies elections in a way that enabled patriotic elements and parties having strong faith in the Islamic ideology to participate in the elections with full determination.—APP

CSO: 4600/03

JUP-MUSLIM LEAGUE ALLIANCE MAY BE REVIVED

Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 83 p 14

[Text]

The JUP-PML alliance, which has remained in cold storage for quite some time, may be revived with Pir Pagara aligning himself with Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani's call for a political solution to the political tangle, sources here say.

Pir Syed Barakat Ahmad Shah and Prof. Shah Faridul Haq, Senior Vice-President and Deputy Secretary-General, respectively, of the defunct Jamiat-Ulema-i-Pakistan who had an hour-long meeting with Pir Pagara on Tuesday, have stressed the need for a government initiative in this direction.

The JUP leaders have reportedly urged Pir Pagara to use his "good offices" with the Government to "break the deadlock" through conciliation with the politicians. They have delivered to him the JUP Council's resolution passed in

bore on Aug. 23 last, which fixed Sept. 30 as the deadline for the government to accept the demand for transfer of power through nationwide polls.

JUP sources say there is a possibility of Maulana Shah Ahmad Noorani meeting with Pir Pagara after Eid to firm up the understanding reached on the current political crisis and on the ways to have it resolved through a Government-politician dialogue.

Meanwhile, Mr Iqbal Haider, Acting Secretary-General of the MRD, had brushed aside any move to have talks with the Government as is being speculated in a section

Press.

"We of the MRD stand firm on our resolve to replace the Martial Law with a democratic regime. The MRD struggle will continue, and sacrifices given by people will not go in vain", he emphasised.

CSO: 4600/03

JUP VOWS ACTION IF DEMANDS NOT MET

Islamabad THE MUSLIM in English 11 Sep 83 p 3

[Article by Nusrat Javeed]

[Text] RAWALPINDI, Sept. 10: Malik Akbar Saqi, Gen. Secretary, defunct Jamaat-i-Ulma-i-Pakistan (Punjab) had said that no foreign hand is operating behind the movement launched by the defunct MRD. "It is direct result of the continuous denial of the human rights by the present regime for the last six years", he added. Saqi was addressing a Press conference at a village 40 kilo metres from here.

Earlier the administration blocked his and journalists' entry to a hotel where he was scheduled to address a Press conference. The journalists were later taken to a nearby village where he managed to address the Press.

The JUP leader said the present movement was not confined to Sind alone and it was wrong to call the activists as separatists. He claimed the movement was countrywide and it was gaining momentum all over the country.

In his strong worded statement he said, the present movement and disturbances were direct result of the situation which had prevailed in the country during last six years.

Malik Akbar said his party had presented five points. These points demand that all the political parties, including the defunct PPP should be invited to a round table conference where the government and politicians should chalk out a schedule for holding elections. He further said his party was against any amendments in the Constitution of 73 and was for the total freedom of the Press and abolition of the military courts. He also demanded that all the political leaders and the workers should be released before Eid.

He warned if these demands were not met till Sept. 30 his party would restore to the "Direct Action" against the present regime.

Answering questions, he claimed that if the round table conference was convened for the specific purpose of chalking out the election schedule the parties of the MRD would attend it.

He refuted the opinion that the statements of the Indian Prime Minister the 'foreign connections' of the movement were exposed. "If we can demand a representative government in Afghanistan, others could demand the same from us", he added. To another questioner he informed that regime was trying that political parties should be divided into 'religious" and "non-religious" parties. He made it clear that his party would not like to join any such alliance of the so-called religious parties which was aimed at supporting the present regime. He said his party stands for a broad based alliance of all the political parties of Pakistan for the purpose of restoring the democratic and constitutional process in the country. He said he and his party believed that the present movement should not be condemned because 'if the present movement is crushed, there will be no hope left for the restoration of the political process in the country.'

He reiterated that his party will never join any such alliance which would like to counter the present alliance of the defunct MRD. We could only think of having an alliance working on parallel grounds, he added.

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BENAZIR BHUTTO'S BOOK EXCERPTED

Calcutta SUNDAY in English 11-17 Sep 83 pp 14-21

[Article by Benazir Bhutto: "Zia, the fake Mussulman"]

[Text]

Gen. Zia-ul Haq has been using Islam as a cloak to oppress the people of Pakistan and to preserve and perpetuate the army rule, says Benazir Bhutto in this exclusive extract from her book, *Pakistan: The gathering storm*. Zulfikar Ali Bhutto's daughter, now heading the Pakistan Peoples Party, calls upon the people to fight this cynical exploitation of Islam and overthrow the government of Gen. Zia. The manuscript of this book was smuggled out of Pakistan by a member of the official party accompanying Gen. Zia during his visit to Delhi this year for the Non-Aligned Meet and is being published by Vikas Publishing House, Delhi.

The government of the country has to be run by the people; as far as possible decision-making processes have to give them an actual role to play their due part. No significant political action by the government, including law-making, should remain feasible which has not been actually deliberated upon and approved by the people throughout the country; means have to be found for popular consultation from time to time. For the rest, an elected parliament must continuously supervise, guide and control the government amidst free media's informed analyses and criticism.

The question of what Islam says on the matter of government and human rights, not that it is controversial, has to be settled finally by the people. Yes, by the people! Today a dictator continues to oppress people on the plea that he is enforcing (sic) Islam. This is obscenely impudent—towards God Almighty (who has unambiguously laid down in the Koran that he has appointed man, not merely all Muslims, as his viceroy on earth and all there is on this earth is for the benefit of humankind, with all the massive emphasis on human equality) and the people at large (whose rights Zia has destroyed).

Let the people prove through concrete action that God Almighty has not issued Gen. Mohammad Zia-ul Haq, Chief of Staff of the Pakistan Army, any direct secret order to overthrow an elected government, abolish parliament and popular bodies and parties, abolish peoples' rights as enshrined in the Constitution of the

Islamic Republic of Pakistan and impose his own (military) rule in place of an Islamic system on which all shades of Pakistani opinion had unanimously agreed. All such impertinences, now or in future, have to be stopped.

Let this be clearly understood. I am not suggesting that all that the government headed by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto did was ideal or that we do not have to move forward. That government was in power for a short time and during a period of much travail. It committed mistakes. But it put the question of what Islam has to say regarding social organisation beyond dispute.

The Constitution of April, 1973 (see box) has finally resolved this question. All the rest of the problem—and the people face many, beginning with intolerable living conditions—have to be tackled gradually by the people of Pakistan through their delegates, elected from time to time, in the light of experience, available skills and resources and opportunity.

God has not appointed this, or does not intend appointing any future dictator, to enforce (an ugly word for an uglier reality) Islam; between God and the people, indeed humanity as such, there are no third parties. What the commonality of predominantly Muslim people do democratically can only be true Islam.

There is no other social or political application of Islam, as the PPP and the United Democratic Front (UDF of 1973) and the even later Pakistan National Alliance (PNA of 1977) had repeatedly agreed; which meant that all schools of Pakistani opinion had agreed on what Islam implied (and had done all that could be done in an agreed manner without causing strife among the faithful).

General Zia-ul Haq never tires of claiming credit for Islamising the economy. Now, one says nothing about its doctrinal position. But what these measures have done to the economy, or promise to do, can be objectively assessed. All one can say about the doctrinal position of the various measures is just in the form of a few general remarks.

The measures themselves are just a few: (i) introduction of zakat and ushr (ii) starting a new window in commercial banks for deposits, and advances, on which no interest is given or charged; they are called Profit and Loss Account (PLS); (iii) the House Building Finance Corporation now makes its loans not for interest but on sharing the profit and loss on the basis of a complicated, if arbitrary, formula; (iv) one of the hundreds of state-owned corporations engaged in trading has been prohibited from obtaining any accommodation from a bank, on interest. It must obtain it on the PLS basis, for which a given ceiling, a 3.5 per cent mark-up on the sum advanced for nine days, has been arbitrarily imposed. This works out to 15 per cent per annum, quite close to the ruling 15 to 16 per cent interest the banks effectively charge on most advances.

While the Holy Koran does lay down the duty of paying zakat and ushr, there is no unanimity over whether the state can collect it. Islam has so many sects; several make the duty entirely individual and the Pakistan government had to make exceptions for certain sects; they may not pay the *Zia Cut*, as it has been irreverently dubbed.

The mode of its collection is also open to question; it is entirely arbitrary. On a given day, 2.5 per cent of all savings banks deposits—all interest-bearing—or the same percentage on the payable sums of the various small savings schemes—also all interest bearing—is deducted. Those declaring that their faith does not oblige them to pay zakat in this fashion may not pay. Those who have current accounts need not pay anything.

The Koranic injunction is for each individual to compute his own income and the tithe at the rate of 1/40th of the assets. This state-enforced collection is on just one form of asset—viz., deposits in savings banks, small saving schemes or other assets untouched. The collection and distribution among the poor widows, orphans, etc. till 30 June, 1982 was Rs. 9,160 million and Rs. 2,600 million respectively. Ushr collection and distribution have yet to take off; rules made for it, yet again, are bound to prove even more controversial.

Nothing much can be said about this so-called progress of Islamisation of the country's financial system. This admittedly small size of the PLS deposits can be argued as being a small beginning. But what needs to be pointed out and faced is that the entire monetised sector of the economy, from the monetary framework downward, including all government and public sector business, works on the basis of interest. The PLS returns do not come out of any inherently different set of activity. It is only the government organisations that borrow from, and repay, the advances, to the PLS (but wholly arbitrarily marked-up); there is no objective or rational basis available for such mark-ups.

The whole thing is a gimmick. All banks pay out these PLS profits regularly and they have always been more than ordinary interest rates. The banks have no conceivable basis for computing the profits; all the money that comes into them is put to the same overriding work: making more money by lending it to those thought to be safe bets. They lend mostly on interest. It is only one (powerful) borrower, the government, which says it will

return the money after a mark-up of its own choice. It is generally one or two percentage points less than the commercial lending rate. The banks can do pretty little, for, all of them are owned by that one borrower. The government forces the banks to give a higher mark-up, or so-called profits, to those pious individual depositors (who do not want interest) compared to those Mammon-loving depositors who want dirty interest!

The generals are constantly borrowing. All of it is on the promise of interest, in fact at variable interest rates that lenders can periodically change. They are integrating the Pakistan economy ever more closely into the world economy—all of which is interest-based. Is that the way to promote an interest-free economy? But more fundamentally, there is no sector of the Pakistan economy that is isolated from the infection of interest-bearing money, in which people can give money without actually knowing what benefit it will bring, if any, and people taking money on trust and returning an honest profit from an operation in which interest payment of receipt plays no part. There is no such sphere in existence, let alone separated and marked out. All the talk of PLS schemes is a fraud; these schemes simply do not exist. Some money is paid out by the banks as profit, because their masters in Islamabad order them to do so. That is all there is to it.

As for Islam's clear injunctions of completely prohibiting the *rba*, translated and understood variously as usury and interest, it is clear enough. So it is in Judaism and Christianity. The difficulty today is that these right-wing democracy-killers, in order to beg, borrow or steal a fig-leaf of legitimacy have hit upon enforcing (sic) Islam as the line of least resistance. I, my party, and every freedom-loving individual in the opposition acknowledge it as the ideal. We shall strive after due research of the facts of today's life and understanding the mechanism of honestly implementing it in the modern world. There is no point in not calling the spade of the Generals' fraud, the spade that it is.

Islam is not to be allowed to become a plaything for dictators. There are no short-cuts to Islamic verities and let no one impose one's nostrums on others. The economic teachings of Islam are for all Muslims. But the fact cannot be deemed that interpretations differ. About this there should be no haste or ignoring of the minority sects' views. Even non-Muslim minorities' rights should not be hurt. That is a prerequisite for making a start. Thoughtless haste can be dangerous for national unity. (Democratic governments in the past have implemented only those Islamic provisions over which there was consensus, both on what they meant and on how they were to be acted upon.) Let Pakistanis say, with one voice, that they will not let any dictator raise intellectual dust or play gimmicks in Islam's or patriotism's name to hide the ugly reality of ever-ruthless exploitation of the people by the landlord-bureaucratic-capitalist-imperialist combine.

We have a big fight ahead. For the paramount task today is breaking the strength of vested interests and throwing them out of power. Firepower of the army notwithstanding, Zia's military regime has to be consigned to the dustbin of history. The question is: how?

The united people of Pakistan are a tremendous force. It is only they who can smash the military dictatorship. But can they do it? Yes. They can. By uniting. Unity is always for a given objective and against a given force. And it is a function of the common action. It does not come about merely from listening fitfully to vague sermons and exhortations from someone who stands outside their struggle for their purposes. The people's unity can only result from the people acting upon a

Lost freedoms

Excerpts from Chapter One (Fundamental Rights) of the 1973 Constitution, now suspended

9. No person shall be deprived of liberty save in accordance with law.

10.—(1) No person who is arrested shall be detained in custody without being informed, as soon as may be, of the grounds for such arrest, nor shall he be denied the right to consult and be defended by a legal practitioner of his choice.

(2) Every person who is arrested and detained in custody shall be produced before a magistrate within a period of twenty-four hours of such arrest, excluding the time necessary for the journey from the place of arrest to the court of the nearest magistrate, and no such person shall be detained in custody beyond the said period without the authority of a magistrate.

(3) Nothing in clauses (1) and (2) shall apply to any person who is arrested or detained under any law providing for preventive detention.

(4) No law providing for preventive detention shall be made except to deal with persons acting in a manner prejudicial to the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, or external affairs of Pakistan, or public order, or the maintenance of supplies or services, and no such law shall authorise the detention of a period exceeding one month unless the appropriate Review Board has, after affording him an opportunity of being heard in person, reviewed his case and reported, before the expiration of the said period, that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention, and, if the detention is continued after the said period of one month, unless the appropriate Review Board has reviewed his case and reported, before the expiration of each period of three months, that there is, in its opinion, sufficient cause for such detention.

19. Every citizen shall have the right to freedom of speech and expression, and there shall be freedom of the press, subject to any reasonable restrictions imposed by law in the interest of the glory of Islam or the integrity, security or defence of Pakistan or any part thereof, friendly relations with foreign states, public order,

decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence.

20. Subject to law, public order and morality—

(a) every citizen shall have the right to profess, practise and propagate his religion; and

(b) every religious denomination and every sect thereof shall have the right to establish, maintain and manage its religious institutions.

21. No person shall be compelled to pay any special tax the proceeds of which are to be spent on the propagation or maintenance of any religion other than his own.

22.—(1) No person attending any educational institution shall be required to receive religious instruction, or take part in any religious ceremony, or attend religious worship, if such instruction, ceremony or worship relates to a religion other than his own.

(2) In respect of any religious institution, there shall be no discrimination against any community in the granting of exemption or concession in relation to taxation.

(3) Subject to law—

(a) no religious community or denomination shall be prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or denomination in any educational institution maintained wholly by that community or denomination; and

(b) no citizen shall be denied admission to any educational institution receiving aid from public revenues on the ground only of race, religion, caste or place of birth.

(4) Nothing in this Article shall prevent any public authority from making provision for the advancement of any socially or educationally backward class of citizens.

25. (1) All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law.

(2) There shall be no discrimination on the basis of sex alone.

(3) Nothing in this Article shall prevent the state from making any special provision for the protection of women and children.

common programme of action, designed to topple the military regime. The concept is simple enough. But there are a number of prerequisites.

First, there has to be a common (peoples) programme. This should be vitally related to the felt needs, yearnings and problems of the people. It has to be one which should instantly strike a chord in everybody's heart. This should be capable of uniting the intelligentsia (including all or most political parties in nominal opposition). It will be foolish to deny the influence of traditional opinion-makers, including recognised political leaders.

So a united front has to be evolved. But its anchor must remain the people through the working of the common programme. But a programme by itself can do nothing. There has to be first a leadership capable of leading a (fierce) struggle and second of (i) mobilising popular opinion, and (ii) organising people's action (power).

The Indo-Pakistan subcontinent's political culture presupposes intense popular participation in agitations, demonstrations, *hartals*, hunger strikes, marches, jail fillings and so forth. They are basically non-violent methods. Now, general strikes, *gheraos*, *morchas*, *bundhs*

and even *jalaos* are being employed. These are not violent means but approaching them at times. These are an effective and time-tested technique.

These are basically non-violent, no doubt. But their essence, the secret of their effectiveness, is not non-violence, contrary to popular misconception. It is the participation of the largest possible number of common people. The question of preferring for eschewing violence is thus secondary or even irrelevant.

The choice is not the freedom fighters'. It is the tyrants' behaviour that determines how non-violent popular movements can remain. Only morons or fascists prefer violence for its own sake. Fighters for humanity's rights and social justice, enjoying people's support, can only struggle through popular participation and action. In our case, they will adopt all means that will enable them to not merely cope with the Zia tyranny's prohibitions but to defeat and destroy it with the help of people's power.

Let no one waste time on the philosophical debate over ends and means. It will be pointless. The question has to be left to Zia and his henchmen. We shall be absolutely non-violent, if he will only let us. But our

precise means will be shaped by objective conditions. That, in the brass tacks, include mainly Zia's machinations. He will want to cow us down and will also employ force to crush the movement. And yet, we have to achieve our aims come what may. His reliance on the Pakistan army shall not cow us into total inactivity. If to be reduced to willing servitude through fear of the tyrant's guns was right, there would never have been any progress. Let Zia choose with which means he wants to be defeated: non-violent or violent.

Zia continues to harangue us nauseatingly on how he is enforcing Islam and goes on asserting that he has a heavenly mandate to enforce Islam (and thus go on ruling dictatorially). Of late he has also started making the astonishing claim that he enjoys popular support. Something has to be said about these snares, apart from amplifying the corollaries of the one-point programme.

Let us consider some of dictator Zia's claims. That God Almighty has directly asked him to set up an Islamic Civitas Dei is a lie. God has done no such thing. Islam says: He has appointed all human beings as His so many viceroys on earth. That is a prescription for absolute human equality.

It is everyone's duty and right to do what Islam has enjoined. There are no third parties between God and man in Islam; Zia has no *locus standi* to speak for either God or Islam. Zia has no right to thrust his own nostrums on all of us. For any individual to claim his right to stay in power because he is enforcing Islam is preempting other viceroys of God, or all human beings living in Pakistan, from doing what they think is their duty.

Let Zia and the military go and their democratic successors will be serving Islam more truly, because they will not be oppressing and exploiting others, and will come into or go out of power in accordance with other Pakistanis' wishes. Islam is no reason why a General should be tolerated for even one minute. Indeed, Islam enjoins the struggle against tyrants. Is Zia not a tyrant? Does his hypocrisy make him a representative figure? His mouthing Islamic slogans while ruling through a mercenary army's bayonets (Martial Law) is an insult to both Islam and the predominantly Muslim people of Pakistan.

His claim that the people have accepted his rule—or else the people should be on the streets—is a barefaced lie. Let him lift his Martial Law for even a day. He will know. Having said that, it is also true: it is not so much the army's guns that have protected him as much as lack of effective leadership that has prevented the people from conducting a proper struggle (in the streets).

Zia has the effrontery to talk of law. There is no legal framework, says he, for holding elections. I ask him: what legal framework did he have for treacherously seizing power in the wee hours of 5 July 1977? The Constitution he had sworn to defend and obey laid down that all army coups are acts of treason. The traitor now talks of law! How obscene! Let him know that free polls, no matter who holds them and no matter under what legal instrument, so long as the people vote freely, will do for us. The popular representatives that emerge from such an election shall look after all questions of law.

Zia knows, and all Pakistanis know, that he is talking of a legal framework for two reasons: first, it is an excuse for gaining time and not holding elections. Second, he wants to copy either Gen. Yahya Khan—the famous "Gen. Yahoo" who provoked a civil war by refusing to accept results of an election he had himself held, used the Pakistan armed forces to indulge in killing, destroying and raping the people of Pakistan and finally managed to lose the more populous half of the nation—

in laying down conditions for transfer of power to the elected Assembly, or Gen. Ayub Khan who gave his own constitution to serve his own ends. Yahoo had given in April 1970 an impossible sort of a Legal Framework Order (LFO) under which he held the 1970 elections in which, among other atrocious conditions, he reserved the right not to transfer power to popular representatives unless they did certain (nearly impossible) things to his satisfaction. Anyhow, the people rejected both Yahoo and Ayub.

Well, let Zia and his cohorts know that we do not expect them to hold elections of their own volition. If free elections are held, it will almost certainly be because the people will have forced them to accede to the demand. It is people's power that will ensure that they are held and that they are free. Real legality will flow from people's power, and through the people's act of freely voting. That central truth must be kept in focus.

When the 1973 Constitution was being made, everyone, from Premier Bhutto down to opposition backbenchers, was determined to make another military takeover impossible; they said so unanimously and wrote in the Constitution that another general guilty of subverting the democratic government shall be (under Section 6) tried for high treason (punishment of which will be death). Thus Zia sees a noose hanging loose, waiting for him.

Some of Zia's sycophants deplore the politics of violence; they think, say or imply that we of the PPP—who, like the entire spectrum of political leadership (except the regime's stooges), insist on restoring the 1973 Constitution in full—want to avenge the death of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto. It is a lie. No doubt that judicial murder was an outrage, a crime against humanity. I grieve for him—as an individual and as his daughter. But not everyone else in the country or in such a diverse opposition can be personally motivated.

The entire nation wants that Constitution to be restored, because that Constitution was the only one that a fully representative Assembly made. Even Zia was forced to admit repeatedly that it was the last hope of the country. If we do not bring back that Constitution, we shall be doing a disservice to the country. So thinks every other public-spirited person and says so. What if a noose also hangs thereby? If that will fit snugly around Zia's neck, so be it. It was designed, made and attached long before Zia was made the Army's Chief of Staff. Even so, hanging Zia is not the motivation, though he richly deserves it. If he is too anxious, let him act and come to us in a contrite frame of mind. Perhaps, some way can be found for sparing his life. For revenge is not our politics. But that particular reprieve must not cheat the law, which will, and must, take its course.

As for indulging in whatever politics is possible and relevant, let me say so firmly, formally and finally: We do not like violent politics. We prefer democratic means of protest—and elections. But if all constitutional avenues are blocked—as Zia has done these past six years—we shall not sit idle, as some others are doing. We shall do what is possible; that we will do the job, and in the most effective way.

Let there be no mistake about it. The choice is Zia's. Either he allows free electioneering, leading to free elections or he does not. In the latter case, he is challenging the people to come and overthrow him by defeating his army. If there is no choice, we shall pick up the gauntlet and fight.

I will be sorry. For, it will be a long and bloody struggle; many will have to sacrifice their life, limb and

property. But we shall not let the usurping generals go on plundering this fair land of ours. True, we shall grieve for Pakistanis killing Pakistanis—the soldiery too are our kith and kin. But patriotic and moral duty is duty. We shall not flinch from it. All I can say to Zia is: We do not ask for mercy and shall show none.

The philosophical debate of ends and means requires time and plenty of time—and no preoccupations. Here, we have a lot of work to do: it is to drive away the generals from seats of power. We shall not sit down indefinitely to discuss the finer points of political and ethical theory. We shall apply our minds to what is the most effective way of achieving what we have undertaken to do in the shortest time. As I have mentioned elsewhere also, to a large extent we are not free to adopt the means we like. They are being determined by the enemy.

The enemy insists that we fight. We shall fight to the bitter end. If he compels us to use violent means, we shall. Otherwise let him allow scope for peaceful means

of setting up a popular (democratic) government. The choice is really his.

Let me also say a word to our allies and allies-to-be on this subject. It is no use repeating *ad nauseam* that our preference is for peaceful ways of organising the people and to wage a struggle against the generals. We, the younger lot, shall not sit with folded hands, if Zia does not lift his hateful restriction. We shall do what we must to unseat him. We shall do so through popular action, not through terrorist activity.

This distinction is important. It is popular action we want not terrorism. But we are not Gandhians. Besides, Gandhi succeeded because his adversaries were shamefaced but as like the British, who were not entirely insensitive to the costs they paid for objectives they sought and were nimble-witted enough to settle for friendship with Congress-dominated India. Moreover, the Congress was the handmaid of Indian capitalists in cahoots with British capitalists which found it was profitable to compromise with British rule without

Thoughts of Benazir Bhutto

IMF

One would be less concerned with what the top people did if only the common people did not suffer. But the corruption at the top is only the visible tip of the gigantic iceberg with which the ordinary folks have to contend all the time. Their life has become a living hell; the rapacity of the state's smaller minions and the traders' exploitation of consumers always goes hand in hand—and it has now touched unbelievable limits.

Coupled with extensive unemployment—the exploitiveness of which is reduced by emigration to the Persian Gulf—the high prices have made the life of the common man an unmitigated misery. Even the small amount of industrialisation that had been achieved is at risk. The industrial sector is now beset with a leaping sickness: it is impossible to give the figures of capacity utilisation (or employment) for the simple reason that the government either does not release them or has no reporting system in place.

Despite this bleak backdrop, the Zia government has continued to pursue a free import policy—which has more or less helped kill local industry. It is an open secret that the military has to follow this policy because it is dictated by the IMF and the World Bank. The number of IMF and World Bank missions sitting in various official agencies for detailed monitoring at any given time is much too large for comfort. The fact is that the Pakistan military has mortgaged the country for a mess of pottage: for an uncertain quantity of military hardware. The result is that Pakistan's independence of action has been lost: most economic policies are now made for us in the IMF-IBRD offices in Washington.

Failure of the traditional political leadership

The traditional political leadership has, it is abundantly clear, failed the people in several ways. First, when people are deprived of all their rights, being ground down and ruthlessly exploited, the leaders are necessarily conspicuous by their absence;

they are busy writing books or memoirs or gossiping in their well-appointed drawing rooms.

Secondly, these leaders are bleating like lost sheep. 'Please, Sir, Gen Zia, listen...If you will not permit us to engage in the only kind of politics we know—the so-called constitutional or democratic politics of protest—the people will start listening to a new type of politician who can operate underground and who talks of revolution...we and you will soon become irrelevant.' And true enough, popular revolution will surely sweep away both Zia and his gentry.

Dynastic rule

We are pained at the government-orchestrated propaganda that we are desirous of keeping the party leadership within the family. We are supposed to want to establish dynastic rule over the country. I wish to formally repudiate any such designs. The Pakistan Peoples Party is a party of the poor and the underprivileged. It stands for social justice. Its main slogan is: *roti (bread), kapra (clothing) and makan (shelter)* for all, through a socialistic economy. The PPP's politics is democratic and its faith is Islam. Now, how can there be scope for a dynastic succession in such a party?

I wish to reiterate: none of us have ever dreamt of keeping the party leadership within the family or of investing the family with any extraordinary importance or function.

MRD

The PPP is under no illusions about the social face of most of the components of the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy (MRD). But, the present situation dictates a broad national front of all democratic forces: all who stand for people's right to determine their own future, and with it to deprive the army of any opportunity or power for imposing its will (and rule) over the people, should come together over minimum programme of sending the army back to where it belongs: the barracks. It has to be done by any and all means available.

Excerpts from *Pakistan: The gathering storm*

paying a high cost in blood and wealth. Our generals are neither so intelligent nor have they room for so much manoeuvre. They are now with their backs to the wall and mean to fight mindlessly.

To repeat: we do not love or prefer violence. But we shall flinch from nothing if it becomes essential in the ensuing fight for people's rights. We shall not sit and wait until Zia or his successor general lifts the restrictions. For the rest, we shall go along with the older political leadership—so long as they engage in the struggle. I promise sincerely to learn from their experience and wisdom in so far as they agree to act and lead the struggle. But not sit back at home and do nothing under high-sounding names.

Dictators love to be seen as dare devil great men; they strike a heroic pose. It is usually in the foreign-affairs field. Zia is acting true to type. He is playing brinkmanship with some finesse. The Russian intervention in Afghanistan has provided him a fine opportunity. He acts the champion of the anticommunist and Islam-loving Afghan freedom fighters (the Mujahideens) and, in collusion with the US, Saudi Arabia and Egypt, permits foreigners to give money, supplies, guns and explosives—and now anti-gunship rocket launchers—to the Mujahideens. He does so for gaining American goodwill support and economic and military aid, and has succeeded. This American support is vital for his staying in power.

But he does so in such a way that the Russians do not become overtly hostile. He keeps assuring them that he cannot stop the Americans and others from doing what they are doing because in the strip of tribal territory all along the actual border, his writ does not run. It is a lie, of course. Wherever the regime's vital interests are concerned, it acts as decisively in these areas as may be necessary; it has all the influence, organisation and force available in these areas. That they are still superficially autonomous is a relic of the Raj and serves many of the bureaucracy's purposes, including opportunities of institutionalised graft—and playing dirty tricks in Afghanistan.

Nevertheless, the pretence serves the purpose. The Russians, for their own ends choose to accept this fiction. For, they too can play at this game from the Afghanistan side of the border. And these Afghan tribesmen are very good at playing both sides of the street; traditionally, the same secret agent, during the nineteenth century, used to give the British the intelligence he thought they will like to hear and quite the opposite to the "other side." But for Zia to rely on this flimsy—and risky—strategem is foolhardy. However, he must strut on the international stage heroically. (He has already accepted three million refugees, who can cause no end of trouble.)

The full enormity of the military's crime in this interval exceeds anything known so far about others; even the patently-intensified exploitation does not cover their transgressions. Its cupidity has brought Pakistan back to square one: It has reopened all the problems that kept Pakistan disunited and unstable in all the first 25 years (before the civil war defeat and dismemberment in 1971). The country and its people face untold dangers from many sources and on many counts. What were those divisive issues? They were (i) ideology; (ii) the question of dividing powers and functions between the federation and units; (iii) the basis of representation in the federal Parliament; (iv) special powers of the head of state; and (v) strangely enough, foreign policy.

These issues have remained controversial through the life of united Pakistan—between 1947 and 1954, between independence and the assumption of total power by an ex-bureaucrat-dictator, though the three constitutional draft constitutions that were presented, and the third had been agreed to. But before its formal passage, the authoritarian head of state preempted it by a palace revolution because it threatened his own power and he was in cahoots with the army, bureaucracy and West Pakistan's aristocracy. This combination, to which captains of business, finance and industry were coopted, continues to provide the basis of dictatorial regimes to this day.

Another Assembly was, however, put together which made a constitution on the non-democratic basis of East Pakistan's 54 per cent population returning the same number of deputies as West Pakistan's 46 per cent in the new Parliament. The constitution, that gave extraordinary powers to the President, was, however, formally implemented. But it lasted just over 30 months. As soon as the government decided upon the date of holding the first general elections (February 1959), the head of state, with the Pakistan army's active assistance, staged yet another palace coup and destroyed every bit of constitutional order that had been so painfully rebuilt only three years earlier.

The Pakistan army soon decided it could operate on its own. Its chief ruled as the ex-officio President and the practice has been in vogue except for the Bhutto interregnum. He imposed a constitution of his own choice which was aptly called Martial Law in Mufti. It lasted six years before people rebelled. When that happened, the army put up its chief as another Chief Martial Law Administrator (CMLA)—President, Gen. Yahya Khan. The "Yahoo's" General ably led the country into civil war, defeat at India's hands, and dismemberment.

Bhutto picked up the shattered pieces and rebuilt Pakistan. How did he accomplish the task? Because he was the people's choice and had their active support. He asked and got the support of all elected (including right-wing) parties in settling those perennial issues of constitution-making through ordinary political give and take. The Permanent Constitution was made by the unanimous agreement of a democratically-elected Assembly. All political schools accepted it. The achievement was unique and even Zia is on record as having called it the last hope of Pakistan. He nevertheless subverted it and, in fact, tore it up.

The problems of 1947 are facing us again. One of the four provinces, the Punjab, is a permanent majority. Its population is 63 per cent of the country (as against the earlier 54 per cent permanent majority of East Pakistan). It is the richhest. It provides 75 per cent of the army and 85 per cent of senior civil bureaucracy. The Punjabis have now displaced the original trading, banking, industrial elites: they have bought up nearly all big non-nationalised industries and big business undertakings. The nationalised sector is also controlled mostly by Punjabi bureaucrats and all their orders, it is alleged, are placed on Punjabi firms.

The Punjabis occupy commanding heights of all professions and constitute most of the economic and political elites. A close-up of Zia's nominated Parliament (1982), the Majlis-i-Shoora, shows the physiognomy and interpenetration of our economic and political elites. It is also known that even in smuggling and drug trafficking, the ultimate financing and organising is said to be in Punjabi hands, for the most part, though not entirely.

This explains why One Unit—the creation of one province by suppressing all the four West Pakistan provinces in 1955 that lasted until 1969—was so universally hated in the smaller provinces (ethnic-linguistic minority areas) but so loved in the Punjab. Minority representatives were, and are, loud in condemning the Punjabi exploitation. They have always demanded, in exactly the same way as the Bengalis used to, full provincial autonomy. The Punjabi elite, as always still reply with emphasis on Islam, Pakistan ideology, Muslim nationalism or the Islamic system and say Islamic solidarity somehow demands more power to the centre (and not the other way around).

It is remarkable how right-wing parties claim to be strong in the Punjab and how they all make Islamic or Pakistan ideology—now called the the Islamic system—their stock-in-trade. Their politics has no other content; urban middle classes in the Punjab, except for the PPP supporters, like it. But this politics had no appeal in other provinces in East Pakistan before 1971 nor, after that, has it any appeal in Sind, the NWFP and Baluchistan. True, the NWFP and Baluchistan have also voted, in part, for one orthodox Islamic party, the JUI. But that is

a special case. While it is a genuinely orthodox religious party, its stance on the autonomy issue and land tenure system—land can belong only to those who actually till it with their own hands—are remarkably dissimilar to all other right-wing and religiously-oriented parties, and are akin to secular and leftist parties.

In simple words, the exploiters have used Islam as a cloak for their nefarious designs to go on looting the people. This is what Zia and his cohorts are doing. Their insistence on the Islamic system is a manoeuvre to preserve the social and economic *status quo* that will leave their privileges—and power—unaffected.

We have to fight this cynical exploitation of Islam. In a country which is 93 per cent Muslim, no democratic government can dream of making a law or do anything that will actually infringe Islamic precepts; no democratic politician can be so dim-witted as to propose anything against the people's religious susceptibilities. Islam can only be a non-issue in Pakistan. In any case, the 1973 Constitution embodies all the Islam that can be realistically written into a constitution. So much so, all orthodox religious parties still regard it as quite Islamic and adequate. Let us prevent Zia and other reactionaries from raising Islamic slogans.

Zia has to hold elections unconditionally and has to surrender power unconditionally. We are told he wants to escape punishment under section 6 of the 1973 Constitution; the "moderates" tell us, why prolong the people's agony, why not reduce it by credibly assuring him his security--that is in a manner that satisfies Zia. This is plausible. We are not thinking of revenge. On a matter of fundamental importance like the integrity of the Constitution no compromises on principles are possible. Besides it is not for any of us to decide Zia's fate; it will be for the next "free" Assembly to do so. For us to bind it to any course would be as wrong as for Zia to throw himself on the mercy of the Assembly and it will judge him by his concrete actions. If he and his colleagues behave, even from now onward and put no needless obstacles in the path of free elections to a sovereign Assembly, it might for all I know, take a lenient view of his transgressions. We in the PPP are not motivated by ideas of revenge but we do intend to follow Zia's accountability policy. For the rest, we shall re-establish the true rule of law.

CSO: 4600/11

BRIEFS

SERVICES OF NEWSMEN TERMINATED--LAHORE, Sept 13: The services of three working journalists from the National Press Trust (NPT) paper daily "Mashriq," in Lahore have been terminated. They included Mr. Aziz Mazhar, Assistant Editor, Mr. Aurengzeb, Sub-Editor, and Mr. Mumtaz Ahmad, Reporter. Their services have been terminated by the Chairman, NPT following a written note by the Chief Editor "Masriq" who has alleged that they had signed a statement regarding the existing situation in the country. The statement was signed by over 50 prominent poets, writers and intellectuals. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Sep 83 p 1]

WOMEN CENSURE FLOGGINGS--The Women Action Forum has expressed concern over the present situation in the country. In a Press release, the Forum criticised the punishment of flogging awarded to women and political persons. It endorsed the statement of the Pakistan Medical Association which has opposed flogging on medical and ethical grounds. The Forum also criticised manhandling and lathicharge on demonstrators and expressed sympathy with the families affected directly and indirectly by the present crisis.--PPI. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Sep 83 p 8]

GHAFFAR'S PLEA TO AUTHORITIES--PESHAWAR, Sept 13: Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan, now detained at the Kheski rest-house near Nowshera, has asked the authorities to shift him either to a prison or to some hospital as he has been undergoing a great mental torture because of isolation. He said he had no one even to talk to him. Conveying his request through a visitor, Abdul Rashid Sattar, Bacha Khan said that he might also be shifted to the place of her daughter-in-law, Begum Nasim Wali Khan. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Sep 83 p 12]

LOANS FOR WAPDA PROJECTS--ISLAMABAD, Sept 15: The British Government and World Bank will co-finance WAPDA's two projects namely, the Reservoir Maintenance Facilities Project (operation and maintenance of dams) and Drainage-IV, for which the British Government has agreed to provide pound 20 million as grant assistance. Notes to this effect were exchanged here. British aid to Pakistan since 1975 has been on grant basis. The total grant extended so far to Pakistan by the British Government amounts to pound 129.6 million, inclusive of the above grant of pound 20 million. Besides, a grant of pound 12.5 million for Tarbela Dam repairs and about pound 13.5 million grant for Afghan refugees has also been given. In addition, the outstanding balance from the past UK loans to Pakistan amounting to pound 76.426 million has also been converted

into grant. The notes were signed by the British Ambassador, Sir Oliver Forster, on behalf of his Government and Mr Ejaz Ahmad Naik, Secretary, Economic Affairs Division, on behalf of the Government of Pakistan.--APP [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 16 Sep 83 p 9]

CRITICISM OF GHAFFAR KHAN--Supporting the Indian foreign minister's statement, an Indian spokesman praised Ghaffar Khan and his close relationship with Indian leaders of the struggle for independence. This is the same gentleman who fought British colonialism but also opposed the establishment of Pakistan. He has never uttered one sentence in favor of Pakistan since its establishment. All he has talked about is his province. Even today, his sole desire is the establishment of Pakhtoonistan, or at least that the border province be called Pakhtoonistan. He has never really lived in Pakistan and has spent his time living in Afghanistan or traveling to India. With an attitude like that, why should Pakistanis respect this gentleman? How can we call him our leader when he has not even uttered one sentence in favor of our country? Khan Abdul Ghaffar Khan stayed in Afghanistan as he wished and now has moved to Pakistan. If the Indian people love him so much and if he so wishes, he is free to go to India. No one will stop him.

/Text/ [Karachi JANG in Urdu 2 Sep 83 p 3] 7997

BAN MAY BE LIFTED--LAHORE, Sept 13: The Provincial Minister for Local Bodies, Malik Allahyar Khan, has hinted that the ban on political parties may be lifted by the Government on a case-by-case basis, enabling them to launch their membership campaign and hold their elections. The issue was raised at the oath-taking ceremony of the newly-elected office-bearers of "The Mall Traders Association." After the formal speech at the function, he was asked how the political parties could start their membership or hold their organisational electoral elections when under martial law orders all of them were banned and were defunct. Malik Allahyar Khan said the Government was ready to allow the functioning of the defunct political parties if anyone of them applied to the Government for this purpose. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 14 Sep 83 p 1]

PRESS CURBS OPPOSED--The All-Pakistan Newspapers Society (APNS) has urged the authorities to exercise restraint and temperance in dealing with the Press. A resolution adopted at a meeting of the executive committee held in Karachi on Wednesday under the chairmanship of Mr Majid Nizami, President, APNS, reiterated that the use of advertisements and newsprint as levers were non-conducive to the development of a healthy environment for the national and regional Press to operate. It urged the authorities to exercise neutrality in the allocation of both advertisements and newsprint. Furthermore, while abhorring the institution of censorship, and pre-censorship in particular, the committee urged the national and regional Press to exercise caution and restraint while reporting events. Finally, the committee appealed to the Chief Martial Law Administrator, President Gen Mohammad Zia-ul-Haq, to review the situation with respect to the regional and national Press, and to instruct the relevant authorities to desist from using the above levers.--PPI. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 83 p 1]

CEMENT PRICE INCREASE SLATED--HYDERABAD, Sept 14: The President, Hyderabad Chamber of Commerce and Industry, Mr Mehboob Khan Ghouri, has criticised the increase in the price of cement by Rs one per bag exclusively in Sind. In a Press release issued here on Monday Mr. Ghouri said that it was really very sad that consumers in Sind were being made to pay more than their brethren in rest of Pakistan. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 83 p 4]

RUMOR DENIED--ISLAMABAD, Sept 14: Speculation in diplomatic circles here that Pakistan was considering to establish diplomatic relations with South Korea were denied by relevant quarters. South Korea has been allowed to set up a Consulate in Islamabad, while Pakistan has full diplomatic relations with DPRK (North Korea). Speculation was set off with increase in the tempo of relations with the South, especially after the Planning and Development Minister, Dr Mahbubul Haq, set South Korea as an example of economic development, followed by the firstever visit by a cultural troupe from Seoul to several cities of Pakistan. It is learnt that a small unofficial cultural delegation may visit South Korea in the near future. [Text] [Karachi DAWN in English 15 Sep 83 p 7]

CSO: 4600/03

SUN REPORTS EGYPTIAN SEIZURE OF ARMS

BK151142 Colombo SUN in English 9 Sep 83 p 1

[By Kenneth Amerasekera]

[Text] A cargo of arms consigned to Sri Lanka has been found on board a vessel passing through the Suez Canal.

Government MPs, 'SUN' learns, have been told that a full investigation is underway.

'SUN' learns that the discovery has been made by the Egyptian Government. The Sri Lanka Embassy in Cairo has been directed to make contact with the Egyptian Government and obtain all details. These include particulars of the party to whom the arms cargo was consigned and the country of origin.

This is the second time where arms and ammunition bound for a non-government source has been discovered.

Earlier the government flew Sri Lanka's first secretary in the embassy in Rome, A. H. Seneviratne, to Athens to meet Greek officials to obtain details on a report that a transport plane loaded with arms and ammunition was heading for Sri Lanka.

The report said that two West Germans, a pilot and a flying engineer, were sentenced to four years and one month imprisonment each on charges of illegal transport of arms and ammunition. The court found them guilty of illegally transporting through Greece 267 cases containing about 300,000 automatic rifle bullets and 400 automatic rockets without permission of the Greek Ministry of National Defence.

Witnesses for the prosecution told court the cases were found on board a transport plane which took off from East Berlin and landed at Salonika's Mirka Airport on 19 July. They also said flight plans were found indicating that the plane was heading for Sri Lanka.

'SUN' reliably learns that the consignment note for the arms and ammunition cargo on board this flight bore the name of a fictitious firm, care-of a GPO [General Post Office] number. Intelligence sleuths who checked on the post box number are learnt to have found that it belonged to a branch of a state owned bank. 'SUN' also learns that the government has sought the assistance of Interpol in this regard.

UAE PAPER ON WELSH MERCENARIES TRAINING TAMILS IN INDIA

GF081206 Dubayy KHALEEJ TIMES in English 8 Sep 83 p 5

[By correspondent]

[Text] Colombo--The Sri Lanka Government has asked India and the United Kingdom for information on reports in British newspapers that Sri Lankan Tamil youths are being trained in the South Indian state of Tamil Nadu by a Welsh mercenary to stage an armed invasion of Sri Lanka.

The government owned Ceylon DAILY NEWS, quoting the WESTERN MAIL newspaper of the UK, said that a band of mercenaries, recruited in South Wales, was training a Tamil army to fight for a separate state in Sri Lanka.

According to the Cardiff-based newspaper, about 20 mercenaries have been signed after a meeting in Cardiff and have spent the last two months in southern India preparing the secret army to fight the majority Sinhalese to form a Tamil state in Sri Lanka.

The WESTERN MAIL claimed to have interviewed a man named Luciano Liggeo, who said that he was behind the recruitment began after he was approached by Liggeo claims wealthy Indian Tamils.

Liggeo told the paper that his role in the whole operation was to train and equip the European mercenaries. He would not be doing any of the fighting himself.

Meanwhile, Sri Lanka Prime Minister Ranasinghe Premadasa, speaking of the ethnic problems between the majority Sinhalese and Tamil minority communities, warned that more than one country was interested in not only destroying the democratic system in Sri Lanka but were posing a threat to its freedom. He told parliament that jackals abroad were eyeing Sri Lanka which, he said, was a prize because of its strategic location in the Indian Ocean.

Tamil separatists on Monday night allegedly raided a northern court house and stole 30 shotguns. They have also warned families living in refugee camps not to have Ny truck [as printed] with the government of President Junius Jayewardene. The refugees, many of them public officials, have been warned not to go back to their jobs, mostly in Colombo.

Though the government continues to pay the officials and has invited them back to their jobs, indications are that many of them, at least 10,000 would prefer to remain in the north and retire prematurely.

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